Michael Karlik

@michaelkarlik.bsky.social

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Judicial reporter at coloradopolitics.com and gazette.com. Shining a light on the work of our state and federal judges. Plus, full-time bird caretaker.

ORDER. Respondents are ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE by close of business August 18, 2026 as to why Petitioner's Motion to Enforce 28 should not be granted and provide the Court with legal authority demonstrating that Respondents may retain Petitioner's travel documents following his release. SO ORDERED by Judge Regina M. Rodriguez on 8/14/2026. Text Only Entry (rmrlc6, ) (Entered: 08/14/2026)
Furthermore, on May 21, 2026, Respondents filed a Response to the Order to Show Cause why the Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 should not be granted, Doc. 17, arguing Petitioner is not entitled to release or a bond hearing because he is an applicant for admission subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and noting that the “Tenth Circuit has not yet interpreted § 1225(b)(2)(A) in this context.” Id. at 12-13. However, in light of the recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Santillan Quiroz v. Mullin, 180 F.4th 1226 (10th Cir. 2026), Respondents are ORDERED to file a Supplemental Response to the Court’s April 21, 2026 Order to Show Cause, Doc. 3, within four days of the date of this Order that addresses the statutory authority for Petitioner’s current detention. Petitioner may file a reply to the Supplemental Response within seven days after the Supplemental Response is filed. DATED: August 13, 2026 BY THE COURT: Daniel D. Domenico Chief United States District Judge
DISCOVERY CONFERENCE Court in Session: 10:01 a.m. Appearance of counsel – all counsel appear via VTC. Preliminary remarks by the Court. Discussion held on discovery disputes as outlined on the record. ORDERED: 1) The Court finds that Defendant Executive Office of President, including its component Office of Management and Budget, are ordered to participate in discovery. 2) The Court finds that discovery including: federal actions or threats directed toward Colorado but not specifically cited in the complaint, is relevant to the scoping out the motive, scoping out the target, and scoping out the means that the administration has chosen to hurt Colorado. The Court finds that discovery including: federal actions or threats toward other states bearing on whether Colorado was targeted for disparate treatment would be unduly burdensome, unless it is federal action or threats toward states that have been linked together with Colorado as targets. 3) The Court finds that Plaintiff’s request for Interrogatory responses regarding oral communications (e.g., meetings, phone calls, etc.) or deleted written communications (e.g., Signal chats) related to the actions or threats against Colorado are not overly broad and Defendants shall provide responses to the related Interrogatories.
As has become a clear pattern with our neighboring State, Wyoming law enforcement elected to detain Saienko in order to facilitate his being taken into ICE custody, in the absence of any criminal charge, warrant, or prior notice, and without being afforded an opportunity to be heard by a neutral decisionmaker. (Id.) Indeed, no individualized assessment of Saienko’s relative flight risk or danger to the community was conducted before, at the time of, or after his detention. (Id.) DHS initiated removal proceedings against him on July 21, 2026. (Id. at ¶ 21.)
ENTERED BY MAGISTRATE JUDGE KATHRYN A. STARNELLA This matter is before the Court on Respondents’ Status Report [#18]. In the Status Report [#18], Respondents inform the Court that although Respondents provided Petitioner with a bond hearing on July 30, 2026 pursuant to the Court’s Minute Order [#17] directing them to do so, the Immigration Judge presiding over the bond hearing failed to comport with the Court’s requirement that Respondents “bear the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner’s continued detention is justified.” Minute Order [#17]; see Status Report [#18] at 1. Respondents accordingly “submit that the Court should order them to provide a new bond hearing for Petitioner within seven days of this Court’s order.” Status Report [#18] at 2. The Court agrees that the remedy suggested by Respondents is appropriate under the circumstances. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondents shall provide Petitioner with a new bond hearing within 7 days of the issuance of this Order. At the bond hearing, the Government shall bear the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner's continued detention is justified. If Respondents do not provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) as required herein, or if the presiding immigration judge continues to fail to apply the burden of proof set forth above, then Petitioner must be immediately released from detention.
