Greg

@jamyang.net

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Cover page of a report titled “Digital Transnational Repression of Uyghurs: The Costs of Dissent Beyond Borders” by Reyhan Topal. The minimalist cream-colored design features large grey serif text, thin coral horizontal lines, three grey dots near the bottom, and the logos “UTJD” (Uyghur Transitional Justice Database.) and “OTF” (Open Technology Fund) in reddish-orange.
15.23 EDT Orbán concedes election to Tisza’s Magyar That’s it. Viktor Orbán is now speaking at Fidesz’s election night and he says the election result is “clear” as he concedes defeat. He says he congratulated the winning party and admits the result is painful for Fidesz.
Striking graphic with a Chinese flag background and several CCTV cameras labeled #Hikvision and #Dahua around a large red “BANNED” stamp. Headline says, “India bans Chinese CCTV giants Hikvision and Dahua.” Smaller text says that from April 1 the companies will be barred from selling internet connected CCTV cameras in India as part of tighter security standards under MeitY’s Essential Requirements norms introduced in April 2024. (c) 2026 TibCERT Tech Update
Council of theEuropean UnionBrussels, 10 March 2026(OR. en)5136/26LIMITECORLX 12CFSP/PESC 19RELEX 11CYBER 6JAI 23FIN 10LEGISLATIVE ACTS AND OTHER INSTRUMENTSSubject: COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION implementing Regulation(EU) 2019/796 concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacksthreatening the Union or its Member States Source: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5136-2026-INIT/en/pdf
THE GALAXY OF FIMI OPERATIONS IN 2025
Figure 14_Layers of the architecture of FIMI threats and deterrence mechanisms included in the FIMI Toolbox
Instead of carefully targeting a single audience, AI tools aredeployed at scale to keep a steady stream of content flowing.The objective is not precision but presence, ensuring thatnarratives are constantly circulating, even without clearlydefined targets.
Figure 20_Example of impersonation video by #Spamouflage on #Bluesky
The new old: Spamouflage content creationThe IMS Spamouflage consists of newly created, repurposed,or hijacked53 social media accounts that post and amplifystate messaging across more than 50 platforms54, engagingalmost exclusively with other Spamouflage content. In2025, Spamouflage perfectioned a new attack pattern: theuse of AI-assisted impersonation videos. This buildson its previous creation of poorly edited pictures andis specifically employed to degrade dissidents anddiscredit opposition voices.Spamouflage appears to use AI to produce more content.Its accounts frequently share AI-generated cartoons builtaround similar narratives, allowing them to quickly generatelarge amounts of tailored material targeting specific actorsor issues.Even if overall engagement remains low, the repeatedposting of varied content creates the impression thatthese views are widely shared. For example, this techniquewas used to target both the EU and the US, with at least50 AI-generated cartoons portraying the EU as subordinateto the US.Spamouflage has also used AI to refine its impersonationtactics and vary its attacks. The IMS manipulated videosusing AI tools to imitate opposing voices. This marks a stepbeyond its earlier use of poorly edited images targetingindividuals.
SPAMOUFLAGEThe Chinese-aligned IMS47 is only partially representedin the graph for illustrative purposes, as it comprises alarge number of inauthentic accounts that would otherwiseovercrowd the visualisation. The IMS is mostly activeon X, where its activity is organised around clustersof accounts. These clusters are characterised by theirown behavioural patterns, and are mobilised for specificpurposes, like responding to breaking news events, targetingdissidents or advancing Chinese propaganda points. Asa result, the IMS does not follow a single, consistentoperational model. One prominent pattern of Spamouflageinvolves a first cluster of seeder accounts impersonatingdissidents, which post a video or an image containing falseallegations. Then, a second cluster of amplifier accounts thatdisseminate the content by posting it as a reply to relevantentities, such as government bodies accounts. Finally, athird cluster of accounts posts, also as a reply to similarentities, a screenshot of the initial video and hashtags tocriticise and call for action against the dissident who allegedlypublished the content. A later section of the report examinesSpamouflage’s emerging use of AI-generated impersonationvideos.
