Strategy Science

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Science of gray zone / hybrid warfare, intelligence, cyber security, war strategy, extremism, social sciences, & law to combat radicalization #natsec #infosec #cybersecurity #science 🧪 #NatSecSky

An example of a message that made people less likely to think of racism as a systemic problem was one that said: “This country’s black and minority ethnic communities still suffer poorer outcomes across education, employment, health and in the criminal justice system. In order to achieve genuine racial equality, we must work towards an inclusive Britain in which we all feel valued, enjoy equal opportunities and share a common sense of belonging.” The authors said “suffer” is “language of illness” and while it may provoke empathy “it does also suggest BAME victimhood rather than steadfastness and agency”.
Researchers believe they may have found the best way to convince the public that racism is a real problem and requires major change: tell them about an Oxford University study exposing discrimination faced by job applicants. A groundbreaking project exploring how better to boost public support for action against systemic racism tested which messages best move people towards a more anti-racist position.
“Overall, we found that reframing the confrontation goal from changing someone’s mind to setting social norms increased participants’ willingness to challenge these types of posts,” Coles said. “Participants also indicated greater willingness to confront someone they were closer to rather than someone who was relationally distant, such as a stranger or acquaintance.”
To understand the brain activity of political extremists viewing misinformation, the researchers conducted a third experiment on 36 participants from Spain who supported the far-right political party, Vox. Here, the researchers repeated the same procedure as in the first and second experiments, but this time they conducted an fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) to observe the changes in participants’ brains as they were asked to decide if they would reshare the social media post. The experiment revealed that certain parts of the brain, like the bilateral inferior frontal cortex and the precuneus, were more active in these individuals when they contemplated sharing the post. These areas of the brain are involved in making you feel like you belong to a social group, understanding other people’s emotional states, and responding to social cues in ways that are considered socially appropriate. Plainly speaking, when these far-right individuals choose to share misinformation, they are likely doing so because they view it as a way to signal to other like-minded extremists that they belong to the same social and political group. This need to virtue signal is the strongest when the misinformation presented to them is related to values that are considered sacred to their community, which, in the case of the far-right, may involve issues such as immigration, religion, or nationalism.
For the second experiment, the researchers replicated the social media experiment in the United States, where they found similar results among Trump-supporting Republicans. In fact, Republicans who voted for Trump (and self-identified as Trump supporters) were found to be undeterred by Twitter fact-checks and were willing to share the misinformation anyway. This tells us that social media fact-checks or flagging of “fake news” may not sufficiently prevent the spread of misinformation, especially when it has an extremist agenda attached to it. To understand the brain activity of political extremists viewing misinformation, the researchers conducted a third experiment on 36 participants from Spain who supported the far-right political party, Vox. Here, the researchers repeated the same procedure as in the first and second experiments, but this time they conducted an fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) to observe the changes in participants’ brains as they were asked to decide if they would reshare the social media posts.
A recent study published in the Journal of Experimental Psychology: General explored, through a series of three experiments, how conservatives in Spain and the United States respond to misinformation that aligns with their political values. In the first experiment, conservatives from Spain who were either far-right or center-right were shown various social media posts criticizing the liberal government. These posts were designed to either appeal to their conservative sacred values or their non-sacred values. Sacred values are moral imperatives that people are unwilling to compromise while non-sacred values can be weighed against other values and may be subject to negotiation or trade-offs. The experiment showed that despite fact-checks and accuracy nudges (like you would see on popular social media platforms like Twitter or Instagram), far-right individuals were far more likely compared to center-right individuals to reshare blatant misinformation. This was especially true if the post resonated with their sacred values and if their personal identity was closely related to their political ideology.
The new study has three important results. First, it found that how empathetic we are is partly due to genetics. Indeed, a tenth of this variation is due to genetic factors. This confirms previous research examining empathy in identical versus non-identical twins. Second, the new study confirmed that women are on average more empathetic than men. However, this difference is not due to our DNA as there were no differences in the genes that contribute to empathy in men and women. This implies that the sex difference in empathy is the result of other non-genetic biological factors, such as prenatal hormone influences, or non-biological factors such as socialisation, both of which also differ between the sexes. Finally, the new study found that genetic variants associated with lower empathy are also associated with higher risk for autism.
And so it will probably go with Russia in space. The original space race was no less political than anything Russia is doing today, but both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were operating from positions of strength, projecting their competing power over a sprawling region of client states and taking the duel to the cosmic high ground. Russia today—with Putin calling the shots on when a booster should be launched and the government issuing petulant threats to quit flying American astronauts to the International Space Station—is acting neither strong nor confident.
