Shane Phillips

@shanedphillips.bsky.social

5801 Followers 324 Following

Housing guy. Researcher at UCLA Lewis Center, host of UCLA Housing Voice Podcast, author of The Affordable City, resident of Los Angeles.

A table showing vote shares for Bass, Pratt, and Raman under different scenarios. The scenarios are: 20% of the remaining vote goes to Pratt and 30% to Raman, 20% Pratt + 35% Raman, and 25% Pratt + 35% Raman. Results for each scenario are shown for four turnout levels: Total turnout matches projections, falls 5% short of projections, exceeds projections by 5%, or exceeds projections by 10%. Raman wins second place in the 20% Pratt + 35% Raman scenario for all turnout levels, and wins second place in all scenarios if turnout is 10% above projections.
Frozen Potomac River with broken ice
"Under the North Korean system, if one person in your family does something wrong or commits a crime against the regime, then the entire family can be sent away to a prison camp. The reason the regime has this kind of system in place is because it wants to instill fear in North Koreans. Kim Il-Sung once said that any person who has anti-government sentiments should be wiped out entirely and up to three generations of their family should be punished."
Chart showing average unit value for single-family homes and units in 5+ unit buildings in LA/Orange and San Francisco Counties. Units in 5+ unit buildings (condos) are 40-50% less expensive on average.
Graph with "returns on rent or equity" on the y-axis and "years of tenancy or ownership" from 0 to 30 on the x-axis. The line representing homeownership with a 3% discount rate starts at nearly -10% in year 1, then increases sharply to 30% by year 4-5 and then more slowly in later years, hitting nearly 60% in year 30. The line representing homeownership with a 5% discount rate also starts near -10% in year 1 and is also near 30% by year 4-5, but it increases more slowly from here, peaking around 44% around year 15 and then dipping slightly over the next 15 years to around 41%. The line representing SPR with a 3% discount rate starts at 0% and rises in a sawtooth pattern with large jumps every 7 years and slower, smaller declines in the intervening years. The peaks are around 14% in year 3, 19% in year 10, 25% in year 17, 32% in year 24, and 40% in year 31.
Graph with "returns on rent or equity" on the y-axis and "years of tenancy or ownership" from 0 to 30 on the x-axis. The line representing homeownership with a 3% discount rate starts at nearly -10% in year 1, then increases sharply to 30% by year 4-5 and then more slowly in later years, hitting nearly 60% in year 30. The line representing homeownership with a 5% discount rate also starts near -10% in year 1 and is also near 30% by year 4-5, but it increases more slowly from here, peaking around 44% around year 15 and then dipping slightly over the next 15 years to around 41%. The line representing SPR with a 3% discount rate starts at 0% and rises in a sawtooth pattern with large jumps every 7 years and slower, smaller declines in the intervening years. The peaks are around 14% in year 3, 19% in year 10, 25% in year 17, 32% in year 24, and 40% in year 31.
Chart showing median net worth for homeowners, median home equity for homeowners, and median net worth for renters for four household groups: all, white, Black, and Latino. Median net worth is around $400,000 for all households and white households, and around $200,000 for Black and Latino households. Median home equity is around $200,000 for all households and white households, and around $140,000 for Black and Latino households. Median net worth is under $10,000 for all groups but highest for white households.
Graph with "annual rent" and "annual reward distribution" on the left y-axis, "distributions as a share of rent" on right y-axis, and years 0 to 15 on the x-axis. A line from year 1-5 representing rent increases from roughly $38,000 to $40,000. A line from year 1-15 representing annual reward distributions is below $5,000 in most years, but spikes sharply to nearly $25,000 in year 3 and to nearly $45,000 in year 10. Another line representing distributions as a share of rent increases from 0% to about 18% in year 3, falls slightly to around 15% from year 4-9, and then increases to around 45% and stays there to year 15.
Chart showing annual rental reward distributions per rental reward on the y-axis and years since project completion on the y-axis, from year 0 to 50. One trend line shows rental rewards distributed as funds become available, with large spikes every 7 years starting in year 14 -- starting at about $8,000 and rising steadily to about $11,000 in year 49. The in-between years distribute much less per rental reward -- under $1,000. The other trend line shows rental rewards distributed such that the payments are equal within each 7-year refinancing period. The first payments also begin in year 14, at around $1,700 per rental reward, rising to around $2,100 in year 50.
Chart showing sales of high value, densely zoned, low intensity properties in the city of Los Angeles and other LA County jurisdictions without an increased real estate transfer tax. It shows that sales of such parcels fell more sharply in the city of LA than the other jurisdictions post-ULA, and the gap has persisted. The trend lines show the gap has closed only a very small amount (<10%) in more than two years.
Two charts, each showing real estate transaction data for the city of Los Angeles and the rest of LA County for Q1 2020 through Q3 2025. The left chart shows transactions for properties sold for less than $5 million, i.e. under the ULA tax threshold, and it shows parallel trends in the city and the rest of the county. The right chart shows transactions over the ULA threshold and it shows a large increase in sales the quarter before ULA went into effect and then a sustained drop from Q2 2023 through Q3 2025 -- sales of ULA-eligible properties declined about 50% more than sales in neighboring jurisdictions. There was a significant rise in such sales in the city of LA in Q4 2023, the last quarter of the original study, and this closed the gap between the city and the rest of the county. The gap has widened again since Q1 2025 as high-value sales in the city fell again and sales in the rest of the county rose.
