P. Andrew Torrez

@andrewtorrez.bsky.social

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Practicing lawyer and cohost of the Law & Chaos podcast with @lizdye.bsky.social READ MY STUFF! lawandchaospod.com LISTEN TO MY STUFF! patreon.com/lawandchaospod he/him

And while it is true that President Trump had a legal right to bring a suit for the unlawful disclosure, any remedy would be circumscribed by the legal guardrails applicable to all litigants: the statute of limitations, naming the appropriate defendant, and pleading special recoverable damages. Notably, had President Trump (and his then-lawyers Alina Habba and Todd Blanche) brought this lawsuit in a timely fashion while he was a private citizen, this litigation understandably might have been resolved in a 109-day time span. But that is not what happened. Instead, President Trump did not pursue his claims until he once again occupied the White House and had appointed his former lawyer, and the former lawyer of persons who are putative beneficiaries of the “Anti-Weaponization Fund” to prominent positions in the DOJ. These officials then negotiated on behalf of the United States, with his current lawyers, including his former White House Counsel to reach a “settlement.” It is risible to suggest that there was ever adverseness between the Parties.
The gravamen of the “settlement agreement” is to fund claims premised on events including those arising from, inter alia, the Mar-a-Lago Documents Case and the events of January 6, 2021.46 Indeed, these two cases have been referenced as quintessential Anti-Weaponization and Lawfare claims.47 Instead of either recusing48 because of their previous representations or vigorously defending this lawsuit as required to do so by DOJ
While the Court appreciates that attorneys successfully transition between private practice and government service, such transitions do not absolve counsel of their ethical obligations. For example, Rule 11.1(c) of the Southern District of Florida Local Rules incorporates the Florida Bar’s rules of professional conduct as ethical standards. See S.D. Fla. L.R. 11.1(c) (“The standards of professional conduct shall include the current Rules Regulating the Florida Bar.”). As relevant here, Rule 4-1.11 of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar provides a conflict-of-interest rule which specifically governs former and current government officers and employees. The commentary to this rule explains, in relevant part, the following: This rule represents a balancing of interests. On the one hand, where the successive clients are a government agency and another client, public or private, the risk exists that power or discretion vested in that agency might be used for the special benefit of the other client. A lawyer should not be in a position where benefit to the other client might affect performance of the lawyer’s professional functions on behalf of the government. R. Regul. the Fla. Bar 4-1.11 (emphasis added).45 The spectre of that risk seems to be present here. 45 These principles, however, are not confined to Florida practitioners or Florida Bar rules. The attorneys involved in the negotiation and execution of the “settlement agreement” are governed by similar ethical standards in the states in which they are admitted to practice law. The Court may take judicial notice of those admissions. See Jackson v. United States, Nos. 12-cv-388, 20-cr-198, 2014 WL 5474132, at *12 n.6 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 2024) (taking judicial notice of attorney’s Florida bar membership status because attorney’s membership and status “can be readily and accurately determined from Florida Bar
In justifying the “unusual”36 settlement to resolve Plaintiffs’ claims, the DOJ and Acting Attorney General Blanche in a press release, and Acting Attorney General Blanche’s Congressional testimony respectively, cited Keepseagle v. Vilsack, 99-cv-03119, (D.D.C. 1999), as the “precedent” for the unprecedented establishment of the $1.776 billion dollar fund. However, Plaintiffs’ briefing is conspicuously silent as to this justification, making no mention of the Keepseagle case. Understandably so.37
Most relevant to the issue of control in this matter is Section 7 of the Executive Order which explicitly addresses President Trump’s ability to direct Defendants’ conduct in litigation. Section 7 begins by declaring, “The President and the Attorney General, subject to the President’s supervision and control, shall provide authoritative interpretations of law for the executive branch.” Id. (emphasis added). The Section continues by making clear that “The President and the Attorney General’s opinions on questions of law are controlling on all employees in the conduct of their official duties.”29 Id. (emphasis added). The following language further animates the Court’s concern as to adverseness in this matter: No employee of the executive branch acting in their official capacity may advance an interpretation of the law as the position of the United States that contravenes the President or the Attorney General’s opinion on a matter of law, including but not limited to the issuance of regulations, guidance, and positions advanced in litigation, unless authorized to do so by the President or in writing by the Attorney General. Id. (emphasis added).
There remain the initial amici—whose appearance was not contested by any Party—and the thirty-five former Federal Judges, whose briefing precipitated this Order. Accordingly, these amici, if they wish, may file, within fourteen (14) days of this Order, a memorandum regarding any appropriate reimbursement. Plaintiffs may file any response seven (7) days thereafter. Finally, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this Order to the State Bar of New York, of which Acting Attorney General Blanche is a member (No. 4192456), AND to the District of Columbia Bar, of which Associate Attorney General Woodward is a member (No. 997320), where disciplinary proceedings are currently ongoing.70
3. The Parties are prohibited from referring to the purported “settlement agreement,” or using, offering, admitting, or citing any of its provisions in any judicial, administrative, regulatory, arbitration, or any other official proceeding as evidence of a “settlement” reached in this matter, Case No. 26-cv-20609-KMW (S.D. Fla. 2026).63 “Plaintiffs” means the named Plaintiffs in this lawsuit: President Donald J. Trump, Donald J. Trump, Jr., Eric Trump, the Trump Organization, LLC and includes any of their agents, representatives, officers, directors, employees, partners, corporate agents, subsidiaries, affiliates, or any other person acting in concert with the party or under the party’s control, whether directly or indirectly. “Defendants” means the Internal Revenue Service and the United States Department of the Treasury.
