Dr Edward Hill

@edmhill.bsky.social

3038 Followers 1007 Following

Researcher in mathematical epidemiology & infectious disease modelling. Affiliations: Civic Health Innovation Labs (CHIL) @livunichil.bsky.social, @thepandemicinst.bsky.social, @livuni-phps.bsky.social‬, @livuni-iph.bsky.social, @liverpooluni.bsky.social.

HPAI key figures for the current seasonal wave (Oct 2025 - Sep 2026) and the two previous waves (Oct 2023 - Sep 2024; Oct 2024 - Sep 2025). 01 Oct 2023 – 30 Sep 2024. Countries and territories reporting HPAI in poultry: 39 No. of HPAI outbreaks in poultry: 851 Countries and territories reporting HPAI in wild birds: 55 No. of HPAI outbreaks in wild birds: 1,076 01 Oct 2024 – 30 Sep 2025 Countries and territories reporting HPAI in poultry: 51 No. of HPAI outbreaks in poultry: 1,431 Countries and territories reporting HPAI in wild birds: 55 No. of HPAI outbreaks in wild birds: 1,926 01 Oct 2025 – 30 Jun 2026 Countries and territories reporting HPAI in poultry: 44 No. of HPAI outbreaks in poultry: 1,577 Countries and territories reporting HPAI in wild birds: 56 No. of HPAI outbreaks in wild birds: 7,301
HPAI key figures for the current seasonal wave (Oct 2025 - Sep 2026) and the two previous waves (Oct 2023 - Sep 2024; Oct 2024 - Sep 2025). 01 Oct 2023 – 30 Sep 2024. Countries and territories reporting HPAI in poultry: 39 No. of HPAI outbreaks in poultry: 851 Countries and territories reporting HPAI in wild birds: 55 No. of HPAI outbreaks in wild birds: 1,076 01 Oct 2024 – 30 Sep 2025 Countries and territories reporting HPAI in poultry: 51 No. of HPAI outbreaks in poultry: 1,431 Countries and territories reporting HPAI in wild birds: 55 No. of HPAI outbreaks in wild birds: 1,926 01 Oct 2025 – 31 May 2026 Countries and territories reporting HPAI in poultry: 43 No. of HPAI outbreaks in poultry: 1,507 Countries and territories reporting HPAI in wild birds: 53 No. of HPAI outbreaks in wild birds: 7,098
HPAI key figures for the current seasonal wave (Oct 2025 - Sep 2026) and the two previous waves (Oct 2023 - Sep 2024; Oct 2024 - Sep 2025). 01 Oct 2023 – 30 Sep 2024. Countries and territories reporting HPAI in poultry: 39 No. of HPAI outbreaks in poultry: 851 Countries and territories reporting HPAI in wild birds: 55 No. of HPAI outbreaks in wild birds: 1,076 01 Oct 2024 – 30 Sep 2025 Countries and territories reporting HPAI in poultry: 51 No. of HPAI outbreaks in poultry: 1,431 Countries and territories reporting HPAI in wild birds: 55 No. of HPAI outbreaks in wild birds: 1,926 01 Oct 2025 – 31 Mar 2026 Countries and territories reporting HPAI in poultry: 40 No. of HPAI outbreaks in poultry: 1,275 Countries and territories reporting HPAI in wild birds: 52 No. of HPAI outbreaks in wild birds: 6,447
Conclusion. Testing is central to effective epidemic response. Here, we report the findings of an expert panel commissioned by the UK Health Security Agency to consider the lessons learned from COVID-19 testing for future pandemic/epidemic response. Through a series of consensus-building meetings, we developed a framework to help health systems prepare for pandemic/epidemic testing, with eight purposes: 1) Test-to-Isolate; 2) Test-to-Release (from quarantine or isolation); 3) Test-to-Enable (access to high-transmission/consequence settings); 4) Test-to-Confirm (test results); 5) Test-to-Diagnose; 6) Test-to-Treat; 7) Test-to-Understand; 8) Test-to-Validate (technical performance of tests). Across all purposes, we identified the need to prepare now for a data-driven approach that can maximise the societal value of testing – co-designing schemes and adapting them during deployment to the complex dynamics of epidemics. This preparation requires interdisciplinarity and the formation of networks with substantial public participation. We recommend more concerted effort here – producing protocol blueprints for evaluating testing and operations in context; shaping data and AI governance trusted by the public; embedding pandemic requirements into core digital infrastructure; and preparing target product profiles for tests (for specific pathogen families) that industry can ramp up quickly.
Conclusion. Testing is central to effective epidemic response. Here, we report the findings of an expert panel commissioned by the UK Health Security Agency to consider the lessons learned from COVID-19 testing for future pandemic/epidemic response. Through a series of consensus-building meetings, we developed a framework to help health systems prepare for pandemic/epidemic testing, with eight purposes: 1) Test-to-Isolate; 2) Test-to-Release (from quarantine or isolation); 3) Test-to-Enable (access to high-transmission/consequence settings); 4) Test-to-Confirm (test results); 5) Test-to-Diagnose; 6) Test-to-Treat; 7) Test-to-Understand; 8) Test-to-Validate (technical performance of tests). Across all purposes, we identified the need to prepare now for a data-driven approach that can maximise the societal value of testing – co-designing schemes and adapting them during deployment to the complex dynamics of epidemics. This preparation requires interdisciplinarity and the formation of networks with substantial public participation. We recommend more concerted effort here – producing protocol blueprints for evaluating testing and operations in context; shaping data and AI governance trusted by the public; embedding pandemic requirements into core digital infrastructure; and preparing target product profiles for tests (for specific pathogen families) that industry can ramp up quickly.
Conclusion. Testing is central to effective epidemic response. Here, we report the findings of an expert panel commissioned by the UK Health Security Agency to consider the lessons learned from COVID-19 testing for future pandemic/epidemic response. Through a series of consensus-building meetings, we developed a framework to help health systems prepare for pandemic/epidemic testing, with eight purposes: 1) Test-to-Isolate; 2) Test-to-Release (from quarantine or isolation); 3) Test-to-Enable (access to high-transmission/consequence settings); 4) Test-to-Confirm (test results); 5) Test-to-Diagnose; 6) Test-to-Treat; 7) Test-to-Understand; 8) Test-to-Validate (technical performance of tests). Across all purposes, we identified the need to prepare now for a data-driven approach that can maximise the societal value of testing – co-designing schemes and adapting them during deployment to the complex dynamics of epidemics. This preparation requires interdisciplinarity and the formation of networks with substantial public participation. We recommend more concerted effort here – producing protocol blueprints for evaluating testing and operations in context; shaping data and AI governance trusted by the public; embedding pandemic requirements into core digital infrastructure; and preparing target product profiles for tests (for specific pathogen families) that industry can ramp up quickly.
