Christian Mott

@cjmott.bsky.social

1039 Followers 1371 Following

Studying punishment, criminal law, moral psychology, & experimental jurisprudence. christianmott.com

Xcancel pot from Noam Brown (@polynoamial) saying: And yes we did try other major problems without success. Sadly no Millennium Prize problems (yet). But also, we didn't spend a lot on each problem. It's possible to push test-time compute much further.
First paragraph of Kavanaugh's concurrence in the judgment in Trump v. Barbara. JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part. Executive Order No. 14160 establishes new exceptions to birthright citizenship for children born to foreign citizens unlawfully or temporarily in the country. 90 Fed. Reg. 8449 (2025). The Court today holds that the Order violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. I respectfully disagree with the Court’s constitutional holding. In my view, the Executive Order does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. But the Order does contravene a federal statute, 8 U. S. C. §1401(a). Congress could—consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment—amend §1401(a) or otherwise enact new legislation establishing exceptions to birthright citizenship for children born to foreign citizens unlawfully or temporarily in the country. But Congress has not yet done so.
Text of paragraph 5 of the Iran-US MOU with the starred text highlighted: "Upon the signing of this M.O.U., the Islamic Republic of Iran will make arrangements using its **best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels with no charge for 60 days only from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman, and vice versa.** The traffic of commercial vessels will immediately start, and considering the need for removing the technical and military obstacles and demining by the Islamic Republic of Iran, will be instated within 30 days. The Islamic Republic of Iran will conduct dialogue with the Sultanate of Oman to define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz, in discussion with other Persian Gulf littoral states in line with the applicable international law and the sovereign rights of coastal states of the Strait of Hormuz."
Paragraph 11 of the MOU text, as posted by CNN, with "excuse me" highlighted: "11 — The United States of America undertakes to make fully available for use the frozen or restricted funds and assets of the Islamic Republic of Iran upon the implementation of this MOU. The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran will mutually agree on the procedures related to the release of these funds during negotiations. Such funds, whether obtaining the original account or transfer, shall be made fully usable for payment to any ultimate beneficiary designed by the Central Bank, excuse me, ultimate beneficiary designated by the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The United States of America undertakes to issue all necessary licenses and authorizations accordingly."
82-0 roster of Josh Giddey, James Harden, Giannis Antetokounmpo, Domanatas Sabonis, and kareem Abdul-Jabbar.
82-0.com roster projected to go 82-0: PG: Oscar Robertson (SAC, 1960s) SG: Clem Haskins (CHI, 1970s) SF: Luka Doncic (LAL, 2020s) PF: Elvin Hayes (HOU, 1970s) C: Alonzo Mourning (CHA, 1990s)
Passage from the Science paper linked in the parent post. "We previously reported that splenic red pulp macrophages in mice and humans are intrinsically superparamagnetic (25). This is due to their function of degrading damaged or aged erythrocytes, which results in the liberation of iron from hemoglobin; this iron is stored within these macrophages as ferritin, a protein complex that sequesters iron in nontoxic form (26, 27)."
Text of the eighth section of the Act of September 2, 1789, that created the Treasury Department: And be it further enacted. That no person appointed to any office instituted by this act shall directly or indirectly be concerned or interested in carrying on the business of trade or commerce, or be owner in whole or in part of any sea-vessel, or purchase by himself or another in trust for him any public lands or other public property, or be concerned in the purchase or disposal of any public securities of any State or of the United States, or take or apply to his own use any emolument or gain for negotiating any business in the said Department other than what shall be allowed by law; and if any person shall offend against any of the prohibitions of this act ie shall be deemed guilty of thigh misdemeanor and forfeit to the United States the penalty of $3,000, and shall upon conviction be removed from office and forever thereafter incapable of holding any office under the United States: Provided. That if any other person than a public prosecutor shall give information of any such offense upon which a prosecution and conviction shall be had one half the aforesaid penalty of $3,000, when recovered, shall be for the use of the person giving such information.