Department—claiming Defendants caused Plaintiffs reputational and financial harm for which they now seek “at least $10,000.000,000.00.” (DE 1 ¶ 11; Id. at 26). At first glance, the Complaint seemingly satisfies Article III by establishing causes of action “arising under . . . the laws of the United States[.]” U.S. CONST. ART. III, § 2. However, closer examination reveals that a justiciable case or controversy is absent; Plaintiffs and Defendants are not adverse because one party controls this litigation. See Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 361 (noting that judicial power only extends to “actual controversies arising between adverse litigants[.]”). In reaching this conclusion, the Court determines that Plaintiffs improperly Page 17 of 56 Case 1:26-cv-20609-KMW Document 106 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2026 Page 18 of 56 employed this lawsuit to justify a particular award in this matter—access to taxpayer funds and exemption from audits and other investigations—which was accomplished by leveraging control over Defendants. a. There is No Case or Controversy Because One Party Controls This Litigation. President Trump is Chief of the Executive Branch, see U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 1 (the “Vesting Clause”), and the Vesting Clause is the bedrock of his authority over that branch of government. Id. Specifically, the Vesting Clause states that “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.” Id.; see also Free Enter. Fund
The Court understands that this puts Defendants in a bind because they are subject to two contradictory orders—one from this Court requiring them to include certain features in the SAVE system and one from Judge Sooknanan prohibiting them from doing so. One of the orders has to give, and not surprisingly, the Court is not persuaded by Defendants’ (and the amici’s) arguments that its order is the one that should give. This Court is not bound by Judge Sooknanan’s order, and with all due respect, the Court disagrees with the conclusions in that order. For example, with respect to the Social Security Act, even though 42 U.S.C. §405(c)(2)(C)(viii)(I) seemingly precludes the Social Security Administration (SSA) from disclosing SSNs to anyone, that statute does not preclude SSA from doing so in the immigration context because SSNs can provide information about citizenship and 8 U.S.C. §1373(a) expressly provides that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of Federal … law, a
The law specifies that sex is determined by biology. §§18–2–25d(a)(4), (b)(1). The legislature expressly found that prohibiting biological male participation in female sports is necessary to promote equal athletic opportunities for women and girls. See §§18–2–25d(a)(1), (3), (5). B. P. J. is a biological male who identifies as female. In third grade, B. P. J. socially transitioned and adopted a new name. Soon thereafter, B. P. J. took puberty blockers to prevent male puberty, and in sixth grade, B. P. J. also began to take hormones. Shortly after passage of the West Virginia law, as B. P. J. was about to enter sixth grade, B. P. J.’s middle school principal informed B. P. J.’s mother that B. P. J. could not participate on the girls’ cross-country and track-and-field teams. B. P. J. is now in high school, where the same policies apply.
3The dissent nevertheless insists that “[i]ndependence was centrally important to Congress in creating these agencies” and indeed that “[a]t no point was it proposed that a commission ought to be set up unless it be independent.” Post, at 36 (internal quotation marks omitted). To the extent that consideration is relevant, it is relevant only in the context of severability. In our prior cases, “when confronting a constitutional flaw in a statute” like the one before us, we have sought to limit “the solution to the problem,” severing the invalid removal provision “while leaving the remainder intact.” Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U. S. 477, 508 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U. S. 197, 233–238 (2020) (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J., joined by ALITO and KAVANAUGH, JJ.) (deeming a removal provision severable); id., at 296–297 (KAGAN, J., joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., concurring in judgment with respect to severability and dissenting in part) (same). If the dissent now disagrees with that approach, and believes that Congress generally “would have preferred no [agency] at all to [an agency] whose members are removable at will,” Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U. S., at 509, it is free to urge as much in a case in which the severability question is before us. In any event, the solution to “an Executive Branch that Congress never dreamed of establishing,” post, at 38 (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting), is not a headless fourth branch that the Framers never dreamed of establishing.
In sum, nothing in the text of the Constitution, as understood at the time of the founding by those who ratified it, suggests the illimitable removal power the Court today endorses. The majority can shut its eyes to this evidence and point back to its past mistakes as support for the new ones of today. See ante, at 20 (citing Seila Law and Free Enterprise Fund). To the extent “‘[o]riginal history’” is seen as “generally dispositive,” however, see United States v. Rahimi, 602 U. S. 680, 738 (2024) (BARRETT, J., concurring), this background should have prevented the Court from continuing to build on the uncertain foundation of a general rule of illimitable Presidential removal.
Even assuming that the Court is right on the merits, the issue warrants much more than a few paragraphs. As JUSTICE THOMAS points out, the differences between the Federal Reserve and our early national banks are more significant than the majority lets on. Ante, at 3–6, 27 (dissenting opinion); see also A. Bamzai & A. Nielson, Article II and the Federal Reserve, 109 Cornell L. Rev. 843, 905–908 (2024); L. Menand, The Unitary Executive and the Federal Reserve, 94 Ford. L. Rev. 2089, 2119–2121 (2026). And the Court’s holding is in serious tension with Trump v. Slaughter, which we also decide today. ___ U. S. ___ (2026). Slaughter announces a categorical rule: Whenever “an agency ‘executes’ a congressional mandate against private parties, it exercises executive power” and must be subject to plenary executive control—“no ifs, ands, or quasis about it.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 22). Yet here, the Court claims a special exception “‘sanctioned by history’” and based on the Federal Reserve’s role in setting monetary policy. Ante, at 24. How can history support both a categorical rule and a carveout? See Slaughter, ___ U. S., at ___ (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 46). Do all the Federal Reserve’s existing regulatory powers have the requisite connection to monetary policy? If not, are they grandfathered in?