Figure 1: Framework to guide multi-stakeholder design, monitoring, evaluation, communication, and adaptation of testing interventions in epidemic response.
Figure 1: Framework to guide multi-stakeholder design, monitoring, evaluation, communication, and adaptation of testing interventions in epidemic response.
Data-Driven Framework to Maximise the Value of Testing in Epidemic Contexts. Summary. Testing is a cornerstone of epidemic response, underpinning public health and social measures, clinical care, and surveillance. However, testing interventions are inherently complex – not only their implementation but also their effects. The value of testing in epidemics depends on managing this complexity with clear objectives, appropriate technologies, effective implementation, and timely adaptation to changing epidemiological and social contexts. Collectively, these factors determine whether testing delivers its intended benefit. We propose a data-driven framework to guide effective and equitable testing in epidemics. The framework is informed by an interdisciplinary expert consultation that reviewed community testing in response to SARS-CoV-2 in the UK, alongside international experiences. The framework has four components: defining purpose; selecting and evaluating technology; designing engagement and implementation; and enabling monitoring, evaluation, and optimisation. We outline inputs, outputs and required tools to support framework delivery. Preparing this capability in advance of emergencies should be central to pandemic preparedness.
Data-Driven Framework to Maximise the Value of Testing in Epidemic Contexts. Summary. Testing is a cornerstone of epidemic response, underpinning public health and social measures, clinical care, and surveillance. However, testing interventions are inherently complex – not only their implementation but also their effects. The value of testing in epidemics depends on managing this complexity with clear objectives, appropriate technologies, effective implementation, and timely adaptation to changing epidemiological and social contexts. Collectively, these factors determine whether testing delivers its intended benefit. We propose a data-driven framework to guide effective and equitable testing in epidemics. The framework is informed by an interdisciplinary expert consultation that reviewed community testing in response to SARS-CoV-2 in the UK, alongside international experiences. The framework has four components: defining purpose; selecting and evaluating technology; designing engagement and implementation; and enabling monitoring, evaluation, and optimisation. We outline inputs, outputs and required tools to support framework delivery. Preparing this capability in advance of emergencies should be central to pandemic preparedness.
Health Data Decoded podcast: Episode 13 Hosts: Dr Sam Ball & Dr Ed Hill. Guest: Dr Micheal Abaho. A podcast from the Civic Health Innovation Labs (CHIL) at the University of Liverpool.
Figure 4: Error in the estimated values of alpha and the percentage of replicates with support for symptom propagation, using an age-dependent methodology. The top row shows the error in the estimates of alpha. A positive error corresponds to the estimated value being an overestimate of the true value of alpha. The solid grey regions correspond to infeasible errors, which are present due to the restriction of alpha being between 0 and 1. The points show the median errors and the lines show the interpolation between those points. The shaded area spans the 2.5th percentile to the 97.5th percentile (the 95% uncertainty interval). The bottom row gives the percentage of replicates (out of 1000) for which alpha=0 was not within the 95% confidence region (i.e. support for symptom propagation). Across panels, we vary the assessed sample sizes n (i.e. the number of primary-secondary case pairs we had data for in each replicate): (first column) 10, (second column) 100, (third column) 1,000.
Figure 2: 95% confidence regions for the predicted value of nu and alpha for five replicates with varying value of n (the number of primary-secondary case pairs we had data for in each replicate): (first column) 10, (second column) 100, (third column) 1,000. The cyan triangles indicate the MLE estimates for each replicate. The red dots correspond to the true values of alpha. The true value of alpha is varied across the rows: (top row) alpha = 0.2, (middle row) alpha = 0.5, (bottom row) alpha = 0.7.
Figure 5: 95% confidence regions for the predicted value of nu and alpha for the three real-world data sets: England households, Israel households, Norway contact tracing. Here, n is the number of primary-secondary case pairs in the data set. Cyan triangles indicate the MLE estimates for each replicate, and the grey shaded regions show the 95% bivariate confidence regions.
Table 1: Epidemiological parameter values for age-free data.
Table 2: Summary case data used for parameter estimation stratified by secondary case age group. We provide the number of primary-secondary case pairs (n) from each study used in our parameter estimation, stratified by the age group of the secondary case, along with the symptom breakdown of all the pairs. Columns headed X -> Y give the number of pairs where the primary case has symptom status X and the secondary case has symptom status Y (e.g. A ->A is the number of pairs where both the primary and secondary cases were asymptomatic).
Figure 1: Schematic showing how symptom severity is determined in the symptom propagation model according to the two parameters characterising symptom propagation, alpha and nu. White-shaded individuals correspond to those susceptible to infection, yellow-shaded individuals correspond to infectious cases with mild symptoms, and red-shaded individuals correspond to infectious cases with severe symptoms. The values on the arrows show the corresponding probability. An infected individual has probability alpha of copying the symptom severity of their infector and a probability 1-alpha of reverting to the baseline probability of having severe disease, i.e. they develop severe disease with probability nu.
