Kyle Barry

@kylecbarry.bsky.social

2526 Followers 1334 Following

Director, State Law Research Initiative (SLRI) http://state-law-research.org; Formerly @theappeal.bsky.social, NAACP LDF, @afjustice.bsky.social. I write about state courts & dismantling mass incarceration. https://open.substack.com/pub/slri

"The Court overrides what Congress passed. It overrides what the people chose. All to serve its own ends. What this Court has done to constitutional rights, democratic institutions, and the rule of law explains why Hawaii's Constitution takes no instruction from it," Eddins wrote. A Supreme Court "that systematically dismantles democratic safeguards, steamrolls constitutional liberties, and tramples human dignity," he said, "does not chart the course for the Hawaii Constitution."
Nor should we take the position that our hands are tied by dicta in a sprawling 19th-century opinion that is, to put the point gently, very far from a model of careful judicial craftsmanship. Too much is at stake. United States citizenship is precious. Anyone who has attended a ceremony where citizens are naturalized can see that message on the faces of those who t le the citizenship oath. Before saddling the Nation with a medieval rule. we had better be certain the Constitution requires it.
Abstract As more state supreme courts expand state constitutional rights against excessive prison terms, we can identify the various components of successful litigation. These include, for example, empirical historical research; a thorough mitigation record; social and neuroscientific evidence to show reduced culpability and the capacity for reform; and an amicus strategy that brings distinct but complementary perspectives. Another basic but often overlooked hurdle is choosing which legal test or tests to apply. What is the specific doctrine, in other words, that courts use to apply the broader concepts of “cruel” and/or “unusual”? By this I do not mean theorizing what “cruelty” ought to mean or how best to measure it, but rather how current law works in practice. More specifically, as state supreme courts expand rights against excessive punishments under state constitutional cruel and/or unusual punishment prohibitions, what are the legal mechanisms they use to do so? As it turns out, they are not all the same, and the various approaches can sow confusion. To provide some clarity, I have charted a taxonomy of successful state constitutional excessive punishment claims, with a focus on categorical rulings—that is, court decisions finding that certain punishment practices are necessarily excessive as applied to an entire category or group of people, not just one individual person. This taxonomy breaks down the tests and legal standards courts have used when expanding rights and how they apply to certain arguments and evidence, providing a roadmap for practitioners working to tee-up new or expanded categorical claims.
In Illinois, the constitutional right against excessive punishment in Article I, Section 11, is commonly known as the “proportionate penalties clause.” People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 337-38 (2002) (Leon Miller). But this nomenclature captures only half the text. In its entirety, the text states: “All penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. art. I, § 11 (emphasis added). Reducing this explicit rehabilitation requirement to a call for “proportionate” penalties is at best incomplete, capturing only the first clause while ignoring the second. A more accurate name given the second half of the sentence would be the “Reformation Clause.”
FEMA Official Says He Teleported to Waffle House. Experts Are Dubious. Gregg Phillips, who is in charge of responding to fires and floods, says the hand of God suddenly and mysteriously moved him to a 24-hour breakfast spot in Rome, Ga.
In a groundbreaking opinion that signals a paradigm shift in how courts treat excessive punishment claims, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court today held that mandatory life without parole sentences for “felony murder” violate the state constitution. Over 1,000 people in Pennsylvania are serving life terms with no chance of release for homicide convictions based solely on their role in some other crime — without any finding that they ever killed or intended to kill anyone. Convicted under the arcane “felony murder” rule, they may have been getaway drivers or lookouts for some other crime that went bad and led to death, and then punished like killers. Under Commonwealth v. Lee, they can now demand a new sentence based on their individual culpability and seek a meaningful chance for release.
Although the judgment of the General Assembly is entitled to a presumption of constitutionality, it is for our Court, ultimately, to determine whether Section 13 permits the mandatory imposition of a life of imprisonment without parole for second degree murder. We find that the sentencing framework imposing a mandatory sentence of life without parole for second degree murder convictions in all cases, regardless of the culpability and characteristics of the defendant ─ including such as the extent of an offender’s participation in the conduct, and the details of his offense ─ without individualized assessment either at sentencing or through parole, prevents the sentencer from considering whether this harshest of sentences proportionately punishes the offender. Furthermore, this mandatory sentencing scheme runs afoul of notions of individualized sentencing for defendants facing the second most severe punishment after death, and the harshest type of incarceration. Finally, the mandatory nature of the sentencing scheme without individualized sentencing lacks adequate penological justification. Ultimately, we find that the mandatory sentencing scheme for second degree murder poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment, and, thus, find it to be cruel.