Mr. Lucena-Ferreira deteriorating health also renders his continued detention unconstitutional. Due process places constitutional limits on the Government’s authority to detain noncitizens and requires that civil detention bear a reasonable relation to its legitimate regulatory purposes. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; Bell, 441 U.S. at 538-39. The record shows that Mr. Lucena-Ferreira suffers from severe gastroesophageal reflux disease and chronic gastrointestinal distress. A physician has diagnosed his condition as serious and requiring treatment. However, he has not received the diagnostic evaluations and specialty care necessary to treat his condition. ECF No. 1 at 19. Mr. Lucena-Ferreira has no criminal history, has previously been released on his own recognizance without incident, has a pending appeal before the BIA, and suffers from serious medical conditions that cannot be properly addressed in detention. Under these circumstances, continued detention no longer reasonably advances the Government’s legitimate interests in ensuring Mr. Lucena-Ferriera’s
5) Respondents shall SHOW CAUSE in writing on or before August 6, 2026 why they should not be sanctioned for unlawfully detaining on April 25, 2026 an individual who had been released on bond—and thus someone who was not a flight risk or a danger to the community—on April 21, 2026. Respondents shall also explain what steps or safeguards are being put in place to ensure that persons released on bond by an immigration judge are not re-detained over and over again. Dated: July 28, 2026 BY THE COURT: N. Reid Neureiter United States Magistrate Judge
First, Respondents have not established that administrative remedies are available to Petitioner. Respondents repeatedly state that Petitioner “may request a custody-redetermination hearing at any time” (D. 12 at 1, 3, 4). That is not quite right. An immigration judge already made
The IJ in this case violated Petitioner’s due process rights by failing to hold the government to its burden of proof of showing that Petitioner’s continued detention was proper by clear and convincing evidence. Liberally construing the petition, as the Court must, the Court agrees with Petitioner that there is an insufficient showing of his flight risk or danger to the community to justify his continued detention under this governing burden. See ECF No. 1 at 2. The IJ found the following: [Petitioner] has no criminal history and no known history of failing to appear for any court proceeding. He testified that he has been employed as a driver for Uber and Lyft, possesses a valid driver's license, attends church, has worked and paid taxes, and has known his proposed sponsor for approximately three years. [Petitioner] also testified that he has filed federal tax returns since 2023.
First, as to the EAD, Respondents represent that they have not been able to “confirm the whereabouts” of his EAD, but “do not oppose taking steps to obtain a replacement EAD for Petitioner.” ECF No. 15 at 3. Respondents further represent that they are “already taking steps to obtain a replacement EAD for Petitioner.” ECF No. 15 at 3. In light of these representations, Respondents are ordered to continue searching for Petitioner’s original EAD or seeking a replacement EAD. To the extent that Respondents argue that Petitioner cannot bring a “property claim” in habeas, id., the Court rejects this argument as to Petitioner’s EAD—not only because Respondents are already attempting to provide Petitioner with the relief that he seeks (an EAD), but because caselaw forecloses it. See, e.g., Molina Quijano v. Baltasar, No. 1:26–cv–00706–CNS, 2026 WL 709753, at *1 (D. Colo. Mar. 13, 2026) (collecting cases explaining that it is proper in habeas context to grant relief “requiring respondents to return” documents).
Immigration Judge Masters focuses her analysis on Petitioner’s “multiple DUI arrests” and the dangers of drunk driving. Id. The Court recently reviewed a similar bond decision written by Immigration Judge Masters, where she utilized virtually identical reasoning: “The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly underscored the manner in which people who drive under the influence of alcohol endanger the welfare of the
ORDER: The Status Report (D. 11) indicates that Respondents are not in compliance with this Court's July 22, 2026, Order (D. 7) requiring Respondents to (1) provide a sufficient record of the bond hearing for review, (2) inform the Court whether Petitioner was granted bond, and if his request for bond was denied, the reasons for that denial, and (3) provide a copy of a warrant justifying Petitioner's detention at the time he was detained. It is unclear to the Court how, five days out from Petitioner's bond hearing, Respondents still do not know what the outcome of the hearing was. Therefore, Respondents are ORDERED to come into compliance with the Court's previous Order by 4 pm today, August 4, 2026. Should they fail to do so, Petitioner SHALL be released by 7 pm, and Respondents SHALL provide a status update by 10 pm. by District Judge Gordon P Gallagher on 08/04/2026. For all non-e-filer pro se parties, a copy of this document has been sent via U.S. Mail to the mailing address of record. Text Only Entry (gpglc6, ) (Entered: 08/04/2026)
Judge Doom, as played by Christopher Lloyd in Who Framed Roger Rabbit?