HPAI key figures for the current seasonal wave (Oct 2025 - Sep 2026) and the two previous waves (Oct 2023 - Sep 2024; Oct 2024 - Sep 2025). 01 Oct 2023 – 30 Sep 2024. Countries and territories reporting HPAI in poultry: 39 No. of HPAI outbreaks in poultry: 851 Countries and territories reporting HPAI in wild birds: 55 No. of HPAI outbreaks in wild birds: 1,076 01 Oct 2024 – 30 Sep 2025 Countries and territories reporting HPAI in poultry: 51 No. of HPAI outbreaks in poultry: 1,432 Countries and territories reporting HPAI in wild birds: 55 No. of HPAI outbreaks in wild birds: 1,926 01 Oct 2025 – 28 Feb 2026 Countries and territories reporting HPAI in poultry: 38 No. of HPAI outbreaks in poultry: 1,147 Countries and territories reporting HPAI in wild birds: 47 No. of HPAI outbreaks in wild birds: 5,996
Conclusion Since our previous assessment on 27 February 2026 (HPAI in Europe #5 February 2026), cases of HPAI H5Nx in wild birds in Great Britain have continued albeit at much lower levels than in December. Wild bird cases are continuing at high levels in Europe particularly in Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. At this time of year (mid-March), it is very unlikely that any wild migratory waterfowl would fly from Continental Europe into Great Britain. There appears to be a shift in the species of wild bird affected from resident waterfowl to gulls and auks in Great Britain based on the 11 wild bird positive samples collected in late February to early March. This shift is further supported by the monthly trends in groups of wild bird cases, with the percentage of cases in resident ducks, geese and swans falling in February, but the percentage in gulls and seabird increasing. Although too early in the year to predict whether these trends will continue, in previous years such shifts have taken the pressure off poultry which is consistent with the number of poultry IPs falling to around less than 1 IP per week in Great Britain since our previous assessment. The risk to poultry with sub-optimal biosecurity is therefore reduced from high (medium uncertainty) to MEDIUM (high uncertainty). This follows the reduction in the risk level for poultry with stringent biosecurity to low as set out in our previous assessment on 27 February 2026. Although the wild bird risk level in Great Britain is now reduced from very high to HIGH, reflecting the fall in wild bird cases and the apparent shift in wild bird species, good biosecurity practices remain of utmost importance for poultry keepers. We are continuing to closely monitor the situation both in Great Britain and in Europe to review the risk. It is important that stringent adherence to good biosecurity practices is maintained.
Europe Between 26 February and 09 March 2026 there were a total of 195 HPAI H5 events in domestic poultry, captive birds and non-poultry including wild birds across Europe reported by the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). Of these reports on WOAH, 160 were in wild birds, 7 in non-commercial poultry and 28 were poultry outbreaks. All reports were HPAI H5N1 except for 1 case of HPAI H5Nx in wild birds in Belgium. Positive reports according to data from IZSVe (2025) have roughly doubled in late February compared to January with around 300 reports per week. Reports continue to be dominated by the wild bird cases.
Wild birds Between 27 February 2026 and 10 March 2026 (based on laboratory testing date), HPAI H5 has been detected in 24 found-dead wild birds, including 15 wild bird species (data available https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/avian-influenza-in-wild-birds ), across 18 counties. The 24 positive wild bird cases since 27 February were collected from both inland and coastal locations with fewer positive cases in the south-west or south of England but more in Scotland and northern England (Map 2). In total there were 11 in England, 13 in Scotland and 0 in Wales (based on laboratory testing date). Figure: Detections per week of HPAI H5 positive found-dead wild birds in Great Britain since 28 September 2025 to 10 March 2026 (based on test date).
Situation assessment Here, an HPAI H5Nx event refers to a report of HPAI in poultry, or a location with at least one HPAI H5Nx positive wild bird. Individual HPAI H5Nx positive wild birds are referred to as cases. United Kingdom Poultry Infected Premises Since our last outbreak assessment on 27 February 2026 there has been just 1 new Infected Premises (IP) confirmed with HPAI H5N1 in poultry (to 9 March 2026). This was a flock of 22,000 pheasants in North Yorkshire in England. The number of IPs per week has fallen week on week since the peak of 14 per week in early November 2025 to on average less than 1 per week in February to early March.
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Preliminary Outbreak Assessment #6 High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) in Great Britain and Europe 10 March 2026 Disease report In our previous outbreak assessment on 27 February 2026 we noted that the number of cases of high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) H5 in wild birds was slowly falling from the peak in December although the wild bird risk level in Great Britain was still considered to be very high. Since then, there have been 24 more cases of HPAI H5 clade 2.3.4.4b events involving “found-dead” wild birds (number based on laboratory testing date) in Great Britain though the number of reports week-on-week has continued to decrease, albeit slowly, since the peak of over 100 per week in mid- December 2025. The total number of wild bird cases in Great Britain since the start of the HPAI season on 1 October 2025 is now 880. Of these 880, 863 have been confirmed as HPAI H5N1,13 as HPAI H5Nx and 4 as HPAI H5N5. Since our previous outbreak assessment on 27 February 2026, there has been 1 report of HPAI H5 clade 2.3.4.4b in domestic poultry (pheasants) in Great Britain with the report being in England. The confirmed infected premises (IP) was located in North Yorkshire. There have been no more IPs in Scotland and Wales. The report has been confirmed as HPAI H5N1. The average number of IPs per week in Great Britain is now less than 1 over the last few weeks. On this basis the risk level for poultry with sub-optimal biosecurity in Great Britain is lowered from high (medium uncertainty) to MEDIUM (occurs regularly) with high uncertainty.
Conclusion Since our previous assessment on 19 December 2025, cases of HPAI H5Nx in wild birds in Great Britain have continued to steadily fall from very high levels week on week to around 20 cases per week. These are mainly resident waterbirds such as mute swans, Canada and greylag geese. Although the number of cases in wild birds continues to fall, there are still a number of reports weekly in various locations in Great Britain including inland sites and across multiple waterbird species. Therefore, the national risk level for HPAI H5 in wild birds in Great Britain is maintained at VERY HIGH (occurs almost certainly). Wild bird cases are continuing at high levels in Europe particularly in Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. At this time of year (almost March), it is very unlikely that wild birds would fly from Continental Europe into Great Britain. The risk to poultry where stringent biosecurity is maintained is decreasing in line with the decrease in wild bird cases as shown in the fall in the number of IPs each week. With no outbreaks in stringent biosecurity premises in the last month, the risk level for poultry with stringent biosecurity is reduced from medium to LOW (with medium uncertainty). The risk of infection of poultry in Great Britain with suboptimal biosecurity is maintained at HIGH (occurs very often) with medium uncertainty. This risk level reflects the continued considerable infection pressure from wild birds at multiple locations in Great Britain, and the upcoming large-scale movements of waterfowl within Great Britain as part of outward migration. Good biosecurity practices remain of utmost importance. We are continuing to closely monitor the situation in Europe and to review the risk. It is important that stringent adherence to good biosecurity practices is maintained.