The narrative portraying the EU as subservient to the US interms of foreign policy (e.g. on Gaza, Ukraine) remained,but this year also included criticism of the EU leadershipas hawkish on China, as well as on Russia, Iran, and theDPRK. The change of US trade policy was used to deploynarratives calling for closer cooperation between theEU and China in setting up a new multilateral order.This narrative was particularly prominent around theEU-China Leaders’ Summit in July. The so-called bigfour topics (Taiwan, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet)featured heavily, primarily through defensive posture onhuman rights abuses in Xinjiang and Tibet. Hong Kong,Taiwan, and the situation in the South China Sea wereused in conjunction with promoting China’s concepts andviews on sovereignty and territorial claims. The ecosystemcontinued presenting Russia’s war against Ukraine andUkraine's accession to the EU as a source of division. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2026/documents/EEAS%204th%20Threat%20Report_web%20version_1.pdf
Map titled “Tibet–Guangdong ultra-high-voltage power transmission project route”. Credit: SCMP Graphics, (c) OpenStreetMap contributors.
A paperback book titled Ocean, as Much as Rain by Tsering Woeser lies on an oak table. The cover features a colourful, circular mandala-like design with layered patterns, clouds, and waves in blues, oranges, and greens, with a small empty chair at the centre. Subtitles note it is a collection of stories, lyrical prose, & poems from Tibet, edited and translated by Fiona Sze-Lorrain with Dechen Pemba.
Historians Produce Pattern Recognition The Associated Press investigation into Silicon Valley’s role in building China’s surveillance state reads like an old 1940s playbook. The birth of Silicon Valley was unlimited federal funding to develop radar technology for Allied forces. Eventually the results threatened American planes over Korea in a devastating turnabout. The cultural shock resuled in a “Top Gun” project that only escalated the cycles. This context matters greatly when considering tech giants like IBM, Dell, Cisco, and Intel spending over two decades essentially building the world’s most sophisticated digital prisons and handing the keys to America’s most obvious geopolitical rival. The scale of stupidity is sobering. American companies sold billions of dollars in surveillance technology to Chinese police and government agencies, as if emboldened by repeated Congressional warnings that these tools were being used to crush dissent and target minorities. Can you imagine a CEO at a tech firm giving an executive team presentation that “these elected politicians are telling us if we get rich helping China we also can destroy democracy and instrument racism globally, hell yeah!”
Caption: Cybersecurity expert, Greg Walton believes the government is focused on monitoring religious life. Credit: Hardcash Productions
Screen shot text: The Chinese have a new tool called Massistant. Massistant is the presumed successor to Chinese forensics tool, “MFSocket”, reported in 2019 and attributed to publicly traded cybersecurity company, Meiya Pico. The forensics tool works in tandem with a corresponding desktop software. Massistant gains access to device GPS location data, SMS messages, images, audio, contacts and phone services. Meiya Pico maintains partnerships with domestic and international law enforcement partners, both as a surveillance hardware and software provider, as well as through training programs for law enforcement personnel. From a news article: The good news, per Balaam, is that Massistant leaves evidence of its compromise on the seized device, meaning users can potentially identify and delete the malware, either because the hacking tool appears as an app, or can be found and deleted using more sophisticated tools such as the Android Debug Bridge, a command line tool that lets a user connect to a device through their computer. The bad news is that at the time of installing Massistant, the damage is done, and authorities already have the person’s data. Slashdot thread.
Screenshot of BlackHat(USA) overview of Ron Deibert's keynote: "Keynote: Chasing Shadows: Chronicles of Counter-Intelligence from the Citizen Lab Ron Deibert | Director, The Citizen Lab, Professor of Political Science, University of Toronto Date: Wednesday, August 6 | 1:30pm-2:10pm ( Oceanside A, Level 2 ) Format: 40-Minute Keynote Track: Keynote For over twenty years, the University of Toronto's Citizen Lab has pioneered investigations into digital security and human rights—from exposing state cyber espionage to uncovering the global spread of mercenary spyware targeting journalists, activists, and human rights defenders. Drawing from my latest book, Chasing Shadows, I will recount how our mission to conduct "counter-intelligence for civil society" revealed surveillance around the inner circle of murdered Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi and uncovered domestic espionage campaigns across Mexico, Spain, Hungary, Poland, Thailand, El Salvador, and most recently, Italy. As our small team disarmed cyber mercenaries and helped improve the digital security of billions, we, too, became targets—caught in the same sinister crosshairs as those we sought to protect. I will also look ahead to the future of our mission and the rising challenges of AI-enabled subversion, Dark PR, and advertising intelligence, and how the kind of public-interest research the Lab has championed is now under threat from a growing tide of despotism and authoritarianism."