CHIEF JUSTICE TODD OPINION No. 3 WAP 2024 Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court entered June 13, 2023, at No. 1008 WDA 2021, Affirming the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County entered December 19, 2016, at No. CP-02-CR-0016878-2014. : : : : : : : : : : : ARGUED: October 8, 2024 DECIDED: MARCH 26, 2026 In this appeal by allowance, we granted allocatur to consider whether a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a felony murder conviction violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article I, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.1 For the reasons that follow, we determine that a mandatory life without parole sentence for all felony murder convictions, absent an assessment of culpability, is inconsistent with the protections bestowed upon our citizens
& NBC NEWS SUBSCRIBE "I fully support what the administration is doing in Iran," he wrote. "But, when briefing members they need to be prepared to deliver substantive information and more fully answer questions."
E.P.A. Moves to Weaken Limits on a Cancer-Causing Gas The gas, ethylene oxide, plays a crucial role in sterilizing medical devices. But long-term exposure is linked to several types of cancer and other ailments.
Lauren A. Simpson Deputy Attorney General *Counsel of Record OFFICE OF ALA. ATT’Y GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36130 (334) 242-7300 Lauren.Simpson@AlabamaAG.gov
Videos and photos shared on social media by Trump administration aides showed hockey team members posing for a photograph in front of the South Portico. They walked along the West Wing colonnade where Trump has posted portraits of every U.S. president just steps away from the Oval Office, where they were welcomed by Trump.
THE APPEAL About Us Donate Despite this far-reaching power, magisterial district judges and most municipal court judges do not need a law degree or membership to the state bar; they only are required to pass a qualifying exam. In fact, only 35 percent of the state's MDJs are members of the state's bar.
Acting pursuant to his statutory authority to “regulate . . . importation” under the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act, or IEEPA, the President has imposed tariffs on imports of foreign goods from various countries. The tariffs have generated vigorous policy debates. Those policy debates are not for the Federal Judiciary to resolve. Rather, the Judiciary’s more limited role is to neutrally interpret and apply the law. The sole legal question here is whether, under IEEPA, tariffs are a means to “regulate . . . importation.” Statutory text, history, and precedent demonstrate that the answer is clearly yes: Like quotas and embargoes, tariffs are a traditional and common tool to regulate importation.
The Colorado Supreme Court Is Full Of Prosecutors And It Shows The Colorado Supreme Court of late has been a menace to personal liberty and equality, granting more power to police and prosecutors while upholding needlessly cruel criminal punishment. That may be surprising. This isn’t deep red Alabama or Oklahoma. Colorado is a blue state with a seven-member supreme court all appointed by Democratic governors. But mass incarceration has never broken neatly along party lines, and often the better tell is what judges did before they took the bench—the professional experiences and perspectives they acquired as lawyers that they now bring to the cases before them as judges. And in Colorado, five justices are former prosecutors, while all seven are either former prosecutors, corporate lawyers, or both. None is a former public defender.
V. ORDER 177. WHEREFORE, the Court finds and Orders as follows: The Court grants declaratory relief pursuant to C.R.C.P. 57 and Colorado law. The Court enters a declaratory judgment that Defendants are in violation of the prohibition against involuntary servitude under Section 26, Article II, of the Colorado Constitution. The Court further declares as follows: 1. Plaintiff and the Class have a constitutional right to be free from slavery and involuntary servitude without exception, pursuant to Section 26, Article II. 2. Section 26, Article II prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude in all circumstances, including within Colorado prisons and as applied to those convicted of crimes. 3. CDOC implements policies which as applied compel and coerce work from Plaintiff and the Class, constituting involuntary servitude in violation of Section 26, Article II. 4. CDOC’s unconstitutional coercive policies include: the threat and use of segregation and isolation, including through Removal from Population, Restrictive Housing, Housing Restriction Sanction, Restricted Privileges, and any other sanction that results in isolation in a cell for more than twenty-two hours a day for more than two days (three if over a weekend) for failure to work.
But court records obtained by the Guardian reveal a Department of Justice prosecutor later directly contradicted DHS' Tren de Aragua statements in court, telling a judge, "We're not suggesting ... [Niño-Moncada] is a gang member? An FBI affidavit issued following the incident also suggests that in the previous shooting cited by DHS, Zambrano-Contreras was not a suspect, but rather a reported victim of a sexual assault and robbery. Neither Niño-Moncada or Zambrano-Contreras have prior criminal convictions, their lawyers have said.