Europe Between 20 December 2025 and 26 February 2026 there were a total of 2,395 HPAI H5 events in domestic poultry, captive birds and non-poultry including wild birds across Europe reported by the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). Of these reports on WOAH, 2,132 were in wild birds, 92 in non-commercial poultry and 177 were poultry outbreaks. In total there were 2,100 wild bird cases of HPAI H5N1 including 2 in Iceland in January 2026. Of interest, there were single cases of HPAI H5N2 in wildfowl in Latvia (mallard duck) and Sweden (barnacle goose) in November 2025, although HPAI H5N2 has not been detected further west this season. There was also a case of HPAI H5N6 in a gull in Portugal in November. Positive reports according to data from IZSVe (2025) have fluctuated at around 200 per week since January 2026 as shown in Figure 3. Reports continue to be dominated by the large number of wild bird cases, although the number of cases in common cranes has greatly diminished with 209 reported since 20 December 2026 and most of these (164) detected in Germany in December with 41 in France, all detected in December.
Wild birds The weekly number of HPAI H5-positive wild bird cases in Great Britain is shown in Figure 2. Between 19 December and 27 February (based on laboratory testing date), HPAI H5 has been detected in 284 found-dead wild birds, including 26 wild bird species (data available https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/avian-influenza in-wild-birds ), across 72 counties. Wild bird cases since 19 December have been reported at both inland and coastal locations across Great Britain (Map 2). The majority of the findings were in England (189), with 86 in Scotland and 9 in Wales (based on laboratory testing date) It should be noted that there is a variable lag period between the collection of found-dead wild birds to sampling, testing, and the reporting of results. It is important to note that these surveillance figures for Great Britain are based on passive surveillance of found dead birds reported to Defra by the general public and as such, may be affected by several factors including frequency of visitors accessing areas with bird populations, the potential for immunity in the wild bird population (which may result in fewer birds developing clinical disease and or dying with HPAI), variable surveillance system sensitivity, as well as the size, location and accessibility of carcasses, meaning that this wild bird surveillance does not necessarily capture all of the cases that occur. We will continue to monitor the situation closely.
Situation assessment Here, an HPAI H5Nx event refers to a report of HPAI in poultry, or a location with at least one HPAI H5Nx positive wild bird. Individual HPAI H5Nx positive wild birds are referred to as cases. United Kingdom Poultry Infected Premises Since our last outbreak assessment on 19 December 2025 (to 24 February 2026) there have been 25 infected premises (IPs) confirmed with HPAI H5N1 in poultry. Of these, 18 occurred in England and 7 in Scotland (see Map 1 for approximate locations). These have been reported in a mixture of backyard and commercial premises housing poultry. The majority of recent IPs in Great Britain have been genotyped as DI.2.1. The number of IPs per week in Great Britain peaked at 14 in week 45 (see Figure 1) prompting the increase in the risk level for poultry with suboptimal biosecurity from high to very high in our previous outbreak assessment on 11 November 2025. However, since week 45, the number of IPs per week has fallen week on week with on average around 1 per week in February.
Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs Preliminary Outbreak Assessment #5 High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) in Great Britain & Europe 27 February 2026 Disease report In our previous outbreak assessment on 19 December 2025 we noted that cases of high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) H5 in wild birds were continuing at high levels both in Europe and Great Britain and the wild bird risk level in Great Britain was still considered to be VERY HIGH. Since then, wild bird cases in Great Britain have continued, albeit slowly falling from the peak in December, with 273 more cases of HPAI H5 clade 2.3.4.4b events involving ‘found-dead’ wild birds (number based on laboratory testing date). The total in Great Britain since the start of the HPAI season on 1 October 2025 is now 854. Of these 854, 839 have been confirmed as HPAI H5N1, 11 as HPAI H5Nx and 4 as HPAI H5N5. Wild bird cases since our previous outbreak assessment on 19 December 2025 extend across most of Great Britain with many inland cases. Wild bird cases have slowly fallen in the first 2 months of 2026 roughly halving from around 40 per week in January to 20 per week in February with just 11 cases in the last week of February. Most wild bird cases in Great Britain in 2026 have been in resident water birds namely mute swans, Canada geese and greylag geese, with some cases in migratory pink-footed geese. There were two cases in seabirds, namely a puffin in Tayside and a gannet in Suffolk. Also there was a case of the BB ‘gull strain’ (as opposed to the DI.2.1 genotype) in a herring gull in Wales in late January. Given the relatively high number of cases in wild bird ongoing in February, the wild bird risk level across Great Britain is maintained at VERY HIGH. The number of migratory waterbirds overwintering in Great Britain will have peaked in December and January and few birds are now expected to fly over to Great Britain from northern Europe, where positive reports of HPAI H5 have continued…
Activity involving giant microbes and different therapeutics (antibiotics, antivirals, vaccines).
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Preliminary outbreak assessment High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) antibodies in dairy cattle in the Netherlands 13 February 2026 Disease report summary. The first report of HPAI antibodies in dairy cattle was reported by the Netherlands Authorities on 23 January 2026. Antibodies to HPAI H5N1 were found in a single cow, initially, which had experienced mastitis and breathing difficulties back in December. Sampling on the farm began after a sick cat from the farm tested positive for H5N1 and subsequently died in late December. Additional testing on the farm identified four other cows that had antibodies against HPAI H5N1. There was no evidence of active infection. Viral RNA could not be detected from any of the blood or milk samples from cows on the farm, meaning sequencing of the strain present in the cattle was not possible. There were no reports of human infection on the farm. There is no evidence of wider circulation of HPAI in cattle in the Netherlands or mammalian-adapted strains circulating in wild birds or poultry in the country. The risk of incursion of strains from the Netherlands capable of infecting cattle is therefore considered very low (very rare but cannot be excluded), with an associated uncertainty due to the lack of sequence data on the Netherlands strain, and hence no comparison possible to those strains still circulating in wild birds in the UK.