Last August, for the first time in the Federal Reserve’s 111-year history, the President attempted to fire one of its Governors. A few weeks later, a federal court issued an injunction to prevent him from doing so. We decide whether that order should remain in effect pending the conclusion of litigation over the attempted removal. I A Our Nation’s first de facto central bank predates even our Constitution. Through the early years of the Revolutionary War, the Continental Congress had been forced to print so much money to finance the war that its currency had become all but worthless. See G. Wood, The American Revolution 145–147 (2002). (“Not worth a Continental,” as the saying goes.) “Duty . . . compells me,” General Washington wrote to Congress in 1780, to request some solution to “the great depreciation of the Money,” for fear of “mutiny” in the ranks. Letter from G. Washington to S. Huntington (May
We have repeatedly found that the President suffers irreparable harm when he is barred from firing a subordinate. See Trump v. Wilcox, 605 U. S. ___, ___ (2025) (slip
Even assuming that the Court is right on the merits, the issue warrants much more than a few paragraphs. As JUSTICE THOMAS points out, the differences between the Federal Reserve and our early national banks are more significant than the majority lets on. Ante, at 3–6, 27 (dissenting opinion); see also A. Bamzai & A. Nielson, Article II and the Federal Reserve, 109 Cornell L. Rev. 843, 905–908 (2024); L. Menand, The Unitary Executive and the Federal Reserve, 94 Ford. L. Rev. 2089, 2119–2121 (2026). And the Court’s holding is in serious tension with Trump v. Slaughter, which we also decide today. ___ U. S. ___ (2026). Slaughter announces a categorical rule: Whenever “an agency ‘executes’ a congressional mandate against private parties, it exercises executive power” and must be subject to plenary executive control—“no ifs, ands, or quasis about it.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 22). Yet here, the Court claims a special exception “‘sanctioned by history’” and based on the Federal Reserve’s role in setting monetary policy. Ante, at 24. How can history support both a categorical rule and a carveout? See Slaughter, ___ U. S., at ___ (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 46). Do all the Federal Reserve’s existing regulatory powers have the requisite connection to monetary policy? If not, are they grandfathered in?
Even assuming that the Court is right on the merits, the issue warrants much more than a few paragraphs. As JUSTICE THOMAS points out, the differences between the Federal Reserve and our early national banks are more significant than the majority lets on. Ante, at 3–6, 27 (dissenting opinion); see also A. Bamzai & A. Nielson, Article II and the Federal Reserve, 109 Cornell L. Rev. 843, 905–908 (2024); L. Menand, The Unitary Executive and the Federal Reserve, 94 Ford. L. Rev. 2089, 2119–2121 (2026). And the Court’s holding is in serious tension with Trump v. Slaughter, which we also decide today. ___ U. S. ___ (2026). Slaughter announces a categorical rule: Whenever “an agency ‘executes’ a congressional mandate against private parties, it exercises executive power” and must be subject to plenary executive control—“no ifs, ands, or quasis about it.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 22). Yet here, the Court claims a special exception “‘sanctioned by history’” and based on the Federal Reserve’s role in setting monetary policy. Ante, at 24. How can history support both a categorical rule and a carveout? See Slaughter, ___ U. S., at ___ (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 46). Do all the Federal Reserve’s existing regulatory powers have the requisite connection to monetary policy? If not, are they grandfathered in?
HHS Applauds FTC Action to Protect Children from Deceptive WPATH Guidelines WASHINGTON—JUNE 17, 2026—The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) today commended the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) decision to pursue legal action against the World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH) over alleged deceptive trade practices.“I commend Chairman Ferguson and the FTC for taking decisive action against WPATH,” said HHS Secretary Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. “Medical organizations must follow the science, disclose conflicts, and put patients first. Children deserve the highest standard of care, parents deserve honest information, and the American people deserve accountability.”The FTC’s action comes after growing scrutiny of the evidence base, guideline-development process, and conflict-of-interest practices surrounding influential organizations promoting sex-rejecting procedures. HHS’s Treatment for Pediatric Gender Dysphoria: Review of Evidence and Best Practices [PDF], released in November 2025, documented significant concerns regarding the development of WPATH’s Standards of Care Version 8 (SOC-8) clinical guidelines that have shaped so-called “pediatric gender medicine” in the United States and internationally.
The Supreme Court has held that a claim of vindictive prosecution is grounded in due process, namely that a defendant “may not be punished for exercising a protected statutory or constitutional right.” Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 372. Thus, the key function of the judiciary in this narrow realm of evaluating prosecutorial decision-making is to ensure that a defendant is not criminally charged “for the exercise of a protected right.” United States v. Mays, 738 F.2d 1188, 1190 (11th Cir. 1984) (emphasis in original). Supreme Court and circuit precedent makes clear that, in the context of a claim of vindictive prosecution, a “protected statutory or constitutional right,” means the exercise of a protected right during the course of litigation. For example, in Goodwin, the Supreme Court addressed the defendant’s claim of vindictive prosecution where the defendant was indicted and convicted of a felony after he requested a trial by jury on pending misdemeanor charges. 457 U.S. at 370. In Blackledge v. Perry, the Supreme Court considered a claim of vindictive prosecution where a felony indictment for assault issued after the defendant appealed for a trial de novo for a misdemeanor assault conviction based on the same conduct. 417 U.S. 21, 22-23, 28-29 (1974); see also Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 358 (holding no due process violation where the prosecutor indicted the defendant on a more serious charge after the defendant rejected a plea offer). Likewise, in Barner, the Eleventh Circuit addressed a defendant’s claim of vindictive prosecution where the superseding indictment adding additional charges was obtained after the defendant withdrew from his plea agreement and filed motions to suppress and dismiss. 441 F.3d at 131213, 1321.
