Minnesota Appellate Court Watch

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A newsletter dedicated to tracking appellate cases in Minnesota. Trends, analysis, and the sort of fun only appellate minutia can offer. Run by @danielsuitor.com. Newsletters/posts are for informational purposes, not legal advice. blog.minnappct.watch

The resulting school choice order reads as a sustained one-sided defense of Respondent, portraying Appellant negatively at every turn while presupposing the conclusion that Minneapolis Public Schools are superior for [CHILD'S NAME REDACTED]—despite conclusions that can’t be reconciled with the record and defy any reasonable reading of it. The result is an order that is plainly absurd. This assessment is not unique to Appellant: every other one of the numerous reviewers—except for Respondent and the court—has reached the same conclusion. Appellant’s district court counsel described it as the most one-sided order she had ever seen and stated that she could not read it in one sitting due to how appalled she was by the district court’s treatment of the record. Where such a stark and unexplained disconnect exists between the record and the outcome, the absence of a coherent explanation risks undermining public confidence in the neutrality of the judicial process.
Issue #1 –Some Examples Demonstrating Clear Error that Materially Impacted the Best Interest Factors that the Court of Appeals gave Improper Deference to:  The district court took the #1 ranked public school district in the state against the #130 ranked and implied that the #130 ranked is better based on rankings—which obviously does not make sense. These types of nonsensical conclusions are reflected across multiple side-by-side metric comparisons in the record (App Reply Brief p.14 / App Brief p.9-12).  The district court chose to consider the student-teacher-ratio and Niche grade of Kenny to support Factor 1 not favoring Gleason Lake despite Gleason Lake having objectively superior statistics for the same metric and from the same source, presented to the court in a side-by-side exhibit. It’s presenting a metric to justify a decision while omitting that the alternative metric is objectively better—it just doesn’t add up (App Reply Brief p.14 / App Brief p.10).  The district court failed to even consider record evidence addressing the school district environment that directly favored Gleason Lake. This included undisputed indicators of safety and student well-being showing a dramatically higher level of student safety and satisfaction in Wayzata schools (App Brief p.22-23).  The district court expressly refused to weigh the foreseeable middle and high school pathways tied to each elementary option, despite record evidence showing the quality gap between Wayzata and Minneapolis widens substantially at those levels. This ignores obvious foreseeable consequences and departs from basic
The resulting school choice order reads as a sustained one-sided defense of Respondent, portraying Appellant negatively at every turn while presupposing the conclusion that Minneapolis Public Schools are superior for [CHILD'S NAME REDACTED]—despite conclusions that can’t be reconciled with the record and defy any reasonable reading of it.
Despite the mandatory language of 484.014 Subd. 3, the District Court retains discretion regarding management of its own records. In applying its discretion in determining the appropriateness of an eviction expungement, the “District Courts should undertake this analysis by balancing the (1) benefit to the petitioner; (2) disadvantages to the public; and (3) burden on the court regarding the expungement order.” Hous. & Redevelopment Auth. of Duluth, MN v. Young, 995 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Minn. Ct. App. 2023).
9. The district court did not explain its reasoning for the decision to stay the orders beyond referencing the judgments. The district court also did not cite the authority—whether a precedential opinion, a statute, a rule, or its inherent authority— under which it exercised the power to issue a stay of the orders. As such, we are unable to determine whether the district court abused its discretion in staying the orders for expungement until the monetary judgments are satisfied. We, therefore, remand these cases for the district court to explain its reasoning for the stay and the authority under which it is ordering a stay. See State v. A.S.E., 835 N.W.2d 513, 517 (Minn. App. 2013) (reversing and remanding when reviewing court is unable to determine whether the district court abused its discretion based upon the record available); Archway Marketing Servs. v. County of Hennepin, 882 N.W.2d 890, 896 (Minn. 2016) (remanding for court “to more fully explain its reasoning”).
Sentence of the Week The red Mustang pulled up next to J.J.’s driver’s-side window and stopped. The driver of the red Mustang, later identified as [Defendant], flashed a badge and said to J.J. and S.S., “In this state we drive 30 miles an hour,” and “the radar said you were going closer to 40.” J.J. asked [Defendant] if the red Mustang was an official police vehicle, and [Defendant] said, “It’s a detective vehicle.” Soon thereafter, [Defendant] drove away. . . . [Defendant] testified that he pulled up next to the white SUV in the Culver’s parking lot and told the driver that he had cut off multiple drivers, that he was “going fast,” at least “35, 40 miles an hour,” and that “in Minnesota, the speed limit’s 30.” Novak denied using the flashing lights on his vehicle, having radar in his vehicle, showing his NAPD [a self-founded organization] badge, and saying that he was a police officer. State v. Novak, pp. 2–3. I'm sorry, man, but this is the least believable testimony of all time. How is a jury supposed to believe that someone who drives a red Ford Mustang cares about driving the speed limit? You’re just not setting yourself up for success, my guy.
