Rob Mullins

@robertmullins.bsky.social

1004 Followers 775 Following

Associate Professor, University of Queensland.

31. Recognition of gender reassignment will involve some blurring of the normally accepted biological distinction between male and female. Some blurring already exists, unavoidably, in the case of inter-sexual persons. When assessing the gender of inter-sexual persons, matters taken into account include self-perception and style of upbringing and living. Recognition of gender reassignment will involve further blurring. It will mean that in law a person who, unlike an inter-sexual person, had all the biological characteristics of one sex at birth may subsequently be treated as a member of the opposite sex.
You are welcome to come and piss in the men's. It's our job to make you feel welcome. Men who think they are women is a male problem. It is it very typical of trans-identifying men not to care about women's feelings. That's okay so long as you don't start encroaching on their spaces. Start a campaign to piss in the men's and make it men's job to make it safe for you. I will support it.
I was deeply saddened to see the content of the EHRC's revised code of practice, which the equalities minister laid before Parliament last week. A few months ago I wrote the below blog post for the UKCLA, arguing against the EHRC's interpretation of the code. As with all blog posts, my arguments were abbreviated and there are points that I would already frame differently. But I am proud of writing it. https://lnkd.in/gjDAhQCA There are many things wrong with the code, but I will mention just one. In FWS the Supreme Court acknowledged that trans men and women can be the victims of sex discrimination and harassment in their acquired sex. It is incoherent and unprincipled to interpret the Equality Act as recognising that trans women can be the victims of misogynist harassment and violence, while also prohibiting them from receiving services that allow them the care and companionship of other women with similar experiences. I also want to express my concerns about the changing environment for students at British universities. I feel a duty to speak out on this on behalf of my own trans, non-binary and intersex students. Some of them would no doubt have considered travelling to the UK for postgraduate studies. I fear that many of them will now have to add the UK to a growing list of countries where they will be excluded and stigmatised for living as they always have. It should go without saying, but I write this on my own behalf and not on behalf of my employer.
While it also remains the case that a transsexual cannot acquire all the biological characteristics of the assigned sex (Sheffield and Horsham, cited above, p. 2028, § 56), the Court notes that with increasingly sophisticated surgery and types of hormonal treatments, the principal unchanging biological aspect of gender identity is the chromosomal element. It is known however that chromosomal anomalies may arise naturally (for example, in cases of intersex conditions where the biological criteria at birth are not congruent) and in those cases, some persons have to be assigned to one sex or the other as seems most appropriate in the circumstances of the individual case. It is not apparent to the Court that the chromosomal element, amongst all the others, must inevitably take on decisive significance for the purposes of legal attribution of gender identity for transsexuals (see the dissenting opinion of Thorpe LJ in Bellinger v. Bellinger cited in paragraph 52 above; and the judgment of Chisholm J in the Australian case, Re Kevin, cited in paragraph
Adjustments to the court process 11. A requirement of a religion may mean proceedings need to be conducted in a certain way, eg breaks, adjusted hours and order of witnesses, to allow for fasting and its impact on metabolism, the need to undertake prayer during the day, Sabbaths starting at sunset, and religious holy days; or following a bereavement, where a religious faith encourages swift funeral ceremonies and extended periods of mourning. 12. Many religious faiths incorporate elements of fasting, to a greater or lesser extent. A fasting day is sometimes so holy that it is also not permitted to work or come into court (eg Yom Kippur). 13. In all cases it is important to demonstrate respect for religious differences: • Show understanding of any issues regarding times when a religious person cannot attend court, eg because of an important holy day, or because they need time off or facilities to pray. For more detail, see appendix D (Glossary of religions). • Take care to get a person’s name right. For details, see “Names and naming systems”. • Show understanding regarding correct practice on taking the oath. Witnesses/jurors should not be pressurised into taking an oath on the wrong religious book. They should be offered the choice of taking a religious oath without the religious book or affirming if they prefer. The important point is that they feel bound by the oath or affirmation. For details, see appendix D (Glossary of religions). • Avoid making any unnecessary objections regarding dress code. (See “Religious dress and wearing the veil” below.) • Consider changing the order in which witnesses are called or timings of hearings/breaks to accommodate faiths that observe their weekly Sabbath from sunset (or before) on Friday until sunset on Saturday (the period where work/activity is not permitted). If a person is fasting, it is helpful to understand the following: • Periods of fasting can often be for many hours and for lengthy periods,…
One prominent defense of compulsory sex-marking is that it facilitates social coordination. In my description of the hegemonic gender regime in Section II, I noted that its rules help simplify coordination problems by splitting the human population into two easily identifiable groups and assigning distinct roles to each. Compulsory sex-marking is key to this process, as it ensures that everyone knows what role others are meant to play. Were this system to break down, coordinating around certain activities—such as, for example, pleasurable sex or sex for reproductive purposes—might become more difficult. Kathleen Stock, for one, writes that no less a drastic outcome than our species’ extinction would occur if we could no longer reliably identify the sex of others.58 If compulsory sex-marking really does help us coordinate in the ways that (again, as described in Sec. II) economists, sociologists, and philosophers of science have suggested, might the benefits from this coordination not, at least potentially, give us reason to accept a more minimal sphere of personal freedom?