A recent district court decision also addressed a defendant’s claim of vindictive prosecution for pre-prosecution speech and found that because defendant had presented sufficient evidence that the government’s justification to prosecute him was pretextual, he could seek discovery into the government’s true motives for pursuing the case. United States v. Carey, 816 F. Supp. 3d 129, 140, 144 (D.D.C. 2026). Carey pointed to two other federal circuits considering the same type of claim: United States v. Sanders, 211 F.3d 711 (2d Cir. 2000) and United States v. Bucci, 582 F.3d 108 (1st Cir. 2009). A court should consider a motion predicated on the government’s attempt to “deter people from exercising their rights” because “the law is especially concerned with chilling effects when it comes to free speech.” Carey, 816 F. Supp. 3d at 139 (citing Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486–87 (1965)); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
If a prosecutor’s charging decision “results from the defendant’s exercise of a protected legal right, as opposed to the prosecutor’s normal assessment of the social interests to be vindicated by the prosecution,” then it is an “improper ‘penalty’” on the defendant. United States v. Taylor, 749 F.2d 1511, 1514 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (citing United States v. Spence, 719 F.2d 358, 364 (11th Cir. 1983)). The vindictive prosecution doctrine aims to prevent the government from using the threat of a criminal prosecution to deter the exercise of constitutional rights. See Maddox v. Elzie, 238 F.3d 437, 446 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“the fear of prosecutorial vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a defendant’s exercise of a constitutional or statutory right”) (quotation marks and citations omitted) (citation modified).
The Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights Harmeet Dhillon, reported to be seeking the position of Attorney General,36 was interviewed on April 24, 2026, by Newsmax.37 She explained that the indictment of the SPLC is “personal” to her because she has seen “a lot of journalist friends . . . and groups that I’ve represented who have been targeted by the Southern Poverty Law Center.”
The fact that an entity or person has engaged in — or even is currently engaging in — First Amendment protected activities cannot immunize that entity or individual from criminal prosecution on unrelated matters. Under the expansive view in Carey (and under the defendant’s flawed logic), the best way for any entity or person to avoid criminal prosecution for any matter would be to openly and vigorously criticize the government or a prosecutor, even in a general manner. Then, any subsequent grand jury charge could be decried as vindictive because the defendant had previously exercised a First Amendment right, regardless of the weight of the evidence supporting the criminal charge. Such an approach would have a chilling effect on otherwise routine, lawful prosecutions. That is exactly why the general presumption of regularity exists, why the defense of vindictive prosecution is appropriately narrow, and why neither the Supreme Court nor the Eleventh Circuit has approved the expansive approach in Carey.
IV. The Record Confirms that Plaintiffs’ Claims Had Independent Merit, That the Parties Were Truly Adverse, and that There is No Evidence of Collusion. Even assuming arguendo that this Court has authority to entertain the Motion—which, as demonstrated above, it does not—Movants’ charges of collusion, deception, and fraud on the Court fail on their own terms. The record in this case refutes those charges. Plaintiffs’ claims rested on established statutory causes of action, the parties occupied inherently adversarial positions, and the decision to resolve the matter through settlement was rational and well within the government’s authority. Movants offer nothing but speculation to the contrary. With a search box that says "decept" and "2 of 2"
A. This Court Lacks Any Authority To Review the Parties’ Settlement. A district court has no roving authority to review or approve a settlement between private parties and the government in ordinary litigation; it does not pass on the wisdom, adequacy, or legality of a Rule 41 dismissal. Judicial approval of a settlement is the exception—reserved for discrete categories such as certified class actions (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)), derivative suits (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1(c)), and qui tam actions (31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1))—not the rule for ordinary litigation between the government and private parties. See Matthews v. Gaither, 902 F.2d 877, 880 (11th Cir. 1990) (a Rule 41(a)(1) dismissal is effective automatically and requires no judicial action or approval). Because this Court had no power to review the settlement here, there was no judicial act that could have been procured through deception. Also has a search box with "decept" and 1 of 2 highlighted
C. Movants Offer No Evidence of Collusion or Fraud. Stripped of rhetoric, Movants’ allegations of collusion rest entirely on inference and speculation. They point to the government’s litigation posture: the absence of filed appearances, the scope of the settlement, and the decision not to assert defenses that were available in parallel litigation. Based on these bare-bones assertions, they ask the Court to wrongly conclude that the entire case was a sham. But none of these facts, individually or collectively, constitute evidence of collusion, much less the clear and convincing evidence required to establish fraud on the court. See, e.g., Booker v. Dugger, 825 F.2d 281, 283–84 (11th Cir. 1987) (fraud on the court “must be established by clear and convincing evidence” and “conclusory averments” do not suffice). The Government’s decision not to raise every available defense is a litigation judgment, not a badge of fraud. Defendants in civil cases routinely elect not to contest certain claims for strategic, economic, or institutional reasons, including the entirely rational conclusion that the cost of defense exceeds the cost of settlement. The fact that the IRS may have identified viable defenses in internal memoranda does not mean it was obligated to assert them, and the decision not to do so does not give rise to an inference of collusion. Movants cite no authority whatsoever, and Plaintiffs are aware of none, holding that a defendant’s decision to settle rather than litigate available defenses constitutes fraud on the court. In sum, the Movants’ position amounts to the assertion that because they disagree with the government’s decision to settle, the settlement must have been collusive. That is not a legal standard. It is a policy objection dressed as a fraud claim, and it does not warrant the extraordinary remedy of reopening a closed case, which, in any event, this Court does not have the power to do.