Chart of annual housing production for 1-unit, 2-9 unit, 10+ unit, and ADUs for 2020 through 2025, with the 2025 figures based on permit data for the first three quarters of 2025 and projecting that Q4 will be the average of the previous three quarters. It shows stable 1-unit and 2-4 unit production and rising ADU production (these project types are generally exempt from the Measure ULA tax because most sell for less than $5 million), and declining production since 2022 for 10+ unit multifamily. Production was over 12,000 in 2022, fell to slightly under 10,000 in 2023, fell further to 7,500 in 2024, and is on track for around 7,300 in 2025.
An expansion of the previous chart that includes Q4 2024 through Q3 2025. It shows permits for 10+ unit projects increase from around 1,200 units in Q3 2024 to around 2,200 units in Q4 2024, then fall to around 750 units in Q1 2025. It rises to 1,900 in Q2 2025 and then to 2,400 in Q3 2025.
Chart comparing number of approved permits in Q3 2024 vs Q3 2025, with about 2500 permits in 2024 and slightly over 4000 in 2025. At the bottom it says "residential construction permits in Q3 of 2025 were 60% higher than the same period a year before, and also showed, quarter-over-quarter rises throughout 2025."
Screenshot of text from Wikipedia: "The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has 14 counties, though eight[1] of these fourteen county governments were abolished between 1997 and 2000. The counties in the southeastern portion of the state retain county-level local government (Barnstable, Bristol, Dukes, Norfolk, Plymouth) or, in one case, (Nantucket County) consolidated town-county government.[2][3] Vestigial judicial and law enforcement districts still follow county boundaries even in the counties whose county-level government has been disestablished, and the counties are still generally recognized as geographic entities if not political ones.[4] Three counties (Hampshire, Barnstable, and Franklin) have formed new county regional compacts to serve as a form of regional governance."
ARTICLE II. BACKGROUND Section 2.1 Statutory Education Code Section 17620(a)(1) authorizes the governing board of any school district to levy a fee, charge, dedication, or other requirements against any construction within the boundaries of a district to fund the construction or reconstruction of school facilities. Developer fees are a type of statutory fee levied on residential and/or commercial/industrial construction, which helps to minimize the impact of the construction on school facilities.
Slide with title "Oldest and Youngest Generation Most Likely to Prefer Small Yards and Walkability." Question: "Q.7 Continue to imagine that you are moving to another home. These next questions are about the kind of community where you would like to live. Please select the community that you prefer." Response options: "Houses with small yards and it is easy to walk to the places you need to go" or "Houses with large yards and you have to drive to the places where you need to go." Over 60% of Gen Z and Silent Generation respondents prefer small yards in walkable communities, with Gen X at only 51% and Millennials and Baby Boomers in between.
Text: I am writing to express my strong opposition to the proposed resolution opposing Senate Bill 79. Los Angeles needs SB 79. I am a housing researcher at UCLA, author of The Affordable City, and host of UCLA Housing Voice, a podcast where we share new and important housing research with an audience of planners, elected officials, students, and advocates across the US. A message we hear again and again on our show, from researchers studying policies all over the world, is that ambitious zoning reforms lead to increased homebuilding, and increased homebuilding makes housing more affordable.
Quote from Veiller: "[D]o everything possible in our laws to encourage the construction of private dwellings and even two- family dwellings, because the two-family house is the next least objectionable type, and penalize so far as we can in our statute, the multiple dwelling of any kind... If we require multiple dwellings to be fireproof, and thus increase the cost of construction; if we require stairs to be fireproofed, even where there are only three families; if we require fire escapes and a host of other things, all dealing with fire protection, we are on safe grounds, because that can be justified as a legitimate exercise of the police power... In our laws let most of the fire provisions relate solely to multiple dwellings, and allow our private houses and two-family houses to be built with no fire protection whatever (NHA Proceedings 1913, 212)."
Screenshot of text of ballot initiative: Proposal Limits Charter City-Only Transfer Taxes. The measure would limit charter city-only transfer taxes to the current statutory rate for documentary transfer taxes (that is, 27.5 cents per $500). Specifically, the measure would invalidate all existing charter city-only transfer taxes exceeding the current statutory rate on December 31, two years following enactment of the measure by statewide voters. This includes those transfer taxes used by charter cities for general purposes as well as those designated for specified purposes. The measure also would prohibit charter cities from imposing any new charter city-only transfer taxes that exceed 27.5 cents per $500. The measure would continue to allow counties and cities to impose and split documentary transfer taxes consistent with current law. Vote Threshold for Special Taxes. The measure also would require special taxes to receive a two-thirds vote for approval, regardless of whether the tax was put before voters through a citizen initiative or the local government. Existing property-related special taxes that were approved by less than two-thirds of voters would be invalidated. Such local measures would be invalidated on December 31, two years following enactment of the measure by statewide voters. Voters could reauthorize such taxes (or impose new ones) in the future, but only with a two-thirds vote. However, charter cities could not reauthorize charter city-only transfer taxes.