Abstract Infection with pnuemococcus bacteria is generally mild but can be more severe in the young and elderly, causing invasive pneumococcal disease (IPD) and community-acquired pneumonia (CAP). Although paediatric pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (PCV) programmes and elderly pneumococcal polysaccharide vaccine (PPV) programmes have reduced cases, we estimate that pneumococcal infection still leads to direct health care costs of around \pounds68M and approximately 16 thousand QALY losses in England per year. The public health situation is complicated by the large number of interacting serotypes, such that while serotype-specific vaccines reduced the target serotypes others arose to replace them. We develop a novel (relatively) low-dimensional model to capture the interaction of 26 common pneumococcal serotypes. The model is matched to English IPD data from 2000-2023 and to five carriage studies (conducted in 2001/02, 2008, 2012, 2015 and 2018). When combined with a health economic approach, this model allows us to calculate the willingness to pay for paediatric vaccination with PCV7 (introduced in England in 2006), PCV13 (introduced in England in 2010) and the future vaccination of both the young and elderly with PCV20, which offers protection against 20 serotypes. Due to rapid serotype replacement, we find that the introduction of PCV7 vaccination in 2006 was not cost effective - a result that could not have been anticipated at the time, but is supported by simple statistical fits to the IPD data. In contrast, switching to PCV13 in 2010 and switching to PCV20 in 2026 are both associated with a high willingness to pay for a single dose. Given pneumococcal disease has shifted over time to become predominantly in the older adult population, we find that switching from PPV23 to PCV20 vaccination in those aged 65 and introducing an additional PCV20 vaccine at age 75 are both cost effective for a sufficiently low vaccine price.
HPAI key figures for the current seasonal wave (Oct 2025 - Sep 2026) and the two previous waves (Oct 2023 - Sep 2024; Oct 2024 - Sep 2025). 01 Oct 2023 – 30 Sep 2024. Countries and territories reporting HPAI in poultry: 39 No. of HPAI outbreaks in poultry: 851 Countries and territories reporting HPAI in wild birds: 55 No. of HPAI outbreaks in wild birds: 1076 01 Oct 2024 – 30 Sep 2025 Countries and territories reporting HPAI in poultry: 50 No. of HPAI outbreaks in poultry: 1410 Countries and territories reporting HPAI in wild birds: 55 No. of HPAI outbreaks in wild birds: 1918 01 Oct 2025 – 31 Jan 2026 Countries and territories reporting HPAI in poultry: 32 No. of HPAI outbreaks in poultry: 928 Countries and territories reporting HPAI in wild birds: 41 No. of HPAI outbreaks in wild birds: 4239
Antigenic characterisation. UKHSA RVU performs antigenic characterisation of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09, influenza A(H3N2) and influenza B viruses using haemagglutination inhibition (HI) assays. Data from these assays are used to compare how similar the currently circulating influenza viruses are to the strains included in seasonal influenza vaccines, and to monitor for changes in circulating influenza viruses. Similarity of currently circulating influenza strains to vaccine strains is defined as having an antibody titre within 4-fold when compared to reference viruses representative of the vaccine strain - A(H1N1)pdm09: 38 A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses have been antigenically characterised and 38 were similar to reference viruses representative of the A/Wisconsin/67/2022 (H1N1)pdm09-like and A/Victoria/4897/2022 (H1N1)pdm09‑like Northern Hemisphere 2025/26 (H1N1)pdm09 vaccine strains - A(H3N2): 165 A(H3N2) viruses have been antigenically characterised and 9 were similar to reference viruses representative of the A/District of Columbia/27/2023 (H3N2)-like and A/Croatia/10136RV/2023 (H3N2) like Northern Hemisphere 2025/26 (H3N2) vaccine strains. 156 viruses were antigenically distant from the Northern Hemisphere 2025/26 vaccine strains: 151 belonged to the K subclade, 4 belonged to the J.2.4 subclade and 1 belonged to the J.2.3 subclade. - B/Victoria: 1 influenza B viruses have been antigenically characterised and was similar to reference viruses representative of the B/Austria/1359417/2021 (B/Victoria lineage)‑like Northern Hemisphere 2025/26 influenza B vaccine strain
Antigenic characterisation. UKHSA RVU performs antigenic characterisation of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09, influenza A(H3N2) and influenza B viruses using haemagglutination inhibition (HI) assays. Data from these assays are used to compare how similar the currently circulating influenza viruses are to the strains included in seasonal influenza vaccines, and to monitor for changes in circulating influenza viruses. Similarity of currently circulating influenza strains to vaccine strains is defined as having an antibody titre within 4-fold when compared to reference viruses representative of the vaccine strain - A(H1N1)pdm09: 38 A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses have been antigenically characterised and 38 were similar to reference viruses representative of the A/Wisconsin/67/2022 (H1N1)pdm09-like and A/Victoria/4897/2022 (H1N1)pdm09‑like Northern Hemisphere 2025/26 (H1N1)pdm09 vaccine strains - A(H3N2): 165 A(H3N2) viruses have been antigenically characterised and 9 were similar to reference viruses representative of the A/District of Columbia/27/2023 (H3N2)-like and A/Croatia/10136RV/2023 (H3N2) like Northern Hemisphere 2025/26 (H3N2) vaccine strains. 156 viruses were antigenically distant from the Northern Hemisphere 2025/26 vaccine strains: 151 belonged to the K subclade, 4 belonged to the J.2.4 subclade and 1 belonged to the J.2.3 subclade. - B/Victoria: 1 influenza B viruses have been antigenically characterised and was similar to reference viruses representative of the B/Austria/1359417/2021 (B/Victoria lineage)‑like Northern Hemisphere 2025/26 influenza B vaccine strain.
Influenza virus characterisation Analysis of viruses from primary and secondary care shows that circulating A(H1N1)pdm09 show genetic diversity - antigenic characterisation of currently circulating A(H1N1)pdm09 shows that these are antigenically similar to the A(H1N1)pdm09 strain included in the Northern Hemisphere 2025 to 2026 vaccine. The characterisation of circulating A(H3N2) viruses show that A(H3N2) viruses are diverse (genetically). Most sequenced viruses to date belong to genetic subclade K. Antigenic characterisation indicates low reactivity of these viruses with post infection ferret antisera raised against the Northern Hemisphere vaccine H3N2 viral components. To date, only a small number of influenza B viruses have been detected, which show some genetic diversity, and antigenic characterization of these viruses is ongoing. Early vaccine effectiveness data indicates that vaccines continue to provide protection against clinical disease despite these observations for A(H3N2). (https://www.eurosurveillance.org/content/10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2025.30.46.2500854#html_fulltext) Genetic characterisation Between week 40 2025 (week ending 5 October 2025) and week 7 2026 (week ending 15 February 2026), the UKHSA respiratory virus unit (RVU) has genetically characterised 1,694 seasonal influenza viruses, and identified 1,479 influenza A(H3N2) viruses, 205 influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses, and 10 influenza B viruses. Details of the characterised viruses by subtype are shown in tables 1, 2 and 3. The RVU has confirmed by genome sequencing the detection of live attenuated influenza vaccine (LAIV) viruses in 9 influenza A/B positive samples collected from children aged between 2 and 16 years of age.