In order to state a claim for violation of § 20703, the United States must allege that it requested a “record or paper required by section 20701.” 52 U.S.C. § 20703. Because the Court finds that Colorado’s SVRL is not a record or paper that must be produced pursuant to §§ 20701 and 20703, the United States has failed to state a claim under § 20703. Accordingly, the Court will grant the motions to dismiss of the Secretary, the Common Cause Intervenors, and the Alliance Intervenors and deny the United States’ motion to compel and dismiss its claims. V. CONCLUSION Therefore, it is ORDERED that the United States’ Motion for Order to Compel Records Demanded Pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1960 [Docket No. 2] is DENIED. It is further
The Court ordered Respondents to provide Petitioner a bond hearing where “the Government shall bear the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the community such that his physical custody is legally justified.” ECF No. 7 at 4. Immigration Judge Ross stated the clear and convincing standard should be applied but instead applied the preponderance of the evidence standard in determining Petitioner presents a risk of flight. The Court’s order clearly states that the clear and convincing standard should be applied to either the flight risk or danger
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. JOHN DOE, Defendant - Appellant. No. 26-9900 _________________________________ Before PHILLIPS, KELLY, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. _________________________________ MORITZ, Circuit Judge. _________________________________ John Doe appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss an information charging him with juvenile delinquency for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(x)(2), which prohibits juvenile possession of a handgun. Doe argues that § 922(x)(2) exceeds Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. We hold that Congress had a rational basis to conclude that regulating juvenile handgun possession is an essential part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme outlined in § 922(x) that directly and substantially affects interstate commerce. Congress also had a rational basis to conclude that this regulatory scheme would be undercut if § 922(x)(2) were excised from the statute. We therefore affirm the district court’s ruling that Congress possessed the authority to enact § 922(x)(2).
Here, it is similarly unclear to the Court whether DHS’ evidence, standing alone, satisfied its clear and convincing burden. The only piece of evidence Immigration Judge Masters cited was the immigration judge’s written decision denying Petitioner’s EOIR 42b, which was offered as rebuttal evidence by the Petitioner. During the bond hearing itself, counsel for DHS did not reference or rely on the immigration judge’s written decision. ECF No. 14-4 at 3. Therefore, the Court cannot determine whether DHS indeed satisfied its burden. “To prove a fact by clear and convincing evidence is a heavy burden that equates to showing the fact is ‘highly probable.’” Mejia v. Baltazar, No. 26-CV-00385-NYW-TPO, 2026 WL 1361514, at *2 (D. Colo. May 15, 2026) (quoting United States v. Dear, 104 F.4th 145, 147 (10th Cir. 2024)). The record is not clear as to whether DHS provided clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a danger or flight risk. Therefore, the Court
Because the primary legal dispute underlying the Petition appears resolved, the Court sees no purpose in awaiting a response from Respondents prior to granting relief. See Santillan Quiroz, 2026 WL 1876709, at *17 n.13 (requiring “the district court must grant Santillan Quiroz’s petition forthwith”). Should there be legal or factual issues not apparent from the Petition needing resolution by the Court prior to providing a bond hearing, Respondents may file a Motion seeking an extension or relief from this Order. See See 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (“The return and all suggestions made against it may be amended, by leave of court, before or after being filed.”); Yassine v. Collins,
not generally imposed on all goods and services. If Colorado were to pass a new fee on sales of plastic water bottles, for example, (as it has done with plastic grocery bags, much to my chagrin) Plaintiff’s statutory con struction would require that this fee not apply to any plastic water bot tles sold at airport locations. This would result in a strange state of af
A bond hearing was held on June 30, 2026. An IJ denied Petitioner’s request for bond. ECF No. 12 at 2. However, in the Motion, Petitioner argues that “[a]lthough Respondents purported to comply with this Court's June 23, 2026 Order by conducting a bond hearing within seven days, they did so without providing any notice whatsoever to Petitioner's retained counsel, despite counsel having been retained specifically to represent Petitioner at the Court-ordered hearing.” ECF No. 11 at 2. Petitioner further argues that as a result, she was forced to proceed without counsel and without the “extensive evidence prepared on her behalf, and without any meaningful opportunity to present the case for her release.” Id. Respondents did not file a substantive opposition to Petitioner’s request. Respondents state, Respondents are not submitting a brief in opposition to the Petition detailing the full facts and circumstances. Respondents recognize that the Court may then decide to grant the Petition and award appropriate relief. Respondents submit that if the Court does grant the Petition, the appropriate relief would be an order directing a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) before an immigration judge within a reasonable time. ECF No. 14 at 1–2. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: 1. Respondents shall provide Petitioner with a new bond hearing under 8
agreement and that each of Aldrich’s claims fails on the merits. On July 14, 2026, Aldrich filed the Reply. It is a legally worthless pleading which responds to nothing and only belches out hate disguised as religion. It will be addressed only at the end of this Order.