Section 745.51 effectively authorizes the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment for life without a realistic possibility of parole. This punishment is, by its very nature, intrinsically incompatible with human dignity. It is degrading in nature in that it presupposes at the time of its imposition that the offender is beyond redemption and lacks the moral autonomy needed for rehabilitation. Although Parliament has latitude to establish sentences whose severity expresses society’s condemnation of the offence committed, it may not prescribe a sentence that deprives every offender on whom it is imposed of any realistic possibility of parole from the outset. To ensure respect for human dignity, Parliament must leave a door open for rehabilitation, even in cases where this objective is of minimal importance. This objective is intimately linked to human dignity in that it conveys the conviction that every individual is capable of repenting and re‑entering society. The intent here is not to have the objective of rehabilitation prevail over all the others, but rather to preserve a certain place for it in a penal system based on respect for the inherent dignity of every individual, including the vilest of criminals. Where the offence of first degree murder is concerned, rehabilitation is already subordinate to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence, as can be seen from the severity of the mandatory minimum sentence for this offence.
NBC NEWS SUBSCRIBE 8 POLITICS NEWS Utah governor signs bill adding justices to state Supreme Court as redistricting appeal looms Once the new seats are filled, Utah Gov. Spencer Cox will have appointed five of the seven justices.
Kennedy questioned Olson about a statement he made in August 2015 during another sermon. According to Kennedy, “During that sermon, you said that marriage was not intended for all people, including, and I’m going to quote your words, our handicapped friends or our persons with physical disabilities that might prevent the robust marriage that we’re called to.” When asked if he said that, Olson replied that he did. Olson said he was “explaining the meaning of Christ’s words” and that there are various reasons why individuals don’t get married. When Kennedy asked for further explanation, Olson said he was explaining why some people don’t get married, not why people couldn’t or shouldn’t. Senator Kennedy also asked Olson whether he said — during a Sunday School lecture on August 23, 2015 — that God “has called wives to be subject to their husbands” and to “serve the good of your husband and support his calling.” Olson said that he thinks he recalls saying something along those lines and that he was “describing our church’s understanding of what Christian marriage ought to look like.”
Nine progressive prosecutors from cities around the country are launching a coalition to assist in prosecuting federal law enforcement officers who violate state laws, one of the prosecutors, Larry Krasner in Philadelphia, said on Tuesday. The organization, which is called the Project for the Fight Against Federal Overreach, will also include Mary Moriarty, the elected prosecutor in Minneapolis. Its acronym, F.A.F.O., references a slang term for negative consequences, and its formation was spurred by “growing concerns about warrantless entries, unlawful detentions, and coercive enforcement tactics by federal agents,” according to a news release.
21 22 23 24 25 1 2 4 5 JUSTICE ALITO: Could I -- could I -- could I explore what that means for ordinary law-abiding citizens who feel they need to carry a firearm for self-defense? So I want you to think about people Heritage Reporting Corporation Official 67 like this, people who work late at night in Manhattan, it might be somebody who cleans fices, it might be a coorman at an apartment, it might be a nurse or an orderly, it might be somebody who washes dishes.
• NBC NEWS Border Patrol officer involved in California shooting | Wed, Jan 21
What We Found After controlling for charge severity, criminal history, and other case factors, judges with prior careers as prosecutors or police officers made more severe pretrial decisions on average. This holds whether comparing them to all other judges or only to those without law enforcement or legal services backgrounds. Because NYC cases are assigned on a rotating calendar and we find no evidence that judges with different backgrounds see systematically different cases, our findings are best explained by how judges decide cases rather than by systematic differences in case assignment.
Today, I bring your attention to the Colorado Supreme Court, which this month reaffirmed an inexplicable quirk of its excessive sentencing jurisprudence that preemptively extinguishes constitutional rights for entire categories of people. The court declares certain crimes to be “per se grave or serious,” which in practice means that no one convicted of such crimes can ever challenge their sentence, no matter its severity. The long-standing rule is both wholly illogical and blatantly unconstitutional (in the sense that it erases constitutional rights), but there is some good news: It appears that two justices are finally ready to, in their words, “deep six this concept.”
In sum, in light of the Legislature’s provision of fee waivers to indigent civil litigants, equal protection principles require a court, upon request, to consider a defendant’s inability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment under Penal Code section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1) or a court facilities assessment under Government Code section 70373, subdivision (a)(1). The court should allow the parties to present and contest any relevant evidence or argument on this question.