Section 11 of the February 20, 1792, Act to establish the Post Office and Post Roads within the United States. "Sec. 11. And be it further enacted, That, if any Deputy Postmaster, or other person authorized by the Postmaster General, to receive the postages of letters, shall fraudulently demand or receive any... [continued in next image]
Secs. 2 and 3 of the Act of July 17, 1862, "An Act to suppress Insurrection, to punish Treason and Rebellion, to seize and confiscate the Property of Rebels, and for other Purposes.": Sec. 2: Sec . 2. And be it further enacted, That if any person shall hereafter incite, set on foot, assist, or engage in any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States, or the laws thereof, or shall give aid or comfort thereto, or shall engage in, or give aid and comfort to, any such existing rebellion or insurrection, and be convicted thereof, such person shall be punished by imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years, or by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars, and by the liberation of all his slaves, if any he have; or by both of said punishments, at the discretion of the court. Sec . 3. And be it further enacted, That every person guilty of either of the offences described in this act shall be forever incapable and disqualified to hold any office under the United States.
Prohibition on inciting etc. rebellions or insurrections appearing at sec. 5334 of the 1874 Revised Statutes. Cites an Act of July 17, 1862 as its source.
Excerpt from the testimony of George S. Leonard, first assistant of DOJ Civil Division, before the House Judiciary Committee on June 21, 1960, on questioning by Cyril Brickfield, committee counsel. Mr. Brickfield: I have just one question on the compromise subject, Mr. Leonard, in this bill: You are just authorized to make a settlement in the amount of $100,000, is that correct -- Mr. Leonard: Oh no -- we are make comprimises [sic] now, in the millions, sir. Mr. Brickfield: But if you do that you have to come to Congress for a special Act, do you now? Mr. Leonard: No -- no. Not at all. Mr. [Ronald V.] Libenati: No. Mr. Leonard: As a matter of fact I have a tort settlement on my desk for well over--- Mr. Brickfield: No, I am not talking about tort settlements; I am talking about this, not the Federal Tort Claims Act-- Mr. Leonard: You see, it is entered as a compromise consent judgment-- Mr. Brickfield: All right. It is entered as a judgment.
The 1948 text of 28 USC 2414: Payment of final judgments rendered by a district court against the United States shall be made on settlements by the General Accounting Office. Whenever the Attorney General determines that no appeal shall be taken from a judgment against the United States or that no further review will be sought from a decision affirming the same, he shall so certify and the judgment shall be deemed final.
Excerpt from House Report No. 428, 87th Congress, 1st Sess., p. 3.
Paragraph III.B of the Trump settlement with highlighting on the second clause of the first sentence: In exchange for the relief provided in this Settlement Agreement, and except as provided herein (e.g., the claims process described below), Plaintiffs hereby RELEASE, WAIVE, ACQUIT, and FOREVER DISCHARGE Defendants and the United States from, and are hereby FOREVER BARRED and PRECLUDED from prosecuting or pursuing, any and all claims, charges, counterclaims, causes of action, appeals, or requests for any relief, including injunctive, monetary, damages, tax payments, debt relief, costs, attorney's fees, expenses, and/or interest, that-as of the Effective Date-have been or could have been asserted by Plaintiffs in the Case or the Pending Agency Claims, by reason of, with respect to, in connection with, or which arise out of, matters in the Case or the Pending Agency Claims.
Passage from slip op. 30 of Callais: 2. Second and Third Gingles Preconditions To satisfy the second and third preconditions—politically cohesive voting by the minority and racial-bloc voting by the majority—the plaintiffs must provide an analysis that controls for party affiliation. In other words, they must show that voters engage in racial bloc voting that cannot be explained by partisan affiliation. This is, once again, critical for “disentangl[ing] race and politics.” Alexander, 602 U. S., at 6. The facts of Gingles afford a good example of how a §2 plaintiff can properly meet these preconditions. There, as discussed, black and white voters had dramatically different voting patterns within the Democratic party. 478 U. S., at 59. This type of intra-party racial-bloc voting pattern helps to demonstrate that the minority plaintiffs have “less opportunity” than their majority counterparts because of race, not just because of partisan affiliation. 52 U. S. C. §10301(b). By contrast, simply pointing to inter-party racial polarization proves nothing, because “‘a jurisdiction may engage in constitutional political gerrymandering, even if it so happens that the most loyal Democrats happen to be black Democrats and even if the State were conscious of that fact.’” Alexander, 602 U. S., at 9 (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U. S. 541, 551 (1999)).
The top of page 276 of the Folio Classique edition of Madame Bovary. The last paragraph reads: -- Et, d'ailleurs, les embarras, la dépense... Ah! non, non, mille fois non! cela eût été trop bête!