B. The Parties Were Truly Adverse. Movants’ suggestion that the parties were not truly adverse is contradicted by the nature of the claims, the identity of the parties, and the posture of the litigation. Three of the four Plaintiffs— Donald J. Trump Jr., Eric Trump, and The Trump Organization, LLC—are private citizens and a private entity, respectively. They are not officers or employees of the federal government. They brought suit against federal agencies for the unauthorized disclosure of their confidential tax information. That posture, wherein private plaintiffs sue the United States for statutory violations, is inherently adversarial.
17 Case 1:26-cv-20609-KMW Document 89 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/12/2026 Page 18 of 22 IV. The Record Confirms that Plaintiffs’ Claims Had Independent Merit, That the Parties Were Truly Adverse, and that There is No Evidence of Collusion. Even assuming arguendo that this Court has authority to entertain the Motion—which, as demonstrated above, it does not—Movants’ charges of collusion, deception, and fraud on the Court fail on their own terms. The record in this case refutes those charges. Plaintiffs’ claims rested on established statutory causes of action, the parties occupied inherently adversarial positions, and the decision to resolve the matter through settlement was rational and well within the government’s authority. Movants offer nothing but speculation to the contrary.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiffs shall file a response to the Motion (DE 63) on or before June 12, 2026, detailing their position on the matters set forth in the Motion, including (1) the charges of collusion and whether the Parties are truly adverse; (2) the assertion that the dismissal in this case was premised on deception by the Parties; and (3) the question of whether the case should be reopened because the Court was the “victim of a fraud.” (DE 63 at 13, citing 11 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2870 (3d ed.)). The non-party movants may, if they choose, file a reply on or before June 19, 2026.
In sum, the allegedly moot decision creates no precedential effect and no preclusive effect beyond the parties. One could conceivably concoct some scenarios in which it could produce preclusion between the parties, but it takes some cockeyed speculation. Even that possibility is not necessarily an argument for vacatur when the party that lost unilaterally mooted the case. To say that the Court’s decision might affect future litigation between the Board and the Government is to say that the Board might keep the benefit of a decision that it won.
The Government’s response to that ruling has vacillated. Shortly after the Court released its decision, the Government filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which this Court denied. See ECF Nos. 21 (Mot. Recons.); 33 (Mem. Op.). U.S. Attorney Jeanine Pirro meanwhile vowed, “[T]his outrageous decision will be appealed by the United States Department of Justice.” AP, US Attorney Pirro to Appeal Judge’s Ruling Against Fed Subpoenas (Mar. 13, 2026), https://bit.ly/4epmZ3R (video at 1:15–22). No appeal followed. Yet the Government’s investigation pressed on. On April 14, prosecutors showed up at the site of the renovations that they were probing. See Matt Peterson, Jeanine Pirro Pursues Fed Pressure While Clock Ticks on Her Appeal in Powell Probe, CNBC (Apr. 15, 2026), https://perma.cc/YY4T-SS54. On April 22, Pirro once again declared, “I am going forward. We are appealing the decision of Judge Boasberg.” Kevin Breuninger, Pirro Says DOJ Won’t Drop Fed Probe, Will Appeal Judge’s Order Blocking Powell Subpoenas, CNBC (Apr. 22, 2026), https://perma.cc/9JL5-89D8. “We have to find out why” the Board’s renovations went so far over budget, she explained. Id.
II. Case 1:26-mc-00012-JEB Document 43 Filed 06/11/26 Page 4 of 11 Analysis The Government’s request is curious. This Court cannot decide whether a hypothetical appeal would be moot. That question can be answered only by the Court of Appeals when (or if) the Government challenges its loss here through the ordinary appellate process. Yet the Government has never even tried appealing. Cf. Samma v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 136 F.4th 1108, 1112, 1114–15 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (Government appealing loss and arguing that appeal is not moot). While this Court cannot answer the question on behalf of the Circuit, it seems far from clear that an appeal would be moot. Still, because the parties both agree that it would be, see Mot. at 9; ECF No. 36 (Opp.) at 1, the Court takes them at their word and asks whether — if they are right — that would justify vacating its decision. The Court first tackles what standard governs the Motion, then applies it to this case.