Influenza activity summary. Influenza activity decreased and is circulating at baseline levels. Emergency department (ED) attendances for influenza-like-illness (ILI) decreased. The number of influenza-confirmed acute respiratory infection (ARI) incidents remained stable. Of influenza viruses subtyped at the UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA) Respiratory Virus Unit throughout this season, the majority were A(H3N2). Indicator: Laboratory surveillance Trend: Decreasing Level: Baseline Data: Influenza positivity decreased with a weekly mean positivity rate of 3% compared with 4% in the previous week. Indicator: Influenza-like illnesses (ILI) General Practice (GP) consultations Trend: Decreasing Level: Baseline Data: The weekly ILI consultation rate decreased to 5.5 per 100,000 registered population in participating GP practices compared with 6.3 per 100,000 in the previous week. Indicator: GP swabbing positivity Trend: Increasing Level: Low Data: In week 7, among all tested samples, 12.2% were positive for influenza, compared with 7.1% in the previous week. Indicator: Hospital admissions Trend: Decreasing Level: Baseline Data: The overall weekly hospital admission rate for influenza hospitalisations was decreasing at 1.30 per 100,000 compared with 1.61 per 100,000 in the previous week. Indicator: ICU/HDU admissions Trend: Remained low Level: Baseline Data: The overall weekly hospital admission rate for influenza ICU-HDU remained low at 0.04 per 100,000 compared with 0.06 per 100,000 in the previous week.
Antigenic characterisation. UKHSA RVU performs antigenic characterisation of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09, influenza A(H3N2) and influenza B viruses using haemagglutination inhibition (HI) assays. Data from these assays are used to compare how similar the currently circulating influenza viruses are to the strains included in seasonal influenza vaccines, and to monitor for changes in circulating influenza viruses. Similarity of currently circulating influenza strains to vaccine strains is defined as having an antibody titre within 4-fold when compared to reference viruses representative of the vaccine strain - A(H1N1)pdm09: 38 A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses have been antigenically characterised and 38 were similar to reference viruses representative of the A/Wisconsin/67/2022 (H1N1)pdm09-like and A/Victoria/4897/2022 (H1N1)pdm09‑like Northern Hemisphere 2025/26 (H1N1)pdm09 vaccine strains - A(H3N2): 131 A(H3N2) viruses have been antigenically characterised and 9 were similar to reference viruses representative of the A/District of Columbia/27/2023 (H3N2)-like and A/Croatia/10136RV/2023 (H3N2) like Northern Hemisphere 2025/26 (H3N2) vaccine strains. 122 viruses were antigenically distant from the Northern Hemisphere 2025/26 vaccine strains: 117 belonged to the K subclade, 4 belonged to the J.2.4 subclade and 1 belonged to the J.2.3 subclade. - B/Victoria: 1 influenza B viruses have been antigenically characterised and was similar to reference viruses representative of the B/Austria/1359417/2021 (B/Victoria lineage)‑like Northern Hemisphere 2025/26 influenza B vaccine strain.
Antigenic characterisation. UKHSA RVU performs antigenic characterisation of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09, influenza A(H3N2) and influenza B viruses using haemagglutination inhibition (HI) assays. Data from these assays are used to compare how similar the currently circulating influenza viruses are to the strains included in seasonal influenza vaccines, and to monitor for changes in circulating influenza viruses. Similarity of currently circulating influenza strains to vaccine strains is defined as having an antibody titre within 4-fold when compared to reference viruses representative of the vaccine strain - A(H1N1)pdm09: 38 A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses have been antigenically characterised and 38 were similar to reference viruses representative of the A/Wisconsin/67/2022 (H1N1)pdm09-like and A/Victoria/4897/2022 (H1N1)pdm09‑like Northern Hemisphere 2025/26 (H1N1)pdm09 vaccine strains - A(H3N2): 131 A(H3N2) viruses have been antigenically characterised and 9 were similar to reference viruses representative of the A/District of Columbia/27/2023 (H3N2)-like and A/Croatia/10136RV/2023 (H3N2) like Northern Hemisphere 2025/26 (H3N2) vaccine strains. 122 viruses were antigenically distant from the Northern Hemisphere 2025/26 vaccine strains: 117 belonged to the K subclade, 4 belonged to the J.2.4 subclade and 1 belonged to the J.2.3 subclade. - B/Victoria: 1 influenza B viruses have been antigenically characterised and was similar to reference viruses representative of the B/Austria/1359417/2021 (B/Victoria lineage)‑like Northern Hemisphere 2025/26 influenza B vaccine strain.
Influenza virus characterisation Analysis of viruses from primary and secondary care shows that circulating A(H1N1)pdm09 show genetic diversity - antigenic characterisation of currently circulating A(H1N1)pdm09 shows that these are antigenically similar to the A(H1N1)pdm09 strain included in the Northern Hemisphere 2025 to 2026 vaccine. The characterisation of circulating A(H3N2) viruses show that A(H3N2) viruses are diverse (genetically). Most sequenced viruses to date belong to genetic subclade K. Antigenic characterisation indicates low reactivity of these viruses with post infection ferret antisera raised against the Northern Hemisphere vaccine H3N2 viral components. To date, only a small number of influenza B viruses have been detected, which show some genetic diversity, and antigenic characterization of these viruses is ongoing. Early vaccine effectiveness data indicates that vaccines continue to provide protection against clinical disease despite these observations for A(H3N2). (https://www.eurosurveillance.org/content/10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2025.30.46.2500854#html_fulltext) Genetic characterisation Between week 40 2025 (week ending 5 October 2025) and week 6 2026 (week ending 8 February 2026), the UKHSA respiratory virus unit (RVU) has genetically characterised 1,694 seasonal influenza viruses, and identified 1,479 influenza A(H3N2) viruses, 205 influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses, and 10 influenza B viruses. Details of the characterised viruses by subtype are shown in tables 1, 2 and 3. The RVU has confirmed by genome sequencing the detection of live attenuated influenza vaccine (LAIV) viruses in 9 influenza A/B positive samples collected from children aged between 2 and 16 years of age.