Petitioner states that the I-213, which was the only evidence DHS submitted, “was not signed, was not otherwise authenticated, and contained so many errors and inconsistencies as to render it unreliable.” ECF No. 13 at 5. The motion lists the catalogue of inexplicable mistakes: For example, the I-213 incorrectly states that Mr. Bonfil Rivera is “not married” and “does not have children,” but he is married with two U.S.- citizen children. Compare Ex. 1 with Ex. 2. The I-213 also inconsistently states: that he is both “30” years old and “32” years old (he is 31 years old); that the Officers were wearing “highly visible ‘ICE’ markings” (but see Ex. 2 at 9); that his first name is “Jesus” (it is Alexis); that there both was a warrant “signed by a supervisor” (which he was never served with and was never filed with the immigration court) but simultaneously that he “was likely to escape before a warrant could be obtained;” that he “re-entered the United States” without permission after previously being in the United States (not true); that his last names are “Zarate Rueda” (they are Bonfil Rivera); that he “has no immigration petitions or applications pending or approved (he has an approved I-130 petition and an approved I-601A waiver application); and that he claimed no fear of persecution if returned to “Colombia” (he is alleged to be a citizen of Mexico). Id. at 5–6 (footnote omitted). These inconsistencies are troubling; indeed, the IJ stated, “[Y]ou certainly give me concerns in regards to some of the information on there, and I’ll be giving it the weight that I deem necessary based on whatever the next testimony is.” ECF No. 17 at 4. However, the IJ’s decision does not attempt to resolve—does not even address, in fact—any of the numerous and obvious irregularities. This is especially significant because the IJ relied on this evidence in support of her conclusion that,
Fireside Chat September 25, 2026 8:00 PM-9:00 PMMT Colorado Hall No recording or photography Associate Justice Neil M. Gorsuch of the Supreme Court of the United States joins the Tenth Circuit Historical Society for its biennial Fireside Chat, fielding questions posed by Professor Jeffrey Rosen and Circuit Judge Timothy M. Tymkovich of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Sponsored by the Tenth Circuit Historical Society
Immigration Judge Masters further stated DHS did not contest that, per this Court’s Order, Respondents bear the burden of proof of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a danger to community. Id at 3. Then, she applied the clear and convince standard in her conclusion—that Petitioner’s “alleged disregard of the law and the community's safety coupled with the inherently deadly consequences of drinking
ORDER GRANTING 17 Request for New Bond Hearing.Within one week of this Order, the respondents must provide the petitioner with a new bond hearing before an immigration judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1003.19, & 1236.1(d)(1) or else release the petitioner.The respondents must provide the petitioner's counsel no less than three business days' notice in advance of any bond hearing.At any bond hearing, the Government must bear the burden of proving that the petitioner is a flight risk by a preponderance of the evidence or a danger by clear and convincing evidence. See Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 40 (1st Cir. 2021); Kuzmic v. Baltasar,
3. On May 13, 2026, ColoradoPolitics.com reported on your delays in ruling on immigration habeas petitions, causing petitioners to needlessly remain in custody. Among your peers on the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, you took on average the longest time to rule on such petitions. a. Provide an explanation for this delay.
On June 30, 2026, the Court held an ex parte hearing on Defendant’s motion to proceed pro se. ECF No. 226. 1 As further explained in its ex parte Order, ECF No. 227, the Court concludes that it has “reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). As such, the Court hereby ORDERS that Defendant undergo a psychiatric or psychological examination and competency hearing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241. Accordingly, the Court hereby ORDERS that
Bar chart of Colorado Supreme Court justices' dissenting opinions
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 229 MOTION for Order To Unrestrict ECF 228 as to Ishmael Petty (1). Before the Court is the United States' Motion to Unrestrict ECF 228. See ECF No. 229. In the motion, the government asks the Court to unrestrict its order at ECF No. 228, which is currently filed under level 2 restrictions, so that it may provide ECF No. 228 to the Bureau of Prisons (BOP). Id. at 1. The motion states that Defendant does not object, but requests "that ECF 228 only be unrestricted for the limited purpose of showing the order to BOP." Id. Because the BOP has been ordered to carry out certain of the instructions outlined in ECF No. 228, the Court GRANTS IN PART the government's motion, ECF No. 229, and ORDERS the government to provide the BOP with a copy of ECF No. 228 no later than July 13, 2026. Consistent with this order, the level 2 restriction on ECF No. 228 will otherwise remain in place for now.