Text from the Dropsite article: In a recent interview, Dr. Foad Izadi, a professor at the University of Tehran, told Drop Site that in the past “a number of high-ranking military officials … made the decision to inform the United States when they were attacking the U.S. bases.” “The idea was basically trying to ride out the Trump administration, not to confront him in a serious manner, respond to him, but respond in a very limited style so they don’t start a huge war with the United States,” he said. “This was their decision. And they were killed in June,” during the 12-day bombing campaign unleashed against Iran by the U.S. and Israel. Izadi said that the new leadership of the military in Iran has determined that the previous policy failed to deter U.S. and Israeli aggression. “The number that I hear is the goal is to get at least 500 American soldiers. The casualties that they need to have if Iran is attacked again is at least 500,” Izadi said. “I think the Iranian government, the Iranian military has decided to respond quite harshly this time because you cannot have a country when that country is threatened to be attacked militarily every other week.”
Text of sec. 4682 of the Maine Civil Rights Act: Interference with rights; private actions. A person whose exercise or enjoyment of the rights secured by the United States Constitution or the laws of the United States or of the rights secured by the Constitution of Maine or the laws of the State has been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, may institute and prosecute in that person's own name and on that person's own behalf a civil action for legal or equitable relief whenever any person, whether or not acting under color of law: A. Violates section 4684‑B; or [PL 2023, c. 287, §2 (NEW).] B. Intentionally interferes or attempts to intentionally interfere with the exercise or enjoyment by any other person of those secured rights by: (1) Physical force or violence against a person; (2) Damage or destruction of property or trespass on property; (3) Threatening physical force or violence against a person; (4) Threatening damage or destruction of property or trespass on property; or (5) Engaging in any conduct that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress or to fear death or bodily injury to that person or to a close relation. For purposes of this subparagraph, "close relation" and "emotional distress" have the same meanings as in Title 17‑A, section 210‑A, subsection 2, paragraph B and paragraph D, respectively.
Paragraphs 15-17 of a declaration by an unnamed witness to the murder of Alex Pretti: 15. The video I recorded of what happened accurately depicts the events leading up to the agents shooting [Pretti] and several minutes afterwards. The video is attached as Exhibit I. 16. I have read the statement from DHS about what happened and it is wrong. The man did not approach the agents with a gun. He approached them with a camera. He was just trying to help a woman get up and they took him to the ground. 17. I feel afraid. Only hours have passed since they shot a man right in front [of] me and I don't feel like I can go home because I heard agents were looking for me. I don't know what the agents will do when they find me. I do know that they're not telling the truth about what happened. I've heard that other witnesses might have been arrested and taken to the Whipple Building.
Example graph
Text of Epstein Files Transparency Act Section 2(b)-(c): (b) Prohibited Grounds for Withholding.— (1) No record shall be withheld, delayed, or redacted on the basis of embarrassment, reputational harm, or political sensitivity, including to any government official, public figure, or foreign dignitary. (c) Permitted Withholdings.— (1) The Attorney general may withhold or redact the segregable portions of records that— (A) contain personally identifiable information of victims or victims’ personal and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; (B) depict or contain child sexual abuse materials (CSAM) as defined under 18 U.S.C. 2256 and prohibited under 18 U.S.C. 2252–2252A; (C) would jeopardize an active federal investigation or ongoing prosecution, provided that such withholding is narrowly tailored and temporary; (D) depict or contain images of death, physical abuse, or injury of any person; or (E) contain information specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order. (2) All redactions must be accompanied by a written justification published in the Federal Register and submitted to Congress. (3) To the extent that any covered information would otherwise be redacted or withheld as classified information under this section, the Attorney General shall declassify that classified information to the maximum extent possible.
Graph of number of Black 1Ls by school by year for 14 schools Prof. Kerr tabulated. There is a noticeable drop in the number at Harvard and Georgetown in 2024.
NYT Excerpt from February 2020 story: "Steve Grad, principal authenticator for Beckett, keeps a file of Mr. Trump’s signature going back to the 1980s for comparison. He said that Mr. Trump had two: one that resembles 'a seismogram reading after an earthquake,' and another that is more legible."