Influenza activity summary. Influenza activity decreased and is circulating at baseline levels. Emergency department (ED) attendances for influenza-like-illness (ILI) decreased. The number of influenza-confirmed acute respiratory infection (ARI) incidents remained stable. Of influenza viruses subtyped at the UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA) Respiratory Virus Unit throughout this season, the majority were A(H3N2). Indicator: Laboratory surveillance Trend: Decreasing Level: Baseline Data: Influenza positivity decreased with a weekly mean positivity rate of 3.9% compared with 5.5% in the previous week. Indicator: Influenza-like illnesses (ILI) General Practice (GP) consultations Trend: Decreasing Level: Baseline Data: The weekly ILI consultation rate decreased to 6.3 per 100,000 registered population in participating GP practices compared with 7.6 per 100,000 in the previous week. Indicator: GP swabbing positivity Trend: Decreasing Level: Baseline Data: In week 6, among all tested samples, 8.1% were positive for influenza, compared with 10.2% in the previous week. Indicator: Hospital admissions Trend: Decreasing Level: Baseline Data: The overall weekly hospital admission rate for influenza hospitalisations was decreasing at 1.48 per 100,000 compared with 2.13 per 100,000 in the previous week. Indicator: ICU/HDU admissions Trend: Decreasing Level: Baseline Data: The overall weekly hospital admission rate for influenza ICU-HDU was decreasing at 0.06 per 100,000 compared with 0.12 per 100,000 in the previous week.
Influenza vaccination Provisional weekly vaccine uptake data for GP patients (2 and 3 year olds, pregnant women, those under 65 years in clinical risk groups and those aged 65 years and over) was reported between week 40 2025 and week 4 2026. The last weekly data of 2025 to 2026 season was published in the week 5 report (https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/national-flu-and-covid-19-surveillance-reports-2025-to-2026-season/national-flu-and-covid-19-surveillance-report-29-january-2026-week-5) On 29 January 2026, monthly vaccine uptake data was published for the third time this season, which covered influenza vaccinations given between 1 September and 31 December 2025 for GP patients, school-aged-children and frontline healthcare workers. Further monthly data will be published on 26 February 2026 which will cover influenza vaccinations given between 1 September and 31 January 2026 for GP patients, school-aged-children and frontline healthcare workers.
Antigenic characterisation. UKHSA RVU performs antigenic characterisation of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09, influenza A(H3N2) and influenza B viruses using haemagglutination inhibition (HI) assays. Data from these assays are used to compare how similar the currently circulating influenza viruses are to the strains included in seasonal influenza vaccines, and to monitor for changes in circulating influenza viruses. Similarity of currently circulating influenza strains to vaccine strains is defined as having an antibody titre within 4-fold when compared to reference viruses representative of the vaccine strain - A(H1N1)pdm09: 38 A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses have been antigenically characterised and 38 were similar to reference viruses representative of the A/Wisconsin/67/2022 (H1N1)pdm09-like and A/Victoria/4897/2022 (H1N1)pdm09‑like Northern Hemisphere 2025/26 (H1N1)pdm09 vaccine strains - A(H3N2): 114 A(H3N2) viruses have been antigenically characterised and 8 were similar to reference viruses representative of the A/District of Columbia/27/2023 (H3N2)-like and A/Croatia/10136RV/2023 (H3N2) like Northern Hemisphere 2025/26 (H3N2) vaccine strains. 106 viruses were antigenically distant from the Northern Hemisphere 2025/26 vaccine strains: 101 belonged to the K subclade, 4 belonged to the J.2.4 subclade and 1 belonged to the J.2.3 subclade. - B/Victoria: No influenza B viruses have been antigenically characterised since week 40 2025.
Antigenic characterisation. UKHSA RVU performs antigenic characterisation of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09, influenza A(H3N2) and influenza B viruses using haemagglutination inhibition (HI) assays. Data from these assays are used to compare how similar the currently circulating influenza viruses are to the strains included in seasonal influenza vaccines, and to monitor for changes in circulating influenza viruses. Similarity of currently circulating influenza strains to vaccine strains is defined as having an antibody titre within 4-fold when compared to reference viruses representative of the vaccine strain - A(H1N1)pdm09: 38 A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses have been antigenically characterised and 38 were similar to reference viruses representative of the A/Wisconsin/67/2022 (H1N1)pdm09-like and A/Victoria/4897/2022 (H1N1)pdm09‑like Northern Hemisphere 2025/26 (H1N1)pdm09 vaccine strains - A(H3N2): 114 A(H3N2) viruses have been antigenically characterised and 8 were similar to reference viruses representative of the A/District of Columbia/27/2023 (H3N2)-like and A/Croatia/10136RV/2023 (H3N2) like Northern Hemisphere 2025/26 (H3N2) vaccine strains. 106 viruses were antigenically distant from the Northern Hemisphere 2025/26 vaccine strains: 101 belonged to the K subclade, 4 belonged to the J.2.4 subclade and 1 belonged to the J.2.3 subclade. - B/Victoria: No influenza B viruses have been antigenically characterised since week 40 2025.
Influenza virus characterisation Analysis of viruses from primary and secondary care shows that circulating A(H1N1)pdm09 show genetic diversity - antigenic characterisation of currently circulating A(H1N1)pdm09 shows that these are antigenically similar to the A(H1N1)pdm09 strain included in the Northern Hemisphere 2025 to 2026 vaccine. The characterisation of circulating A(H3N2) viruses show that A(H3N2) viruses are diverse (genetically). Most sequenced viruses to date belong to genetic subclade K. Antigenic characterisation indicates low reactivity of these viruses with post infection ferret antisera raised against the Northern Hemisphere vaccine H3N2 viral components. To date, only a small number of influenza B viruses have been detected, which show some genetic diversity, and antigenic characterization of these viruses is ongoing. Early vaccine effectiveness data indicates that vaccines continue to provide protection against clinical disease despite these observations for A(H3N2). (https://www.eurosurveillance.org/content/10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2025.30.46.2500854#html_fulltext) Genetic characterisation Between week 40 2025 (week ending 5 October 2025) and week 5 2026 (week ending 1 February 2026), the UKHSA respiratory virus unit (RVU) has genetically characterised 1,651 seasonal influenza viruses, and identified 1,449 influenza A(H3N2) viruses, 196 influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses, and 6 influenza B viruses. Details of the characterised viruses by subtype are shown in tables 1, 2 and 3. The RVU has confirmed by genome sequencing the detection of live attenuated influenza vaccine (LAIV) viruses in 9 influenza A/B positive samples collected from children aged between 2 and 16 years of age.