UNITED STATES’ MOTION TO UNRESTRICT ECF 228 The United States of America, by and through Assistant United States Attorney Brian Dunn, respectfully moves to Unrestrict ECF 228, and states as follows: 1. The Order contained in ECF 228 is currently Level 2 Restricted, making it viewable by only the parties and the Court. 2. ECF 228 does not reference any matter that is subject to attorney-client privilege and does not reference private medical information of the defendant. Thus, the United States does not believe there is cause for Level 2 restriction. 3. ECF 228 contains instructions to BOP, who is not a party to this case. Under local rules pertaining the Level 2 restriction, the United States cannot currently send the order to BOP for viewing. 4. The parties have conferred, and the defense does not object. However, defense has requested that ECF 228 only be unrestricted for the limited purpose of showing the order to BOP
Governor Polis Appoints Kyle W. Brenton to the Colorado Court of Appeals and Dalia D. Labrador to the Arapahoe County Court in the 18th Judicial District DENVER - Today, Governor Polis appointed Kyle W. Brenton to the Colorado Court of Appeals. The appointment fills the vacancy created by the retirement of the Honorable Gilbert M. Román, and is effective August 1, 2026. Governor Polis also appointed Dalia D. Labrador to the Arapahoe County Court in the 18th Judicial District. The appointment fills a vacancy created by the appointment of the Honorable A. Danielle Touart to the 18th Judicial District Court, and is effective immediately.
5 In Santillan Quiroz, the Tenth Circuit contemplated in a footnote that, on remand, the district court should “order the Government to, within seven days of such order, either provide [the petitioner] with a bond hearing or else release him.” 2026 WL 1876709, at *17 n.13. In this Court’s view, it is somewhat ambiguous whether this language means that the Tenth Circuit views release as contingent on the Government’s failure to provide a bond hearing, or a bond hearing and release as equal, alternative remedies. In the absence of clear guidance, this Court will continue to order immediate release in the first instance under appropriate circumstances, unless and until the Tenth Circuit holds otherwise.
Second, this Court has already written of its “concern[] that the immigration courts are not affording immigrants fair bond hearings,” as “the mounting evidence that bond determination hearings conducted in Immigration Court under § 1226(a) have preordained outcomes has become impossible to ignore.” Pal v. Lyons, 2026 WL 937962, at *4 (D. Colo. Apr. 7, 2025); see also Quiroz Zacarias v. Mullin, 2026 WL 1092162, at *4–*5 (D. Colo. Apr. 22, 2026) (concluding “the IJ deprived [petitioner] of his due process rights” by issuing a bond decision that was “wholly bereft of any analysis whatsoever”). Indeed, courts across the country have, with increasing frequency, ceased “order[ing] even initial bond hearings in cases like this one involving unlawful detention under § 1225(b) because Respondents’ conduct can no longer be attributed to mere negligence or ineptitude, . . . and doing so would effectively allow the Government to transform an unlawful detention into a lawful one through post-hoc
The petitioner here contends that he may only be subjected to detention under Section 1226(a), and he is therefore entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration judge, which the respondents have thus far denied him. Doc. 1 at 8-9. The respondents state that they “are not submitting a brief in opposition to the Petition,” and they “recognize that the Court may then decide to grant the Petition . . . and award appropriate relief.” Doc. 6 at 1-2. Because the petitioner was detained in the interior of the country, is not in expedited removal proceedings under Section 1225(b)(1), and has no criminal history that would subject him to mandatory detention under Section 1226(c), he may only properly be detained under Section 1226(a), and he is entitled to a bond hearing. See Santillan Quiroz, 2026 WL 1876709, at *4 to *17. I therefore “must grant [his habeas] petition forthwith,” and “order the Government to, within seven days . . . either provide him with a bond hearing or else release him.”3 Id. at *17 n.13.