FINAL JUDGMENT 1:21-CV-565-RP A jury trial was held in this matter from September 9, 2024, through September 23, 2024. On September 23, 2024, the jury returned a verdict on three claims asserted by Plaintiffs Wendy Davis, David Gins, and Timothy Holloway (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) against Defendants Eliazar Cisneros, Randi Ceh, Steve Ceh, Joeylynn Mesaros, Robert Mesaros, and Dolores Park (collectively, “Defendants”). (Verdict, Dkt. 557). The jury found Defendant Eliazar Cisneros (“Cisneros”) liable for engaging in a conspiracy in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) but not liable for civil conspiracy or civil assault under Texas law. The jury awarded $0.00 in compensatory damages to Plaintiff Wendy Davis, $0.00 in compensatory damages to Plaintiff David Gins, and $10,000.00 in compensatory damages to Plaintiff Timothy Holloway. (Id.). The jury also found that $30,000 in punitive damages should be assessed against Cisneros. (Id.). Finally, the jury found the other Defendants—Randi Ceh, Steve Ceh, Joeylynn Mesaros, Robert Mesaros, and Dolores Park—not liable on all claims. (Id.).
COUNT III (Claim Against Defendants and John/Jane Does for Civil Assault) 148. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 149. Plaintiffs bring a claim of civil assault, the elements of which mirror the elements of criminal assault. Sanchez v. Striever, 614 S.W.3d 233, 239 (Tex. Ct. App. 2020) (citing Loaisiga v. Cerda, 379 S.W.3d 248, 256 (Tex. 2012)). A defendant commits assault when he or she “(1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another […]; (2) intentionally or knowingly threatens another with imminent bodily injury […]; or (3) intentionally or knowingly causes physical contact with another when he or she knows or should reasonably believe that the other will regard the contact as offensive or provocative.” Tex. Penal Code § 22.01(a). Under the Texas Penal Code, “[a] person is […] liable for an offense committed by the conduct of another if […] acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense[.]” Tex. Penal Code § 7.02(a).
(3)Depriving persons of rights or privileges If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
INTRODUCTION On October 30, 2020, dozens of individuals in at least forty vehicles bearing flags exalting then-President and Presidential Candidate Donald J. Trump formed a self-labeled vehicular “Trump Train” on Texas’s main highway with the express purpose of terrorizing and intimidating a group based on that group’s political viewpoints, including their support for a different presidential campaign. The goal of this effort was to intimidate supporters of thenDemocratic Presidential and Vice Presidential Candidates Joseph R. Biden and Kamala Harris, and to stop those supporters from speaking and acting freely in support of the candidate of their choice in Texas. 2. That day—the last day of early voting for the presidential election in Texas— supporters of the Biden-Harris Campaign intended to campaign at various political events across central Texas. The participants in the Trump Train deliberately upended those plans. The Trump Train vehicles surrounded the Biden-Harris Campaign bus on the highway, forced it to slow down to a crawl, came within inches of the bus, and, as one of the drivers later bragged, “slamm[ed]” into a staffer’s follow car. Those on the bus feared injury or for their lives. All suffered lingering trauma in the days and months thereafter.
photo of truck about to ram an SUV
Now, this was a case -- and you can see it here -- surrounding a bus with about a hundred cars in the interstate and attempting to control its movements by physically blocking with their vehicles and driving dangerously, could reasonably constitute force.
screenshot of Kat Abughuzaleh's X post about the Broadview protest
Now, we are not saying that you need to 2 3 4 5 • find that it rose to this level of seriousness, but the point is, in this case out of the Western District of Texas, what the court says, the vehicles Page 15 surrounded another vehicle and physically blocked it 09:35:43 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 and stopped it from going forward. That, in that case, constituted force, intimidation, or threat. What this case also says is, and this a direct quote above: The most commonly understood dictionary definition of intimidate is to place a person in fear. Now, as you're going to hear from Agent A in a little bit, you're going to find out that he was in fear for his own life and safety because of the actions of the co-conspirators. Does anybody have any questions about this portion of the statute? Okay.
Okay. So next I'm going to put up here the next question: What is force, intimidation, or threat? So this, this case that I have referenced here out of the Western District of Texas is for a comparable statute. This is a criminal statute that we are charging here, but there is a civil statute that is more or less the identical language that also has this force, intimidation, or threat language. Now, this was a case -- and you can see it here -- surrounding a bus with about a hundred cars in the interstate and attempting to control its movements by physically blocking with their vehicles and driving dangerously, could reasonably constitute force.
Section 372 is not a content based or viewpoint regulation of speech or expressive conduct. The Ninth Circuit has held that § 372 is not impermissibly vague as applied to a defendant who filed false UCC forms, and issued an illegitimate arrest warrant directed to a United States bankruptcy judge. United States v. Fulbright, 105 F.3d 443, 452 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2007). In Fulbright, the defendant claimed that the statutes of conviction, §§ 372 and 1503, were unconstitutional as applied to his conduct. The defendant filed UCC forms and an illegitimate arrest warrant directed to the bankruptcy judge presiding over his bankruptcy proceeding. He claimed that filing these documents could not constitute force or threat or intimidation within the meaning of § 372. However, the Ninth Circuit rejected these arguments finding "it is the nature of these documents, not the simple act of filing them, that brings them within the statutes' purview." Id. The Fulbright court found that filing a false UCC form and issuing an illegitimate arrest warrant is prohibited and the statutes were not impermissibly vague as applied. The Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant's contention the § 372 was an overbroad content and viewpoint regulation in violation of the First Amendment. Id. The court found that the government has a legitimate interest in preventing the intimidation of public officials, that the statute did not punish filing authorized court documents, and therefore did not implicate a legitimate free speech interest. Id.
100. On the form, Batman explained why the requirement that he be physically present at headquarters during the month of June violates his sincere religious convictions: The flag has six colored stripes which stand for various expressions of sexuality that are sinful according to my religion. Being forced to participate in the County’s celebration of sinful sexuality by working under this flag and being forced to look at it in order to come to work violates my religious beliefs.