Most active jurist: Judge Michelle Larkin, with an astonishing five opinions, the highest since I began this endeavor. Notably, all five were criminal appeals, and four of the five were decided in less than 50 days from argument, 1.95 standard deviations faster than the average criminal opinion. A remarkable run for Judge Larkin and her staff.
A Visit from St. Nicholas, Esq. Adapted from the original poem by Clement Clarke Moore ‘Twas the night before Christmas, when all through the Court Not a lawyer was stirring, not even a clerk; The draft opinions were submitted for citechecks with care, In hopes that wise rulings soon would be there; The counsel were nestled all snug in their beds; While outlines of arguments danced in their heads;
The Bad Neighbor of the Week Award Minnesota is a state that prides itself on neighborly congeniality and generosity. This intermittent feature highlights times when those values go by the wayside and next-door enmity reaches the appellate dockets. For an area of law generally predominated by complex, technical analysis of state environmental law and local zoning codes, land use practice has some of the best drama. In the case of Miller v. City of White Bear Lake, a couple sued the city for granting variances to allow the folks next door to tear down their old single-story house on the lake and build a new one that was 1.34 feet wider. Nobody beefs like lake neighbors! As the COA points out, a 34-to-38-foot-wide lot with 15-foot setbacks means there are only 4 to 8 feet of space to legally build without a variance, and the minimum house width is 22 feet. Some kind of variance was going to be needed. I just don’t think going from 3.2 to 3.36 feet on the left side of the lot and 7.5 to 6 on the right was the hill to die on. But maybe that’s the kind of attitude that prevents me from owning a lake house.
Case Name of the Week Kellogg v. Freund This case name is one letter off from being an all-time freaky dude showdown. If you want an interesting and terrible time, I suggest learning about the various beliefs of John Harvey Kellogg, the inventor of Corn Flakes. As for Sigmund Freud, perhaps the most normal thing about him is that his American fame originated in Worcester, Massachusetts. And I can say that, because my American fame (now useless undergraduate degree) originated in Worcester.
14. Scheffler’s primary objection concerns Class Counsel’s alleged lack of zealous advocacy and alleged inflated attorney fee request. Based on the Court’s awareness of this file, the Court soundly rejects the assertion that Class Counsel did not zealously advocate for their clients. The attorneys comprising Class Counsel are extremely experienced and knowledgeable in class-action litigation, and the Court finds that their ability to negotiate a potential settlement on behalf of such a large class in a relatively short amount of time is a testament to their hard work and dedication to this case. The Court also dismisses the ad hominem remarks directed towards attorney Melissa S. Weiner, Esq. and gives them no weight given the inappropriate nature of Scheffler’s criticism towards her. Ms. Weiner filed a Declaration on September 4, 2025, as noted by Class Counsel (Christopher Renz) at the hearing. The Court has reviewed and considered Ms. Weiner’s Declaration. The Weiner Declaration confirms the significant breadth and experience of Weiner as well as other Pearson Warshaw LLP attorneys involved in representation of the Class in complex class-action litigation; importantly, the Weiner Declaration also lists other class-action cases throughout the country in which courts have approved attorney fee requests by Pearson Warshaw LLP at hourly rates identical or similar to those utilized in this case.1 (Weiner Decl. at 7-9). Finally, the Weiner Declaration notes the significant involvement by Weiner in the broader legal community and bar association to 7 enhance access to justice. Id. at 2. Once again, Scheffler’s personal attacks on Weiner and her colleagues are misplaced and entirely inappropriate.
State v. Boyd, No. A24-0035 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2025). Criminal Appeal from Carlton County District Court (09-CR-22-339) Opinion, Worke (Johnson dissenting) Reversing and remanding convictions for first-degree possession and obstruction of process on grounds that the triggering condition of an anticipatory search warrant wasn’t met because the warrant only allowed arrest when the defendant was “traveling to Cloquet” and law enforcement stopped him “before any of the I-35 exits leading to Cloquet” leaving them without “a substantial basis to infer [he] was destined for Cloquet.” The dissent argues that the defendant “plainly was traveling ‘towards Cloquet” because he was traveling on I-35 towards the exits most likely used to reach Cloquet The COA notes that there is no precedential caselaw on the use of anticipatory warrants. I don't know if this is a good case for the Supreme Court to weigh in on, mostly because it came down to interpretation of the text of the warrant and not any matters underlying the warrant, but rare are the criminal issues with no Supreme Court input so a grant of review wouldn't be surprising.