After an extension requested by Petitioner, she had a bond redetermination hearing on May 1, 2026. The Immigration Judge (IJ), Bobbie C. Masters, denied bond in a Bond Decision of the Immigration Judge (Decision) (D. 14 at 29–32). She reasoned: The Court finds Respondent does present a risk of flight by clear and convincing evidence. Respondent was ordered removed on March 18, 2026. Although that decision is currently being appealed, it is speculative that appeal will be successful and the case will be remanded. Her removal proceedings are closed. In addition, the Respondent has been in the United Sates for a short period of time, has not demonstrated any family ties or that she owns property in the United States. Respondent's limited options to lawfully remain in the United States and the speculative likelihood that her appeal will be granted substantially increase her flight risk because she has little incentive to appear for a final order of removal. See Matter of Andrade, 19 I&N Dec. 488, 490 (BIA 1987) (noting an applicant with a greater likelihood of obtaining relief from removal has increased motivation to appear for future immigration hearings than one with less potential of obtaining such relief). Given all the foregoing, the Court therefore concludes that Respondent's ongoing detention is justified because her release would pose a significant risk of flight that no amount of bond or combination of conditions could mitigate. See id. at 806-07 (“The respondent’s limited avenue for relief, combined with his other minimal ties to the United States, support the Immigration Judge’s determination that the respondent poses a high flight risk and should be held without bond pending the outcome of his removal proceedings.”). Accordingly, the Court finds that a bond is not warranted in this case.
ORDER.In light of Santillan Quiroz v. Mullin, — F.4th —, No. 26-6019, 2026 WL 1876709 (10th Cir. June 30, 2026), within one week of this Order the respondents must either:(a) provide the petitioner with a bond hearing before an immigration judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1003.19, & 1236.1(d)(1) or else release the petitioner, and file a status report stating the results of any bond hearing that was conducted or the date of the petitioner's release if no bond hearing was held; or(b) show cause why this case is distinguishable from Santillan Quiroz and the application for a writ of habeas corpus should not be granted.SO ORDERED by Chief Judge Daniel D. Domenico on 07/01/2026. Text Only Entry. (agryan) (Entered: 07/01/2026)
NOTICE of Supplemental Authorities regarding Tenth Circuit's June 30, 2026 decision in Santillan Quiroz v. Mullin re: 18 Order on Motion for Attorney Fees, 19 MOTION for Reconsideration re 18 Order on Motion for Attorney Fees by Petitioner Maricela Regalado-Hernandez (Jenkins, James) (Entered: 07/01/2026)
Respondents did not comply with the Court’s Order to Show Cause and did not file a response to the Petition. On June 6, 2026, Petitioner filed a Motion to Enforce deadline, requesting the Court to “enter an order directing Respondents to file a response by a date certain and granting such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.” The Court granted the Motion to Enforce on June 8, 2026, and ordered Respondents to enter their appearance and show cause as to why the Petition should not be granted. ECF No. 8. Again, Respondents did not comply with the Court’s order. On June 16, 2026, Petitioner filed a Motion for Order to Treat Petition as Unopposed. ECF No. 9. Two weeks later, on June 30, 2026, Respondents finally filed a response and simply stated “for the purposes of this specific case, Respondents are not submitting a brief in opposition to the Petition detailing the facts and circumstances of this case.” ECF No. 10 at 2. Given Respondents’ lack of response, the Court finds that Petitioner is improperly detained under § 1225 and entitled to immediate release. Even considering the Petition on the merits, the Court finds this case similar to Mendoza Gutierrez and that the facts in this care are sufficiently similar to lead the Court to reach the same result as it did in Mendoza Gutierrez. See Mendoza Gutierrez v. Baltasar, No. 25-CV-2720-RMR, 2025 WL 2962908 (D. Colo. Oct. 17, 2025).