BOP guidance on Inmate Security Designation and Custody Classification, passage from p. 51. Sex Offender. A male or female inmate whose behavior in the current term of confinement or prior history includes one or more of the following elements will be housed in at least a Low security level institution, unless the PSF has been waived. A conviction is not required for application of this PSF if the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR), or other official documentation, clearly indicates the following behavior occurred in the current term of confinement or prior criminal history. If the case was dismissed or nolle prosequi, application of this PSF cannot be entered.
Passage from Rucho v. Common Cause, slip op. at 16: Partisan gerrymandering claims invariably sound in a desire for proportional representation. As Justice O’Connor put it, such claims are based on “a conviction that the greater the departure from proportionality, the more suspect an apportionment plan becomes.” Ibid. “Our cases, however, clearly foreclose any claim that the Constitution requires proportional representation or that legislatures in reapportioning must draw district lines to come as near as possible to allocating seats to the contending parties in proportion to what their anticipated statewide vote will be.” Id., at 130 (plurality opinion). See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 75–76 (1980) (plurality opinion) (“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require proportional representation as an imperative of political organization.”).
CPL 40.51 says that double jeopardy does not bar successive prosecution of someone federally convicted if that person was pardoned and 4. the president who granted such reprieve, pardon or other form of clemency to such person (a) was thereby aided in avoiding potential prosecution or conviction; (b) knowingly obtained a benefit from such offense; or (c) knowingly obtained a tangible, material benefit from or on behalf of such person; or 5. such person possessed or possesses information material to the determination of any criminal or civil investigation, enforcement action or prosecution of the president granting such reprieve, pardon or other form of clemency, or of one or more persons described in subdivision one, two or three of this section.
Passage from pp. 20-21 of the majority opinion in Trump v. CASA: "When a district court issues a universal injunction, thereby halting the enforcement of federal policy the Government says that it has little recourse but to proceed to the court of appeals for an emergency stay. The loser int he court of appeals will then seek a stay from this Court. This process forces courts to resolve significant and difficult questions of law on a highly expedited basis and without full briefing." (citations omitted)
UAW Region 9A graphic reading: Fill out your ballot 1. Zohran Mamdani 2. Brad Lander 3. Zellnor Myrie 4. Adrienne Adams 5. Michael Blake and Don't rank Cuomo!
Section from p. 32 of the Ninth Circuit order in Newsom v. Trump: "First, the text of § 12406 does not give governors any veto power over the President’s federalization decision. The omission of an express consent requirement is telling, as Congress provided governors with veto power in another section of Title 10. See 10 U.S.C. § 12301(d) ('However, a member of the Army National Guard of the United States or the Air National Guard of the United States may not be ordered to active duty under this subsection without the consent of the governor or other appropriate authority of the State concerned.' (emphasis added))."
Passage from AAUP v. DOJ, ECF 148 at 29-30. "[A]ll of Plaintiffs' arguments that Defendants violated the APA (and the separation of powers) by failing to comply with procedural requirements for cutting funding pursuant to Title VI simply presuppose that Title VI is the exclusive vehicle by which the Executive Branch may withdraw financial support for an institution that allows religious discrimination. "The Court urges Plaintiffs, and the amici who decry Defendants' alleged failure to follow Title VI to the letter, to review the text of that statute. Title VI does not mention religion. As such, it strikes the Court as unlikely that Title VI is the sole and exclusive 'legal tool[]' available to a President who instructs executive agencies to prioritize 'combat[ting] anti-Semitism . . . on university and college campuses.'" (citations omitted)
Passage from p. 24 of AAUP v. DOJ, ECF 148 at 24-25: "Turning to representational standing, Plaintiffs fail to establish that any injuries their members may have suffered are fairly traceable to Defendants. As noted above, the Court does find that some of Plaintiffs [sic] members used federal grants to Columbia for their academic work. The loss of professional opportunities or income may certainly constitute an injury in some cases. However, here, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that it makes a difference to their members whether the funding for their research and salaries comes from American taxpayers, non-party Columbia's multi-billion-dollar endowment, the largess of Columbia's donors, or the eye-popping tuition bills paid by Columbia students, including the Jewish students who apparently paid for the privilege of being threatened with violence on their way to class." (citations omitted)
Passage from Justice Gorsuch's opinion for the Court in 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 21-476, slip op. at 7 (June 30, 2023): "For all these reasons '[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation,' West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943), it is the principle that the government may not interfere with 'an uninhibited marketplace of ideas,' McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 476 (2014)."