C. The “Per Se” Shortcut ¶16 When considering the gravity or seriousness of an offense, we have designated certain crimes “per se grave or serious”—a shortcut unique to Colorado law. Wells-Yates, ¶ 13 n.6, 454 P.3d at 198 n.6. If a crime, “based on [its] statutory elements, necessarily involve[s] grave or serious conduct” in all factual scenarios, it’s designated as per se grave or serious, and the court begins its abbreviated proportionality review by evaluating the harshness of the penalty. Id. at ¶¶ 63, 65, 454 P.3d at 209. This designation not only saves time, but it allows courts to avoid the “somewhat imprecise” practice of a case-by-case analysis. Id. at ¶ 12, 454 P.3d at 198 (quoting People v. Gaskins, 825 P.2d 30, 36 (Colo. 1992)). ¶17 Despite these benefits of efficiency and consistency, we have encouraged caution before labeling a crime as per se grave or serious.
The Court concedes that this “shortcut” is “unique to Colorado law” and that it “eliminates a longstanding layer of due process for criminal defendants.” Nonetheless, it remains on the books because it supposedly “saves time” and promotes “consistency.” I would submit that “saving time” is never a good reason to dispense with constitutional rights, but the Court’s claims to efficiency are dubious in any case. Now, instead of properly analyzing its cruel and unusual clause, the Court spends its time hopelessly trying to figure out wtf “per se grave or serious” actually means and what offenses it applies to. With this rule in place, and with prosecutors thirsty to invoke it, the first part of every excessive punishment analysis turns into Tom Cruise cross-examining Jack Nicholson in A Few Good Men: “Q: Grave Danger?” A: [raises eyebrow] “Is there another kind?”
2025 Sees State Courts Diverge From Federal Criminal Norms By Brandon Lowrey · Listen to article Law360 (December 12, 2025, 12:30 PM EST) -- Some of this year's most notable criminal appellate rulings homed in on differences between state and federal constitutional protections against the most serious punishments, with movement in Michigan, bucking the trend in Wyoming, and an ambiguous but potentially earthshaking decision out of Texas. Michigan's high court has a history of departing from federal precedent, said Kyle Barry, director of the State Law Research Initiative. "Michigan has justices who have taken a real interest in whether extreme punishments are serving any sort of legitimate purpose whatsoever, and they're actually looking at evidence like neuroscience and psychology in assessing especially long prison terms for younger people," he said. "These are people who have the capacity to change, and it makes no penological sense whatsoever to decide that they must die in prison with no chance of ever getting released."
2. Adolescence There is a dramatic turning point that the researchers saw occurring around the age of nine on average — a time when many children begin to enter puberty. The brain switches gears and starts rewiring to become more efficient. The adolescence phase the researchers identified lasts for two decades, into the early 30s on average. This is when people are most vulnerable to developing a mental health disorder, but it’s also a critical time for brain development. “It is really important to think about adolescence as this protracted window,” said Katie Insel, a psychologist at Northwestern University who studies how the brain changes over the course of adolescence. She said that while in our society we may think of 18- or 21-year-olds as adults, this research adds to a growing body of work suggesting that the brain isn’t fully developed or stable until our late 20s or even early 30s.
Several days have passed since news emerged from Wisconsin that one state supreme court justice accused another of trying to choke her during a conference of the justices and there are some new developments. There are now two probes of the alleged incident in which Justice Ann Walsh Bradley claims that fellow Justice David Prosser choked her during a disagreement related to the state's partisan battle over the collective bargaining rights of public employees.
In the case of State v. Planned Parenthood, Lee and Nielsen filed an amicus brief — often referred to as a friend-of-the-court — on behalf of Pro-Life Utah, challenging a decision by a lower court to block a state law that would have outlawed almost all abortions in the state. The brief laid out an “originalist” argument, which Nielsen said Thursday is key to his judicial philosophy, drawing on newspaper articles written between the 1850s and 1940s to make the case that, during the period the Utah Constitution was ratified, Utahns did not envision it including a right to abortion. “At the time of ratification, the general public did not view abortion as a protected constitutional right,” the brief argues. “Quite the opposite. It viewed it as something meriting the utmost condemnation available in our law and society: criminal charge and punishment.”