Screen cap of Scenario from RAND report on Visions for Potential AGI Futures: Scenario 6. Authoritarian Advantage (Centralized AGI Development Empowers the PRC) The text box below outlines our sixth scenario. Authoritarian Advantage: Description As AGI systems are developed and deployed, they turn out to fundamentally favor authoritarian regimes because of their centralized control and ability to mitigate any adverse consequences associated with the rapid implementation of AGI. The PRC leverages its lead in the widespread commercialization and societal integration of AGI to spread its influence in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East by offering ubiquitous surveillance technologies, infrastructure investments, and strategic partnerships for compute-sharing. Automated surveillance systems allow authoritarian regimes and leaders to control information, selectively repress dissidents with near perfect accuracy, and influence group behavior through the sophisticated network mapping of human relationships. In addition, the PRC’s investments and innovation in industrial robotics pays off, enabling the replacement of low-skilled labor with loyal AIs. Meanwhile, the United States and its allies grapple with domestic challenges, including rampant disinformation campaigns that undermine public trust in institutions, high unemployment rates exacerbated by automation, and heightened civil unrest driven by socioeconomic disparities and political polarization. These internal issues strain the U.S. government’s resources and reduce its ability to act abroad, leading to a retrenchment in international influence. In a bid to achieve autarchy and avoid dependence on Chinese manufacturing, the United States implements protectionist policies and reshoring initiatives. However, these measures come at the cost of depressed economic growth because of inefficiencies and higher production costs, and they strain relationships with traditional allies who are economically intertwined wi…
Screenshot of the concluding paragraph of the article linked in the post: All countries need scale and efficiency in data management. Yet for democracies the task is harder, because they must build in checks and balances that safeguard property rights, privacy and civil liberties. As it embraces its vast experiment, China will put less weight on such things and could build an efficient and dystopian system of surveillance. For decades it has been a “fast follower” of Western innovations. If China now races ahead in showing the financial value of its national data ocean, its method of centralisation will pose not just an economic challenge, but also a political one. ■ Subscribers to The Economist can sign up to our Opinion newsletter, which brings together the best of our leaders, columns, guest essays and reader correspondence. Explore more Leaders Opinion Artificial intelligence China This article appeared in the Leaders section of the print edition under the headline “China’s formidable data empire”
The Element of Surprise: Space and Cyber Warfare in U.S.-China Rivalry KEY TAKEAWAYS China’s hacking efforts are becoming increasingly strategic in effect and particularly dangerous in relation to space systems. In the information age, strategic surprise can have long-lasting impacts. The U.S. needs to be clear with China that its hacking will not be met with impunity. [ Source: USIP ] PHOTO: An internet cafe in Beijing, July 28, 2011. (Sim Chi Yin/The New York Times)
Screen cap of RecordedFuture whitepaper cover: Auto YARA: Automated Yara Rule Generation for High-confidence Threat Detection #bioinspiration
[ screenshot of a selection of text from a SCMP article ] : "“Without cybersecurity, there is no national security” read a prominent slogan in the exhibition hall. The Third Research Institute of the Ministry of Public Security showcased a tool that it claimed could monitor Telegram, a widely used instant messaging app known for its privacy and security. It said the tool could monitor Telegram accounts registered with Chinese mobile phone numbers, which have strict real-name requirements. To date, the tool has collected more than 30 billion messages and monitored 70 million Telegram accounts, as well as 390,000 public channels and groups, according to the institution. A promotional video from the institution showed how drug transactions could be monitored in group chats by logging into Telegram with a hacked Chinese mobile phone number. It also said that messages on Telegram involving topics related to politics and Hong Kong could be monitored. The institute cited the widespread use of Telegram by anti-government protesters in Hong Kong in 2019 as one of the reasons for developing the tool. In mainland China, internet users have to use virtual private networks (VPNs) to access Telegram, as well as the website for the South China Morning Post. But a technology company from the eastern city of Nanjing showcased a tool capable of detecting such use."
A man operates a remote-controlled robotic dog equipped with surveillance and multi-barrel launching devices at the 12th China International Exhibition on Police Equipment (第12届中国国际警用装备博览会) in Beijing. The booth displays additional robots with tracks and mounted equipment. (Image credit: Global Times, 14 May, 2025)
A screenshot showing a Cloudflare security verification page in Chinese for the website tibetnetwork.org, asking users to verify they’re human by checking a box before accessing the site.
A technician works on a video surveillance system on Beijing's Tiananmen Square. (Reuters)
A poster for a documentary broadcast on ITV1 and streamed on ITVx : Inside China: The Battle for Tibet - A missing boy, a culture under threat - undercover cameras expose China’s control over Tibet as the ageing Dalai Lama’s succession nears