I am also providing you with the Workers’ Compensation paperwork along with the brochure for the County’s Employee Assistance Program (EAP) to address your comment related to mental stresses associated with the image presented by the pride flag. The EAP offers confidential professional help at no cost to County staff.  If you believe the condition is work-related and want to receive medical treatment, please let me know as soon as possible. You will need to download and complete the DPW Workers' Compensation Packets at EmployeePacket12-2013.pdf AND SupervisorPacket 10-2022.pdf . (If you are u nable to openthe links,please u se the attached P DFpackets)  If you do not want to receive medical treatment, please download and complete the Declination of Medical Treatment paperwork at Declina on Packet 01-2014.pdf The packet requires both your and my information for completion. Please submit the completed packet to the Ricardo Castaneda of the DMC Unit as soon as possible. Let me know if you have any questions. Sami Kabar Principal Engineer Los Angeles County Public Works Office: (626) 458-6104 Mobile: (626) 476-2056
remotely not just on Monday’s, but every day during the timeframe that the flag is displayed at Public Works headquarters building (i.e., the month of June) so that I can continue to perform at a high level and not have to deal with the undue additional mental stresses associated with the image presented by the pride flag. Please note, last year I teleworked for the entire month of June and there was no impact to my performance or the overall operations of my Section. In fact, the ratings for my Performance Evaluation for last year, which included the time I teleworked for the entire month of June 2023, were the highest ratings thus far in my current position as a Senior Civil Engineer. Due to next week being the first working week in June, and with the expectation that the pride flag will be added to the flag pole at Public Works headquarters building, time is of the essence in processing this accommodation request to telework once again this year during the month of June. Thank you, Eric Batman, P.E. Senior Civil Engineer Los Angeles County Public Works
Afternoon Sami, This email is a follow-up to our discussion on Tuesday, May 28, 2024, during which I verbally requested an accommodation for the month of June 2024. Currently, I telework one day a week (typically on Monday’s), and report to Public Works’ headquarters building the remaining three days a week. My understanding is that the County plans on flying the pride flag at all County buildings during the month of June, including the Public Works headquarters building, which I currently report to three days a week. The flag pole at Public Works headquarters building is located prominently at the front of the building near the main entrance, which is the entrance I use when I enter the building during the days that I report to the office. The pride flag represents and conveys a message along with an ideology that is in direct opposition to my deeply held religious beliefs and is therefore highly offensive. While the pride flag is flown in June, each morning I would be subjected to its message and ideology immediately when I first entered the building, each time I exited and then re-entered the building for a short walk during pre-determined break periods, each time I exited and then re-entered the building at lunch, and finally when I exited the building to go home each evening. Being exposed to this symbol displayed in such a highly visible location at Public Works headquarters building multiple times throughout each working day would negatively impact my ability perform my work and would result in a hostile work environment. Therefore, I am requesting an accommodation to work remotely not just on Monday’s, but every day during the timeframe that the flag is displayed at Public Works headquarters building (i.e., the month of June) so that I can continue to perform at a high level and not have to deal with the undue additional mental stresses associated with the image presented by the pride flag. Please note, last year I teleworked for the entire month of June and…
LA to Christians: You’re Mentally Ill May 30, 2026 Los Angeles denies Christians the same religious exemption given to Muslims When Eric Batman asked for a. religious accommodation from mandatory LGBTQ “Pride” initiatives, the County of Los Angeles told him to get counseling, effectively declaring his Christian beliefs to be a mental illness. Liberty Counsel is suing Los Angeles on Eric’s behalf. Don’t let Los Angeles treat Christianity as a mental illness! Support our legal fund today and a special Challenge Grant will DOUBLE the impact of your donation!
“Inevitably,” Alito told the 5th Circuit’s judicial conference in May, according to SCOTUSblog, he has “a tentative idea” of how a case will turn out before arguments.
Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson, in particular, are among the most loquacious. Sotomayor, the court’s senior liberal, spoke on average more than six minutes during arguments in the current term, according to an analysis by Adam Feldman, founder of Empirical SCOTUS, and Jake Truscott, a political science professor at the University of Florida.
10 The same is true with respect to Defendants’ assertion that the injunction “threatens CBP’s ongoing efforts to effectuate the Supreme Court’s decision” in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 146 S. Ct. 628 (2025), by diverting resources from the refund process for tariffs imposed pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”). Defs.’ Mot. at 11. That argument posits that the court should grant Defendants relief because CBP is busy setting up a system to refund another set of unlawful tariffs. Defendants disregard the harm to importers that have been required to pay both sets of unlawful duties, only to wait months for a refund.