The governor, who is a lawyer, has so far vocally opposed most attempts by the Legislature to influence the courts’ operations. But earlier this month, Cox signed a law revoking the Supreme Court justices’ authority to choose their own chief, instead designating the governor to pick the head of the high court every eight years, subject to Senate confirmation. The governor vetoed a previous version of the bill that would have required him to pick a new chief every four years. Cox said Tuesday he may now support a dead proposal from earlier this year to expand the number of justices on the Utah Supreme Court. The Utah Constitution says the court must have “at least five” justices.
The state Supreme Court considered Tuesday whether an arbitration agreement is unenforceable if it is impossible for a prospective employee to read -- even if its contents are fair.
Fifteen-year-old Miguel Vazquez was one of the people who took off running when federal agents arrived. "I thought, 'Wait, why am I running? I'm a citizen," Vazquez said.
The Peaks Tavern, Noe Valley, San Francisco
THE Antonio Banders gif
THE STATE WANTS TO BE FULLY CANDID, WE WANTTO TAKE THIS UP TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT. WEWANT THE COURT -- THAT COURT -- TO RECONSIDER ROPER.WE THINK THAT THERE ARE SEVERAL REASONS THAT IT SHOULDDO SO, NOT THE LEAST OF WHICH IS ROPER, AT THE TIME WASON FAIRLY SHAKY FOOTING AS A -- I BELIEVE -- PARTY LINEFIVE-FOUR DECISION. THE COURT: WHAT DO YOU MEAN, PARTY, WHAT DO YOU MEAN? MR. GRAY: AN IDEOLOGICAL LINE, SORRY TO SAY, CONSERVATIVEVERSUS LIBERAL JUSTICES. THE COURT: YOU BELIEVE THAT OUR JUSTICES ARE CONSERVATIVE ANDLIBERAL? THE APPLICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION? MR. GRAY: I DON'T WANT TO MAKE WAVES, YOUR HONOR, BUT THEREIS -- THERE IS SOME ELEMENTS OF THE COURT'S HISTORYTHAT MAY LEAD ONE TO BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE IDEOLOGIESAT PLAY.
Shots fired at site of protest outside Coast Guard base near Oakland By Jessica Flores, Reporter Updated Oct 24, 2025 7:42 a.m.
bikeradar Home › News > The Tour De France Slows Rise Of Far Right: ... The Tour de France slows rise of far right: "It looked like our town was actually important" Voting in towns and villages on the route of the Tour found to shift less to the right than nearby areas, according to new research
From that convention emerged a revolutionary idea: that Illinois should adopt in its constitution the strongest known language in the nation limiting a government’s ability to mete out extreme punishments to those citizens who have transgressed the criminal law—and clearly identifying the purpose of those criminal sentences as rehabilitation. Thus was born what appears in Illinois’s constitution today: the so-called proportionate-penalties clause. That clause, codified in 1970 as Article 1, Section 11 of the Illinois Constitution, proclaims that “all penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship. No conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate. No person shall be transported out of the State for an offense committed within the State.” This Article traces the origins of the proportionate-penalties clause back to the 1970 constitutional convention, using floor debate transcripts and other contemporaneous sources to establish that its authors did, indeed, intend Illinois sentences to serve rehabilitative purposes. To interrogate the context of those documents, this Article also examines the surrounding historical events of late 1960s-era Chicago, as well the lives and identities of the delegates who propelled this clause forward. This Article uses the authors’ words as prescient calls for a new interpretation of the proportionate-penalties clause that hews to their vision —and that can serve as a model for rethinking the guardrails around criminal punishments nationwide. Indeed, a constitutional scheme that insists that criminal penalties be directed at rehabilitative ends can and must carry implications for many of the statutes and rules that sustain our current system of mass incarceration.
The Illinois constitution provides that "all penalties shall be determined ... with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship"
American flag and the main stage at the No King’s rally in San Francisco
Judge Perry expressed concern about what it would mean to send in National Guard troops who are unfamiliar with Chicago’s long history of strained police-community relations. “Chicago’s history of strained police-community relations is extremely well documented but also fairly nuanced,” she said. “It’s something that I think the state and local authorities understand extremely well, and it can be hard for federal authorities, and certainly those from Texas, to appreciate.”
When Will The California Supreme Court Protect Young People From Extreme Punishments? Two Justices Urge Action A divided California Supreme Court recently upheld life without parole sentences for young adults, despite evidence that such punishments “perpetuate[] extreme racial disparities in [the state’s] criminal and juvenile justice systems.” But that was an equal protection case, and Justice Kelli Evans, clearly frustrated by that result, used a recent dissent to suggest a different approach: using the state constitution’s separate ban on “cruel or unusual” punishment.