Passage from p. 18 of DOJ's filing. In short, Section 12406 affords no veto to Governor Newsom over the President's decision to call forth the guard, just as it afforded no veto to Governor Faubus when President Eisenhower last invoked the predecessor to Section 12406 to ensure that the enforcement of federal law was not obstructed.
Excerpt from a hearing transcript of the Committee on Militia, House of Representatives, February 9, 1911, pp. 12-13. Mr. LLOYD. What do you think of the constitutional authority of Congress passing a law allowing the War Department to call these men in the service directly from the militia without the authority of the governor of the State, without calling on the governor of the State first? Gen. WOOD. The President will call on the governor for troops, but in case the governor fails to respond he can then call upon the troops themselves. They must come. They can not evade the call on the ground that it has not come through the governor of the State, or on any other ground. The present militia law, known as the "Dick law," provides that the militia can only be called by a call issued through the governor of the State. This seems to be a dangerous limitation of the powers of the Chief Executive, and might lead to embarrassment. The old militia law was better: The President could call every man of arms-bearing age; he could call everybody who was sound and within the age limit, who was not exempted by law. The CHAIRMAN. Without reference to what the governor would do? Gen. WOOD. Yes. Mr. LLOYD. He did not call you as a militiaman, though did he? Gen. WOOD. He was called as part of the militia. Capt. HAGOOD. Yes: He had the right to call everybody directly up to the time of the Dick law in 1903. Up to that time there was no provision as to calling the governor: it was only a matter of courtesy that that was done. Gen. WOOD. We now have no direct way of reaching the men, and the present conditions would lead to confusion. We know that in New England and other States farther south, on account of wars bearing unpopular, governors have not always responded when calls were made by the President....
Excerpt from the May 25, 1908 Congressional Record, p. 6942: Part of a statement from Representative Parker, of New Jersey: "Now, Mr. Speaker, as a member of the Committee on the Militia years ago we refused to bring up that law for revision for fear that by some mistake or amendment this power should be taken away from the President. "This bill, strange to say, without intending to do so, does take away that power; for in the first section, after saying that all males of a certain age belong to the militia, the bill divides them into two classes, the organized militia and the reserve militia, and with a proviso that the provisions of this act shall apply only to the militia organized as a land force. As a result the subsequent section 4, in which the authority for calling out the militia is reenacted, only applies to the organized militia, and the power of the President over every able-bodied citizen is taken away by this act. I consider that to be a matter that goes back to all questions of finance. "The old law of 1795 gave the President direct authority over every citizen of this land, and in this bill, in the section which provides that in case of rebellion or invasion, or threatened invasion, the President may issue a call, it is not provided that he may call out every able-bodied man, through their officers, but it provides that he may issue his orders for that purpose through the governor of the respective State or Territory, or through the commanding general of the militia of the District of Columbia, from which State, Territory, or District such troops may be called, to such officers of the militia as he may deem proper. Why, we remember a time, at the beginning of the civil war, when some of the governors did not desire to have the militia called out, but we got our militia from West Virginia, and eastern Tennessee and Kentucky by the orders of the President direct."
1908 Militia Act text from 35 Stat. 400: "Sec. 3. That section four of said Act as amended be, and the same is hereby amended and reenacted so as to read as follows: 'Sec. 4. That whenever the United States is invaded or in danger of invasion from any foreign nation, or of rebellion against the authority of the Government of the United States, or the President is unable with the regular forces at his command to execute the laws of the Union, it shall be lawful for the President to call forth such number of the militia of the State or of the States or Territories or of the District of Columbia as he may deem necessary to repel such invasion, suppress such rebellion, or to enable him to execute such laws, and to issue his orders for that purpose, through the governor of the respective State or Territory, or through the commanding general of the militia of the District of Columbia, from which State, Territory, or District such troops may be called, to such officers of the militia as he may think proper."
Passage from p. 17 of DOJ's opposition to the motion for a TRO in Newsom v. Trump. 3. Section 12406 does not require a governor's consent or input. Defendants also acted lawfully in the processes they used to federalize Guardsmen. Section 12406's first sentence establishes the President's unilateral authority to federalize Guardsmen. Again, it reads: "[T]he President may call into Federal service members and units of the National Guard of any State . . . ." The next sentence adds that "[o]rders for these purposes shall be issued through the governors of the States." 10 U.S.C. sec. 12406. The statute is thus clear that the orders are issued by the President, and they are conveyed through State officials. Nothing in the statute entitles a Governor to veto or impede a valid presidential order.