Influenza activity summary. Influenza activity decreased and is circulating at low levels. Emergency department (ED) attendances for influenza-like-illness (ILI) decreased. The number of influenza-confirmed acute respiratory infection (ARI) incidents decreased. Of influenza viruses subtyped at the UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA) Respiratory Virus Unit throughout this season, the majority were A(H3N2) Weekly influenza vaccine uptake for the 2025 to 2026 season was reported for the last time this season in week 4 (data up to 25 January 2026). Compared with the equivalent week last season (2024 to 2025), vaccine uptake is higher for pregnant women, those aged 2 and those aged 3 and comparable for those aged under 65 years in clinical risk groups and those aged 65 years and over. Indicator: Laboratory surveillance Trend: Decreasing Level: Low Data: Influenza positivity decreased with a weekly mean positivity rate of 5.4% compared with 7.1% in the previous week. Indicator: Influenza-like illnesses (ILI) General Practice (GP) consultations Trend: Decreasing Level: Baseline Data: The weekly ILI consultation rate decreased to 7.6 per 100,000 registered population in participating GP practices compared with 9.4 per 100,000 in the previous week. Indicator: GP swabbing positivity Trend: Increasing Level: Low Data: In week 5, among all tested samples, 14.7% were positive for influenza, compared with 11.5% in the previous week. Indicator: Hospital admissions Trend: Decreasing Level: Low Data: The overall weekly hospital admission rate for influenza hospitalisations was decreasing at 2.19 per 100,000 compared with 3.35 per 100,000 in the previous week. Indicator: ICU/HDU admissions Trend: Stable Level: Low Data: The overall weekly hospital admission rate for influenza ICU-HDU was stable at 0.14 per 100,000 compared with 0.14 per 100,000 in the previous week.
This week, provisional monthly data on influenza vaccine uptake in frontline healthcare workers was published, showing vaccine uptake at national, commissioning region, and trust level, and by staff group, between 1 September and 31 December 2025. National vaccine uptake (44.2%) is 8 percentage points higher than the same time point in the previous season (36.2%). Vaccination for this group started from 1 and 3 October respectively in 2025 to 2026 and 2024 to 2025 seasons, rather than 1 September as in previous seasons.
This week, provisional monthly data on influenza vaccine uptake in children of school years reception to year 11 was published, showing the provisional proportion of children who received the 2025 to 2026 influenza vaccine via school, pharmacy or GP practice between 1 September and 31 December 2025. For primary school aged children (4 to 10 years of age), national vaccine uptake was 55.2% (1.2 percentage points higher than the same timepoint in the previous season); and for secondary school aged children (11 to 15 years of age) was 46.9% (2.9 percentage points higher than the same timepoint in the previous season).
Influenza vaccine uptake in GP patients Weekly vaccine uptake data is provisional. Influenza vaccination is reported by GP practice through the ImmForm website. ImmForm provides a secure online platform for vaccine uptake data collection for several immunisation surveys, including the seasonal influenza vaccine uptake collection. Details can be found at sources of surveillance data for influenza, COVID-19 and other respiratory viruses: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/sources-of-surveillance-data-for-influenza-covid-19-and-other-respiratory-viruses#vaccine-uptake For the 2025 to 2026 season’s vaccination programme, as in previous seasons children and pregnant women have been eligible since 1 September. For this current season and the previous season (2025 to 2026 and 2024 to 2025 seasons respectively), adult groups (excluding pregnant women) were eligible from the start of October (01 October 2025 and 03 October 2024 respectively), rather than 1 September as in previous seasons. See the Timing section of the annual flu letter for more information: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-flu-immunisation-programme-plan-2025-to-2026 Up to the end of week 4 of 2026 (Sunday 25 January 2026), the provisional proportion of people in England who had received an influenza vaccine this season in targeted groups was as follows: Children (99% of GP practices reporting): - 43.4% of children aged 2 years - 44.6% in children aged 3 years Compared with the equivalent week last season (2024 to 2025), vaccine uptake is higher for pregnant women, those aged 2 and those aged 3 and comparable for those aged under 65 years in clinical risk groups and those aged 65 years and over.
Influenza vaccine uptake in GP patients. Weekly vaccine uptake data is provisional. Influenza vaccination is reported by GP practice through the ImmForm website. ImmForm provides a secure online platform for vaccine uptake data collection for several immunisation surveys, including the seasonal influenza vaccine uptake collection. Details can be found at sources of surveillance data for influenza, COVID-19 and other respiratory viruses: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/sources-of-surveillance-data-for-influenza-covid-19-and-other-respiratory-viruses#vaccine-uptake For the 2025 to 2026 season’s vaccination programme, as in previous seasons children and pregnant women have been eligible since 1 September. For this current season and the previous season (2025 to 2026 and 2024 to 2025 seasons respectively), adult groups (excluding pregnant women) were eligible from the start of October (01 October 2025 and 03 October 2024 respectively), rather than 1 September as in previous seasons. See the Timing section of the annual flu letter for more information: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-flu-immunisation-programme-plan-2025-to-2026 Up to the end of week 4 of 2026 (Sunday 25 January 2026), the provisional proportion of people in England who had received an influenza vaccine this season in targeted groups was as follows: Adults (99% of GP practices reporting through Immform): - 40.5% in those aged under 65 years in a clinical risk group - 38.5% in all pregnant women - 74.2% in all those aged over 65 years Compared with the equivalent week last season (2024 to 2025), vaccine uptake is higher for pregnant women, those aged 2 and those aged 3 and comparable for those aged under 65 years in clinical risk groups and those aged 65 years and over.