The in forma pauperis statute provides in part: "The court may ... dismiss the case if the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that the allegation is frivolous or malicious." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(d). This Court has held that dismissal with prejudice is an appropriate sanction in cases involving a bad-faith misstatement of assets. Dawson v. Lennon, 797 F.2d 934, 935 (11th Cir.1986) (dismissal with prejudice, although a last resort, is appropriate in cases involving bad faith). In the context of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which also concerns sanctions, several circuits have held that although a district court lacks jurisdiction over the substance of a case after a Rule 41(a)(1)(i) notice of dismissal, the court retains power to impose sanctions under Rule 11. See Danik, Inc. v. Hartmarx Corp., 875 F.2d 890, 895 (D.C.Cir.1989), cert. granted sub nom. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 275, 107 L.Ed.2d 256 (argued February 20, 1990); Muthig v. Brant Point Nantucket, Inc., 838 F.2d 600, 603-04 (1st Cir.1988); Schering Corp. v. Vitarine Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 889 F.2d 490, 496 (3d Cir.1989); Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir.1987); Kurkowski v. Volcker, 819 F.2d 201, 203 (8th Cir.1987); Greenberg v. Sala, 822 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir.1987). But see, Johnson Chem. Co. v. Home Care Prods., Inc., 823 F.2d 28 (2d Cir.1987) (Rule 41(a)(1)(i) notice of dismissal deprives court of jurisdiction to impose Rule 11 sanctions). These courts reason that while a Rule 41(a)(1) notice of dismissal prevents a court from considering the merits of a case, the court still has the authority under Rule 11 to enforce rules of court through sanctions. An award of fees under Rule 11 is more like a sanction for [criminal] contempt of court than like a disposition on the merits or even an award of costs. An award under Rule 11 is a "sanction" for violating a rule of court. The obligation to answer for one's ac…
Defendants Internal Revenue Service and the United States Department of the Treasury have neither served an answer nor a motion for summary judgment in this action. Accordingly, voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) is available as of right, and requires neither leave of Court nor the consent of any party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i); Matthews v. Gaither, 902 1 Although Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) filings are sometimes colloquially styled as “motions,” the Eleventh Circuit has made clear that a Rule 41(a)(1)(A) dismissal is self-executing, terminates the action upon filing, and divests the district court of jurisdiction. See Est. of W. v. Smith, 9 F.4th 1361, 1367–68 (11th Cir. 2021); Anago Franchising, Inc. v. Shaz, LLC, 677 F.3d 1272, 1277–78 (11th Cir. 2012). Plaintiffs accordingly file this document as a Notice rather than a motion, as the notice does not require judicial action. Est. of W., 9 F.4th at 1368. Case 1:26-cv-20609-KMW Document 52 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/18/2026 Page 2 of 3 F.2d 877, 880 (11th Cir. 1990) (a notice of voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) is effective immediately upon filing); Anago Franchising, Inc. v. Shaz, LLC, 677 F.3d 1272, 1277–78 (11th Cir. 2012) (Rule 41(a)(1) dismissals are “self-executing,” and divest the district court of jurisdiction upon filing); W. Grp. Nurseries, Inc. v. Ergas, 167 F.3d 1354, 1358 (11th Cir. 1999)
The in forma pauperis statute provides in part: "The court may ... dismiss the case if the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that the allegation is frivolous or malicious." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(d). This Court has held that dismissal with prejudice is an appropriate sanction in cases involving a bad-faith misstatement of assets. Dawson v. Lennon, 797 F.2d 934, 935 (11th Cir.1986) (dismissal with prejudice, although a last resort, is appropriate in cases involving bad faith). In the context of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which also concerns sanctions, several circuits have held that although a district court lacks jurisdiction over the substance of a case after a Rule 41(a)(1)(i) notice of dismissal, the court retains power to impose sanctions under Rule 11. See Danik, Inc. v. Hartmarx Corp., 875 F.2d 890, 895 (D.C.Cir.1989), cert. granted sub nom. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 275, 107 L.Ed.2d 256 (argued February 20, 1990); Muthig v. Brant Point Nantucket, Inc., 838 F.2d 600, 603-04 (1st Cir.1988); Schering Corp. v. Vitarine Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 889 F.2d 490, 496 (3d Cir.1989); Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir.1987); Kurkowski v. Volcker, 819 F.2d 201, 203 (8th Cir.1987); Greenberg v. Sala, 822 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir.1987). But see, Johnson Chem. Co. v. Home Care Prods., Inc., 823 F.2d 28 (2d Cir.1987) (Rule 41(a)(1)(i) notice of dismissal deprives court of jurisdiction to impose Rule 11 sanctions). These courts reason that while a Rule 41(a)(1) notice of dismissal prevents a court from considering the merits of a case, the court still has the authority under Rule 11 to enforce rules of court through sanctions. An award of fees under Rule 11 is more like a sanction for [criminal] contempt of court than like a disposition on the merits or even an award of costs. An award under Rule 11 is a "sanction" for violating a rule of court. The obligation to answer for one's ac…
1-18.200 – Settlement Transparency “It is the policy of the Department of Justice that, in any civil matter in which the Department is representing the interests of the United States or its agencies, it will not enter into final settlement agreements or consent decrees that are subject to confidentiality provisions, nor will it seek or concur in the sealing of such documents.” 28 C.F.R. § 50.23. While there may be “rare” exceptions to this policy that may be invoked only by certain Department officials, see id., as a general rule, civil settlements are subject to the principles of openness in judicial proceedings. [new April 2018]
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Availability of Judgment Fund in Cases Not Involving a Money Judgment Claim Share right caret Date of Issuance: April 14, 1989 Headnotes The Judgment Fund is not available for suits that do not seek to require the government to make direct payments of money to individuals, but merely would require the government to take actions that result in the expenditure of government funds. The Judgment Fund is available: (1) for the payment of final “money judgments” (but not for “non-money judgments”) whose payment is not “otherwise provided for”; (2) for the payment of tort settlements covered by statutory provisions listed in 31 U.S.C. § 1304(a); and (3) for the payment of non-tort settlements authorized by the Attorney General or his designee, whose payment is not “otherwise provided for,” if and only if the cause of action that gave rise to the settlement could have resulted in a final money judgment.