While Deputy K. accompanied Tanna to the back of the car, he “noticed several items sticking out of [Tanna’s] pocket, including a clear plastic bag.” When the deputy asked about the plastic bag, Tanna indicated it was marijuana . . . . Tanna then attempted to run around the passenger side of the car and away from Deputy K. Deputy M. stepped in and grabbed Tanna, who “tense[d] up” and “attempted to bring his . . . right hand up.” As Deputy M. and Tanna continued to struggle, Deputy K. saw Tanna put a small plastic bag in his mouth and noticed that the bag “was fully into his mouth and there was chewing going on and that white substance or crystal substance was falling from his mouth.” Both deputies attempted to pull the item from Tanna’s mouth while he was pressed against the car. Deputy M. also saw Tanna “chewing” with “stuff falling out that was white” that the deputy believed was methamphetamine. Tanna was taken to the ground but continued resisting and “start[ed] spitting.” At some point during the struggle, the small plastic bag came out of Tanna’s mouth. Eventually, the officers were able to handcuff Tanna after one officer threatened to use a taser.
Sentence of the Week The Board directed the parties to submit memoranda on the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Both parties agreed that the Board was statutorily required to hear the appeal. In February 2025, the Board concluded that it did not have jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal. - Blissenbach, page 3. I too would cut my own leg off to avoid having to decide discrimination cases stemming from return-to-office orders issued in May 2020, but the statute seemed pretty clear on this one. And both parties agreed that there was jurisdiction! The Occupational Safety and Health Review Board’s reasoning for refusing to hear the case seems to be “Well yes, the statute says we have to hear all appeals from an ALJ, but it doesn’t say we have to hear discrimination appeals.” Blissenbach, page 6. I honestly respect that hustle.
Two Delaware LLCs, both alike in ignominy, In fair Itasca, where we lay our scene From lease dispute defer to arbitral authority
This in itself establishes the need for a writ of prohibition directed to the Wright County district court. For context about the reason this is occurring, Wright County shared its desire to participate in the CCA subsidy program earlier this year. In conjunction with the DOC, it prepared for a transition in Fall 2025. But the DOC determined transition could not move forward when, late in the process, Wright County informed the DOC that it would not provide DOC employees that would be displaced by the transition their accrued leave benefits. The CCA requires that, to the extent possible, a county employ all displaced DOC employees “with all of the benefits enjoyed by the officer or employee while in the service of the state.” Minn. Stat. § 401.04, subd. 2(a-b) (emphasis added). As a result, the Commissioner did not approve Wright County to participate in the CCA subsidy program.
RELIEF REQUESTED Petitioner respectfully requests this Court issue a writ of prohibition directing the Wright County district court to stop ordering probation services for adult felons to Wright County Probation until the Commissioner affirms that he has approved Wright County’s transition to a CCA model or has otherwise authorized assignment of these services to Wright County. WHY THE WRIT SHOULD ISSUE “A writ of prohibition will issue when the court exercises, or is about to exercise, judicial power, the exercise of such power is unauthorized by law, and the result will be an injury for which there is no other adequate remedy.” Klapmeier v. Cirrus Indus., Inc., 900 N.W.2d 386, 392 (Minn. 2017). Writs of prohibition are an important tool “to oversee the actions of lower courts in the rare instances in which a court . . . exercises judicial power that is unauthorized by law.” Id. A writ of prohibition can be issued if “(1) an inferior court or tribunal [is] about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power; (2) the exercise of such power [is] unauthorized by law; and (3) the exercise of such power [will] result in injury for which there is no adequate remedy.” In re Leslie, 889 N.W.2d 13, 14 (Minn. 2017) (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
No. A25-____ December 4, 2025 STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS _____________________________________________ Minnesota Department of Corrections, Petitioner. In Re Wright County District Court Felony Supervision Orders. _____________________________________________ PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION DIRECTED TO THE WRIGHT COUNTY DISTRICT COURT AND REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION WRIT REQUESTED ON OR BEFORE DECEMBER 10, 2025
Decisions average 275 days from filing, 71 since argument Civil: 252 / 69 Criminal: 302 / 74 Precedential: 252 / 83 Nonprecedential 273 / 71 Order opinions: 344 / 59
Sentence of the Week "Arnold explained further that “this is real live monetary money that is . . . federally regulated” and that “anyone who does not process those instruments . . . will be prosecuted by the SEC” or another governmental entity." - State v. Arnold, page 3. My "this is real live monetary money that is federally regulated" T-shirt has people asking a lot of questions already answered by my shirt.