The second possible criticism concerns the proposition at [3a] considered at point (vi) (above at paragraphs 57 – 62). While I am less certain than the Interim Update that a man prevented from using the Claimants’ trans-inclusive female lavatory would be likely to establish the less favourable treatment necessary to make good a claim of direct sex discrimination, I do not consider that the way the point is put in the Update is necessarily wrong. Rather, it is a point that may turn on the facts of a situation. Even though the EHRC’s obligation when exercising its power under section 13(1)(d) of the EA 2006 is to provide an accurate statement of the law, the court must apply this requirement recognising that any statement of law will rest on some assumption of fact, even if only generic. Where a body such as the EHRC has issued guidance that rests on factual premises that are permissible, the court should hesitate before concluding that the guidance as issued was unlawful. Thus, I do not consider that the EHRC’s approach to point (vi) gives rise to any legal error.
The Claimants contended that a female lavatory does not cease To be single-sex if, for example, (a) it is cleaned by a man, or (b) a mother brings her Young son to use the lavatory, or (c) a man uses the lavatory in an emergency. Thus they submitted it would be just the same were an employer to allow trans women to use a female lavatory. The Claimants refer to this approach as a “trans-inclusive lavatory” And I will refer to it in the same way in this judgment. However, the examples the Claimants rely on do not support their conclusion
As explained already: (a) subject to the point on whether such provision might amount to less favourable treatment of men (see above at paragraphs 57 – 62) trans-inclusive lavatories could be provided consistently with the requirements of the EA 2010; and (b) consistently with the single-sex provision required by regulation 20 of the 1992 Workplace Regulations, an employer could provide a trans-inclusive lavatory as additional provision (see above at paragraphs 26 and 71). On this analysis neither the EA 2010 nor the 1992 Workplace Regulations gives rise to any necessary interference with any aspect of the Claimants’ article 8 rights.
When you are on the losing end of a debate, a fruitful strategy is to change the way the debate is framed. Your opponent is then faced with the following dilemma: Either argue against the framing itself—and then lose track of the original debate—or try to win the debate on the new terms you just imposed onto it. Whatever they choose, you are more likely than not to win. Contemporary analytical jurisprudence is a good case in point.
In 1996, the applicant started work with a new employer and was required to provide her National Insurance (“NI”) number. She was concerned that the new employer would be in a position to trace her details as once in the possession of the number it would have been possible to find out about her previous employers and obtain information from them. Although she requested the allocation of a new NI number from the Department of Social Security (“DSS”), this was rejected and she eventually gave the new employer her NI number. The applicant claims that the new employer has now traced back her identity as she began experiencing problems at work. Colleagues stopped speaking to her and she was told that everyone was talking about her behind her back.
While it also remains the case that a transsexual cannot acquire all the biological characteristics of the assigned sex (Sheffield and Horsham, cited above, p. 2028, § 56), the Court notes that with increasingly sophisticated surgery and types of hormonal treatments, the principal unchanging biological aspect of gender identity is the chromosomal element. It is known however that chromosomal anomalies may arise naturally (for example, in cases of intersex conditions where the biological criteria at birth are not congruent) and in those cases, some persons have to be assigned to one sex or the other as seems most appropriate in the circumstances of the individual case. It is not apparent to the Court that the chromosomal element, amongst all the others, must inevitably take on decisive significance for the purposes of legal attribution of gender identity for transsexuals (see the dissenting opinion of Thorpe LJ in Bellinger v. Bellinger cited in paragraph 52 above; and the judgment of Chisholm J in the Australian case, Re Kevin, cited in paragraph 55 above).
Due to a limited word count, we are unable to evaluate the decision’s impact on the rights and interests of people born with intersex traits or variations of sex characteristics (differences/disorders of sex development in some medical discourses). However, the treatment of such persons is of growing legal and ethical concern, both in the UK and elsewhere.48 49 Most people born with intersex traits do not consider themselves to be transgender (and most trans people were not born with intersex traits). Most people born with intersex traits identify as either boys/men or girls/women, in a manner typically corresponding to their birth-assigned sex category.50 51 Nevertheless, some such persons self-identify as intersex (or as intersex men or women), non-binary, or in a manner that differs from the sex/gender category they were placed in as infants by clinicians. What is the place, therefore, of a person whose ‘biological sex’—even as picked out by various physical markers—troubles the categories of ‘man’ and ‘woman’ invoked in UK law following the Court’s ruling? (See also the fourth footnote of this article in relation to non-intersex persons who may identify as non-binary, genderqueer and so forth.)
Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) chairwoman Mary-Ann Stephenson said while practically they are of no use to a transgender person trying to access a toilet or a changing room of their acquired gender, such certificates remain important in other ways. In an interview with the Press Association, she said: “I think in terms of people’s right to marry in their legal sex, to be buried in their legal sex, and so on – and it was the right to marry which was the original case that went to the European Court of Human Rights – the gender recognition certificates are still very important to people.”
But the real problem, Calder adds, isn't the government: "It's the civil service, and gender ideologyl is so deeply embedded there. So it doesn't matter who the heck you're voting in because they remain in post and a lot of the bills are going through them." FWS saw this for themselves when they met civil servants at a time when Nicola Sturgeon, as first minister, was trying to jam through gender recognition reform in 2022. The proposal said a man could become a woman by saying he was, better known as "self- ID"
NHS Fife and Upton, meanwhile, are set to stick to their guns, despite concerns over the costs of the case and doubts over its prospects. The options available to the board include arguing for a “novel” interpretation of 1992 regulations guaranteeing single-sex changing facilities at work, which would allow Upton to be counted as female. Alternatively, the board and Upton’s lawyers could put forward a human rights-based case, arguing that Upton’s would be undermined if she were banned from women’s facilities. Both options are seen in legal circles as, at best, long shots.