Excerpt from the Congressional Record, February 28, 1911, p. 3701. Passage from a memorandum submitted by Maj. Gen. Dick, the Chief of Staff of the Army. "The militia organized under the old laws and the National Guard of today, however, are very different; so different, in fact, that it may not be considered altogether fair to class them together. But the improvement goes only so far as the defects in the old laws have been remedied, and the two are identically the same so far as the defects in the old laws have not been remedied. "The principal defects in the old militia laws were as follows: "1. Divided responsibility between the Federal Government and the States: Massachusetts, Connecticut, Vermont, Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, and Arkansas have, through their governors, refused to turn out the militia when called upon by the President to do so. Other States have greatly interfered with the Federal Government in its use of militia either by raising objections and obstacles or by forcing hte service of troops not desired. "The modern existing law instead of remedying this defect has intensified it. The old law did not require the President to consult the governors with reference to turning out the militia. He could issue the call direct. As a matter of courtesy, the call was made through the governors. But now it is required by law. There is no way for the Federal Government to coerce the governors, and if any governor should refuse or fail to transmit it to the militia of his State it is easy to see that the whole matter could be thrown into confusion...."
Excerpt from a hearing transcript of the Committee on Militia, House of Representatives, February 9, 1911, pp. 12-13. Mr. LLOYD. What do you think of the constitutional authority of Congress passing a law allowing the War Department to call these men in the service directly from the militia without the authority of the governor of the State, without calling on the governor of the State first? Gen. WOOD. The President will call on the governor for troops, but in case the governor fails to respond he can then call upon the troops themselves. They must come. They can not evade the call on the ground that it has not come through the governor of the State, or on any other ground. The present militia law, known as the "Dick law," provides that the militia can only be called by a call issued through the governor of the State. This seems to be a dangerous limitation of the powers of the Chief Executive, and might lead to embarrassment. The old militia law was better: The President could call every man of arms-bearing age; he could call everybody who was sound and within the age limit, who was not exempted by law. The CHAIRMAN. Without reference to what the governor would do? Gen. WOOD. Yes. Mr. LLOYD. He did not call you as a militiaman, though did he? Gen. WOOD. He was called as part of the militia. Capt. HAGOOD. Yes: He had the right to call everybody directly up to the time of the Dick law in 1903. Up to that time there was no provision as to calling the governor: it was only a matter of courtesy that that was done. Gen. WOOD. We now have no direct way of reaching the men, and the present conditions would lead to confusion. We know that in New England and other States farther south, on account of wars bearing unpopular, governors have not always responded when calls were made by the President....
Excerpt from the Congressional Record, August 18, 1958, p. 18230: "Even in cases where the President is within his authority to call forth the militia to enforce the 'laws of the United States,' the law expressly provides that orders federalizing National Guard units 'shall be issued through the governors of the States.' "This is made plain in section 3500 of title 10 of the United States Code [the prior codification of 10 USC 12406], from which I quote: [Quoting the language of 10 USC 3500, which is materially identical to 10 USC 12406]. "None of the three conditions set forth in this section was met in the Little Rock case. There was no danger of invasion, there was no rebellion or danger of rebellion."
Excerpt from the May 25, 1908 Congressional Record, p. 6942: Part of a statement from Representative Parker, of New Jersey: "Now, Mr. Speaker, as a member of the Committee on the Militia years ago we refused to bring up that law for revision for fear that by some mistake or amendment this power should be taken away from the President. "This bill, strange to say, without intending to do so, does take away that power; for in the first section, after saying that all males of a certain age belong to the militia, the bill divides them into two classes, the organized militia and the reserve militia, and with a proviso that the provisions of this act shall apply only to the militia organized as a land force. As a result the subsequent section 4, in which the authority for calling out the militia is reenacted, only applies to the organized militia, and the power of the President over every able-bodied citizen is taken away by this act. I consider that to be a matter that goes back to all questions of finance. "The old law of 1795 gave the President direct authority over every citizen of this land, and in this bill, in the section which provides that in case of rebellion or invasion, or threatened invasion, the President may issue a call, it is not provided that he may call out every able-bodied man, through their officers, but it provides that he may issue his orders for that purpose through the governor of the respective State or Territory, or through the commanding general of the militia of the District of Columbia, from which State, Territory, or District such troops may be called, to such officers of the militia as he may deem proper. Why, we remember a time, at the beginning of the civil war, when some of the governors did not desire to have the militia called out, but we got our militia from West Virginia, and eastern Tennessee and Kentucky by the orders of the President direct."