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A25-0104 State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Eugene Nathaniel Arnold, III, Appellant. Filed December 1, 2025 Affirmed Johnson, Judge Sherburne County District Court File No. 71-CR-21-525 Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Dawn Nyhus, Sherburne County Attorney, George R. Kennedy, Assistant County Attorney, Elk River, Minnesota (for respondent) Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Evan Ottaviani, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant) Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge; and Johnson, Judge. JOHNSON, Judge NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FACTS On December 28, 2020, the Sherburne County District Court entered judgment in a criminal case against Arnold. The district court imposed a prison sentence but stayed execution of the sentence. The district court also ordered restitution in the amount of $1,564.78, a surcharge of $75.00, and a law library fee of $10.00, for a total of $1,649.78. Two days later, Arnold mailed an envelope to the office of the Sherburne County Court Administrator. Inside the envelope was a document entitled “CASHIER’S CHECK” in the amount of $26,649.78. The purported cashier’s check, which was introduced into evidence as exhibit 2, is appended to this opinion. The envelope included other documents, including a “letter of credit,” which explains Arnold’s means of satisfying the judgment debt, and a document warning that it would be fraudulent for the recipient to not process the cashier’s check within three days. A few weeks later, on February 12, 2021, Arnold mailed a second envelope to the court administrator’s office. Inside the second envelope was another document entitled “CASHIER’S CHECK,” this time in the amount of $1,564.78, which is the amount of restitution ordered in the prior criminal case. The second purported cashier’s check, which was introduced into evidence as exhibit 3, also is appended to this opinion. The second
The Church Autonomy Doctrine “The legal principle that has come to be known as the ‘ecclesiastical abstention doctrine’ or the ‘church autonomy doctrine’ has its roots in a line of U.S. Supreme Court decisions regarding church property and church schisms.”3 Pfeil, 877 N.W.2d at 532. Although none of those decisions directly addresses the factual circumstances of this case, “several helpful rules can be drawn from them.” Id. at 534. Among them is the following rule: although courts can resolve disputes involving religious organizations, they may do so “only if” (1) they are “able to resolve the matter by relying exclusively on neutral principles of law,” (2) they do not “disturb the ruling of a governing ecclesiastical body with respect to issues of doctrine,” and (3) “the adjudication does not interfere with an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself.” Id. (quotation omitted). The third factor is dispositive here.
Catholic teaching permeates and shapes the ethos of Catholic schools. Informed by Catholic teaching, these Guiding Principles shall inform the creation of policies, handbooks, statements, employee agreements, training for employees, and the approach to accompaniment in the Catholic schools of the Diocese of [insert], thus ensuring that the immeasurable dignity of every child is protected and respected, particularly as it relates to foundational beliefs of the Catholic Church: • God created each person body and soul “in His own image, in the image of God he created them; male and female he created them” (Gen. 1:27). The dignity of each person and the source of his or her most important identity is found in this creation in the image and likeness of God (CCC §364). • God uses the body to reveal to each person his or her sexual identity as male or female. A person’s embrace of his or her God-given sexual identity is an essential 5 part of living a fulfilled relationship with God, with oneself, and with each other (Laudato Si §155). • The harmonious integration of a person’s sexual identity with his or her sex is an expression of the inner unity and reality of the human person made body and soul in the image and likeness of God (CCC §364-65).
IN COURT OF APPEALS A25-0559 Reyzl Grace MoChridhe, Appellant, vs. Academy of Holy Angels, Respondent, Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis, Respondent. Filed December 1, 2025 Affirmed Larkin, Judge Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CV-24-11601 Jess Braverman, Brittany Stewart (pro hac vice), Gender Justice, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Joni M. Thome, Katherine Rollins, Wanta Thome PLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant) Katie M. Connolly, Sara Gross Methner, Sara L. Lewenstein, Nilan Johnson Lewis PA, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Thomas B. Wieser, Thomas Wieser Law, West St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Holy Angels) Paul J. Zech, Scott D. Blake, Felhaber Larson, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Lorie S. Gildea, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Archdiocese) Leslie L. Lienemann, Celeste E. Culberth, Culberth & Lienemann, LLP, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Brian T. Rochel, Kitzer Rochel, PLLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and