Justice Amy Coney Barrett, who is often seen as a crucial swing vote in cases, pointedly asks the lawyer for Colorado about the harms of conversion therapy. The lawyer says that the harm “comes from telling someone there’s something innate about yourself you can change – and then you spend all kinds of time and effort trying to do that, and you fail.” Video
Congress may draft another formula based on current conditions. Such a formula is an initial prerequisite to a determination that exceptional conditions still exist justifying such an “extraordinary departure from the traditional course of relations between the States and the Federal Government.” Presley, 502 U. S., at 500–501. Our country has changed, and while any racial discrimination in voting is too much, Congress must ensure that the legislation it passes to remedy that problem speaks to current conditions. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered.
The WHITE HOUSE The White House v The Democrat Party wants: @WhiteHouse • 8h XXXXX rs 'Transgender' for everybody Men competing in women's sports Crime and lawlessness in our streets Cashless bail policies over the safety and security of our nation It's never America First. 1.2K 12 2.7K 14K 1hl 433K 贝
The sun sets behind a cul de sac of McMansions, with the text: “田 "God blessed us with this great nation, and together, we can increase self-sufficiency and empower Americans to climb the economic ladder toward a brighter future." - Secretary Scott Turner”
Case caption/cover page along with image of hand written note saying, 'Trump has pardons and tanks ....what do you have?" And the typed response: "Dear Mr. or Ms. Anonymous, Alone, I have nothing but my sense of duty. Together, We the People of the United States –- you and me -- have our magnificent Constitution. Here’s how that works out in a specific case –- "
6 NOEM v. VASQUEZ PERDOMO KAVANAUGH, J., concurring "relevant factor" when considered along with other salient factors. Id., at 887. Under this Court's precedents, not to mention common sense, those circumstances taken together can constitute at least reasonable suspicion of illegal presence in the United States. Importantly, reasonable suspicion means only that immigration officers may briefly p the individual and inquire about immigration status. If the person is a U.S. citizen or otherwise lawfully in the United States, that individual will be free to go after the brief encounter. Only if the person is illegally in the United States may t. stop lead to further immigration proceedings.
Former Mariners pitcher Randy "Big Unit" Johnson takes photos at an NFL game
This case presents an issue not addressed in Genser: What happens if an elector fails to follow a mandatory requirement for voting by mail — such as correctly signing and dating the declaration envelope or sealing the ballot inside the secrecy envelope — and election officials, after becoming aware of the nullifying error, mislead the elector into believing she is prohibited from voting provisionally? The lower courts held a county board of elections violated electors' procedural due process rights by knowingly setting aside facially defective mail-in ballots without notifying those electors their ballots would be disqualified. The courts directed the board to provide such notice so the electors could challenge the decision to set aside these ballots or, instead, vote with a provisional ballot on Election Day. We largely affirm.
The Trump administration canceled grants for street safety measures, pedestrian trails and bike lanes in communities around the country this month, each time offering a simple rationale for yanking back federal aid: the projects aren’t designed for cars.
But she wrote in a concurrence of her “growing discomfort with the routine practice of sentencing individuals to life without the possibility of parole, regardless of the offense or the age of the offender.” She went on: We should not be satisfied with the status quo; permanent incarceration has neither reduced crime nor increased confidence in our criminal justice system. The principles set forth in Gregory compel us to ask the same questions about a life sentence without the possibility of parole. Is it fairly applied? Is there a disproportionate impact on minority populations? Are there state constitutional limitations to such a sentence? I dare say that these questions are not just academic. They also reflect our values and beliefs about punishment and our criminal justice system. We should join the national movement favoring release upon a showing of rehabilitation and inject into our sentencing practices the exercise of mercy, compassion, and the fact that we know not a person’s capacity to change.”
A state high court interprets a state constitution its own way. State v. Wilson, 154 Hawaiʻi 8, 14, 543 P.3d 440, 446 (2024). This court has long understood federalism principles and operated with a no lock-stepping approach. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 499-500 (1977) (shout out to the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court). Our state constitutional provisions offer greater rights protection than federal *** counterparts. See, e.g., State v. Texeira, 50 Haw. 138, 142 n.2, 433 P.2d 593, 597 n.2 (1967). This court may interpret Hawaiʻi’s Establishment Clause broader than the federal Establishment Clause.