Excerpt from p. 6943 of the Congressional Record for May 1908. The text reads: "Mr. FLOYD. My time is so limited that I regret I can not. There is one other question, and that is the constitutional question. A great argument is made against this bill by gentlemen who claim it enlarges the power of the President. I want to express my views on that question. The Constitution, as I understand it, provides that the President of the United States, through the governors of the several States, in time of war may call out the militia of the different States to repeal invasion, suppress insurrection, or to execute the laws of the United States. It is not within the power of this committee, it is not within the power of Congress to tkae from or add to that constitutional provision. That is a provision of the Constitution of the United States and lodges that power in the President of the United States, and ti is not within our power to add to or take from it, and we do not undertake to do that and do not understand we are doing that by this provision of the bill. [Applause.]
Passage from the Congressional Record for May 21, 1908, p. 6661: Efficiency of the Militia. Mr. HEMENWAY. I desire to call up the bill (S. 4316) to further amend the act entitled "An act to promote the efficiency of the militia, and for other purposes," approved January 21, 1903. There being no objection, the Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, proceeded to consider the bill, which had been reported from the Committee on Military Affairs with amendments. The VICE-PRESIDENT. The bill has been read. The amendments will be stated. The first amendment of the Committe on Military Affairs was, on page 4, after line 15, to insert 'through the governor of the respective State or Territory, or through the commanding general of the militia of the District of Columbia, from which..."
1908 Militia Act text from 35 Stat. 400: "Sec. 3. That section four of said Act as amended be, and the same is hereby amended and reenacted so as to read as follows: 'Sec. 4. That whenever the United States is invaded or in danger of invasion from any foreign nation, or of rebellion against the authority of the Government of the United States, or the President is unable with the regular forces at his command to execute the laws of the Union, it shall be lawful for the President to call forth such number of the militia of the State or of the States or Territories or of the District of Columbia as he may deem necessary to repel such invasion, suppress such rebellion, or to enable him to execute such laws, and to issue his orders for that purpose, through the governor of the respective State or Territory, or through the commanding general of the militia of the District of Columbia, from which State, Territory, or District such troops may be called, to such officers of the militia as he may think proper."
PACER docket entries from Harvard v. DHS. They read: 06/05/2025 59 Judge Allison D. Burroughs: ORDER entered granting Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. (KF) (Entered: 06/05/2025) 06/05/2025 60 ELECTRONIC NOTICE of Hearing.Preliminary Injunction Hearing set for 6/16/2025 10:00 AM in Courtroom 17 (In person only) before Judge Allison D. Burroughs. (KF) (Entered: 06/05/2025)
Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Declaration of Noam Biale filed in AAUP v. Rubio. They read: 4. On June 3, 2025, we held a meet-and-confer call with Defendants in which we again raised the proposed Non-Retaliation Order. On that call, Defendants’ counsel advised that they could not agree to the proposed Non-Retaliation Order because their client agencies did not want to be bound by an agreement preventing them from taking action against individuals whose identities they did not know yet. 5. I clarified that the proposed Non-Retaliation Order was structured principally as an agreement not to take adverse actions against Plaintiffs’ witnesses because they were witnesses in this federal case, which we had not imagined would be difficult for the government to agree to. Defendants’ counsel reiterated that the agencies were “not comfortable” with such a proposal and advised us to “go ahead and ask the judge to rule on it.”
Screenshot from the MSCHE website listing for Columbia University. Entry for May 16, 2025 under "Accreditation Actions": "Staff acted on behalf of the Commission to request a supplemental information report, due May 30, 2025, that provides additional information on Standard II: Ethics and Integrity; Standard IV: Support of the Student Experience; Standard VI: Planning, Resources, and Institutional Improvement; and Standard VII: Governance, Leadership, and Administration. To note that the evaluation visit has occurred and will be acted upon by the Commission at the June 2025 meeting."