ORDER granting 1 Marlon Joel Carbajal Padilla's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (the "Petition"). The parties have consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge for all proceedings, including entry of a final judgment [#6]. Respondents indicate in their Response [#7] to this Court's Order to Show Cause [#4] that, though they maintain that Petitioner's detention is lawful, they are not submitting a brief in opposition to the Petition. The Court thus GRANTS the Petition for the same reasons articulated in numerous other decisions produced by this Court and this District. See Inestroza Paguada v
ORDER: Before the Court is Petitioner Alex Armando Martinez-Orellana's Motion to Enforce Judgment ("Motion"). (ECF No. 19.) Therein, he "reported that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) only returned 12 of the 950 dollars that he had in his wallet when he was apprehended." (Id. at 1.) As such, Martinez-Orellana seeks an order "requiring ICE to return all of his personal belongings, including the $938 in cash that was not returned." (Id. at 2.) Since Martinez-Orellana filed the Motion, the Government has represented that "the Laramie County Sheriff's Office has confirmed that it is in possession of Petitioner's missing money and intends to reimburse him these funds in due course." (ECF No. 37 at 2.) On June 29, 2026, Martinez-Orellana confirmed that he has been fully reimbursed. (ECF No. 46 at 1.) Given this confirmation, as well as the Court's view that this reimbursement is the sole remedy available to Petitioner pursuant to the Motion, (See ECF No. 19 at 3 (seeking only a single remedy: "an order requiring Respondents to return these funds")), it is DENIED AS MOOT. SO ORDERED by Judge William J. Martinez on
Nor does it violate the petitioner’s procedural due-process rights. The Due Process Clause does not provide applicants for admission like the petitioner a liberty interest in being released from immigration detention as a matter of procedural due process. Sierra, 258 F.3d at 1218 & n.3 (petitioner was “legally considered to be detained at the border and hence as never having effected entry into this country”); accord Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 139-40 (applicants for admission, “even those paroled elsewhere in the country for years pending removal,” are “‘treated’ for due process purposes ‘as if stopped at the border’” (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215 (1953))). The petitioner is “entitled only to the process Congress has conferred on him by
While Jennings forecloses Petitioner’s statutory argument, it does not foreclose his due process claims. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that immigration detention is constitutionally permissible because it serves regulatory rather than punitive purposes. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003). As another court in this District has recognized, however, “courts have ‘sharply disagree[d] about the reach of the Due Process Clause as applied to arriving [noncitizens].’” Nieto v. Ceja, No. 1:24-cv-02821- DDD-NRN, 2025 WL 4087626, at *6 (D. Colo. June 12, 2025) (quoting Gonzalez Aguilar v. Wolf, 448 F. Supp. 3d 1202, 1212 (D.N.M. 2020). “Some courts have held that, at some point, due process requires a noncitizen subject to prolonged detention under Section 1225(b) be given an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge, or some other form of individualized review of eligibility for release beyond the opportunity to request discretionary parole under Section 1182(d)(5).” Id. (collecting cases). “But other courts have held that due process imposes no time limit or hearing requirement while [a noncitizen] is detained pending removal proceedings.” Id. (citations omitted). This Court agrees with those courts that have concluded that the Due Process Clause applies to noncitizens detained pursuant to Section 1225(b). See, e.g., Mbalivoto
IV. Conclusion As the United States prepares to celebrate its 250th anniversary, the Court notes that the demarcation of the rights of noncitizens in this country has not always been clear. Indeed, nearly fifty years ago the Supreme Court noted: [D]ecisions of this Court with regard to the rights of [noncitizens] living in our society have reflected fine, and often difficult, questions of values. As a Nation, we exhibit extraordinary hospitality to those who come to our country, which is not surprising for we have often been described as “a nation of immigrants.” Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 294 (1978). Fifty years later, it is difficult to reconcile the rights acknowledged by Zadyvdas with certain statements from Knauff and Thuraissigiam. This Court has done its best to do so. If the Court is wrong, let another court declare that a noncitizen with no criminal history, no history of flight, and an adjudicated right to asylum may be detained indefinitely without running afoul of the Due Process Clause.
Finally, we are unpersuaded by the assertion that these initiatives do not run afoul of the single subject rule because if the proposed mid-cycle temporary redistricting maps do not pass, then there would be no reason to move the independent commission from the constitution to a statute. Such an argument does not establish that the measures are necessarily and properly connected. To the contrary, this argument makes clear that the subjects are, in fact, disconnected and incongruous because one is not necessarily connected to the other. III. Conclusion ¶37 For these reasons, we conclude that an initiative violates the single subject requirement when its effectiveness is conditioned on the passage of a separate initiative. We therefore further conclude that Initiative #241, Initiative #242, and Initiative #328 encompass multiple subjects in violation of article V, section 1(5.5) of the Colorado Constitution and section 1-40-106.5.