Page from Harris poll results in June 2024 to question: "Should Israel move forward with operations in Rafah to finish the war with Hamas, doing its best to avoid civilian casualties even though there will be casualties, or should it back off now and allow Hamas to continue running Gaza?"
Trump v. United States, pp. 8-9, "Congress cannot act on, and courts cannot examine, the President's actions on subjects within his 'conclusive and preclusive' constitutional authority. It follows that an Act of Congress -- either a specific one targeted at the President or a generally applicable one -- may not criminalize the President's actions within his exclusive constitutional power. Neither may the courts adjudicate a criminal prosecution that examines such Presidential actions. We thus conclude that the President is absolutely immune from criminal prosecution for conduct within his exclusive sphere of constitutional authority."
Docket in Mahdawi v. Trump, 2:25-cv-00389 (D. Vt.), entries 19-21. Shows that Mahdawi filed a motion for release under Mapp on April 22, 2025 and on the same day, Judge Crawford revised the notice of hearing for the April 23, 2025 status conference to include a hearing on that motion.
Document from the Abrego Garcia case: "Defendants' Response to Interrogatory No. 1: Defendants object to Interrogatory No. 1 as based on the false premise that the United States can or has been ordered to facilitate Abrego Garcia's release from custody in El Salvador. See Abrego Garcia, 604 U.S. --, slip op at 2 (holding Defendants should 'take all available teps to facilitate the return of Abrego Garcia to the United State") (emphasis added).
Passage from Mapp v. Reno, 241 F.3d 221, 230 (2d Cir. 2001): "As mentioned above, our cases hold that a court considering a habeas petitioner's fitness for bail must inquire into whether the habeas petition raises substantial claims and whether extraordinary circumstances exist that make the grant of bail necessary to make the habeas remedy effective." (cleaned up)
Passage from Landano, 970 F.2d at 1239. Relevant language, "[in] Calley v. Callaway, 496 F.2d 701 (5th Cir. 1974), where the bail issue was presented in a similar posture, the court held that bail pending post-conviction habeas corpus review was available 'only when the petitioner has raised substantial constitutional claims upon which he has a high probability of success, and also when extraordinary or exceptional circumstances exist which make the grant of bail necessary to make the habeas remedy effective."
Docket entry 206 in Khalil v. Joyce, 2:25-cv-01963 (D.N.J.). DAted April 20, 2025, "TEXT ORDER: The Petitioner filed today under seal a motion [ECF 203] and made a follow-up sealed filing [ECF 205]. The motion is denied. Among other things, the second Lucas/Landano factor is not satisfied. See generally Ozturk v. Trump, 25 Civ. 374 (WKS). Document 10 at 63-64. So Ordered by Judge Michael E. Farbiarz on 4/20/2025."
The last paragraph of Kavanaugh's concurrence: "Especially given the history and precedent of using habeas corpus to review transfer claims, and given 5 U.S.C. sec. 704, which states that claims under the APA are not available when there is another 'adequate remedy in a court,' I agree with the Court that habeas corpus, not the APA, is the proper vehicle here."
The entirety of p. 1938 of the Congressional Record, Volume 93, Part 2. It is too long to write out in the alt text.
The entirety of p. 1863 of Congressional Record Volume 93, Part 2. Too long to write out in full in the alt text.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the second amendment of the committee. The CHEIF CLERK. On page 1, after line 9, it is proposed to strike out "any person who has served as President of the United States during all, or portions, of any two terms, shall thereafter be ineligible to hold the office of President; but this article shall not prevent any person who may hold the office of President during the term within which this article is ratified fro holding such office for the remainder of such term" and to insert "A person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, on 365 calendar days or more in each of two terms shall not be eligible to hold the office of President, or to act as President, for any part of another term; but this article shall not prevent any person who may be holding the office of President or acting as President during the term within which this article becomes operative from holding the office of President or acting as President during the remainder of such term."
Text of 22nd Amendment adopted by House of Representatives on February 6, 1947, after amendment. (Appearing in remarks of Rep. Springer): "Any person who has served as President of the United States during all, or portions, of any two terms, shall thereafter be ineligible to hold the office of President; but this article shall not prevent any person who may hold the office of President during the term within which this article is ratified from holding such office for the remainder of such term."