Putin and Trump could be on the same side in this troubling new world order The hacking crisis may be distracting. Us from a disturbing convergence between 2 mighty powers. Mon. 19 December 2016 01.00 EST [Graphi] Graffiti depicting Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump: 'Alexander Dugan was one of the first public figures in Russia to spot that Trump was a potential ally photograph.' Mindaugas Kubis/AP.
[Screenshot of video game] SimHealth: The National Health Care Simulation
Psychology of Terrorism Randy Borum Director, Psychology of Terrorism Initiative
Sex-negation in children, therefore, inhibits “rebellious forces” because disobedience translates into anxiety (Reich 1947, 25). This, accordingly, extends to other domains of social life. Reich claims that by preventing “sexual curiosity” and “sexual thinking” in a child, a general fear toward political criticality and curiosity develops. Character-analytic investigations show that, especially during the first years of childhood, imposing restrictions on sexual behaviour are consequential because the intertwining of “the socio-economic and the sexual structure as well as in the structural reproduction of society” takes place in this time frame in the patriarchal family (Reich 1947, 24). At the cost of generalization, it can be argued that fascism is the answer to patriarchal longing. Reich clarifies the support for totalitarian systems in sex-negating patriarchies arguing that, instead of one being a clearly articulated policy of the other, their relationship is threefold: Suppression of sex creates a structure with an interest in “actively supporting the authoritarian order;” “The process makes the mass individual passive and unpolitical” (Reich 1947, 27, 26); As Reich already presumed in 1933, repression of “natural sexual satisfaction” results in different kinds of “substitute gratifications” – traits essential in war, such as “natural aggression” and “brutal sadism” (1947, 27). It is, therefore, in the totalitarian system’s interest to protect itself through discourses and narratives spread in media and religion to avoid rebellion and population uprisings. The family is the “factory” of ideology for society, a function continued by religious institutions (Reich 1947, 51), which will be addressed in the following section.
National Security Implications [infographic] 1. Military implications 2. Economic implications 3. Border security implications
Balancing National Security and Transparency [Infographic] A. The Ethics of Redaction B. The primary argument in favor of reduction is the preservation of national security. C. On the other hand, critics argue that excessive reduction can hinder transparency and accountability. D. One example that highlights ethical challenges of reduction is the release of government documents related to surveillance programs. E. Tips for ethical reduction include ensuring that reductions are consistent and clearly marked to avoid misleading interpretations. F. The balance between national security and transparency is a delicate one, and there is no one-size-fits-all solution. G. In conclusion, the ethics of the reduction revolve around the tension between national security and transparency.
Striving for Transparency in National Security [Infographic] 1. The issue of transparency in national security is one that has sparked intense debate and controversy in recent years. 2. While it is understandable that certain aspects of national security need to be kept classified, it is crucial for governments to be transparent about their actions and decisions in order to maintain public trust. 3. One example of the importance of transparency in national security can be seen in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in the United States. 4. Tips for achieving transparency in national security include establishing independent oversight mechanisms such as parliamentary committees. Or umbudsman to ensure the government actions are subject to scrutiny. 5. Case studies from various countries can also provide valuable insights into the challenges and benefits striving for transparency in national security. 6. On the other hand, countries like China and Russia have been criticized for their lack transparency in national security. 7. In conclusion, while achieving complete transparency and national security may not be feasible or desirable. Government must make a concerted certain effort to be as transparent as possible without compromising their ability to protect the nation.
Using the U.S. as a baseline, while some stats point to 28.7% of software programmers being women, according to Wikipedia, “fewer than 12% of computer science bachelor's degrees were awarded to women at U.S. PhD-granting institutions in 2011.”
Abstract Expanding third-person effect (TPE) research to digital disinformation, this article investigates the impact of COVID-19 digital fake news exposure on individuals' perceived susceptibility of influence on themselves, their close others, and their distant others. Findings from a survey of 511 Chinese respondents suggest that, overall, individuals would perceive themselves to be less vulnerable than close others and distant others to the impact of COVID-19 digital disinformation. The highest self-other perceptual discrepancy is found when individuals receive disinformation on mobile social networking apps. Also, individuals who practice more active fact-checking perceive themselves to be less susceptible. The perception of disinformation effects on self as well as the self-other perceptual discrepancy is both positively related to emotional responses (anxiety, fear, and worry) to the COVID-19 pandemic. This study contributes to existing research by linking exposure to disinformation in different digital channels, the TPEs, and emotional outcomes in the context of a public health crisis. It also highlights the importance of educating and enabling fact-checking behaviors on digital media, which could help to reduce negative emotional impact of the disinformation.
Table 4. Measures for study topics. * The total score represented the number of correct responses to the questions. An incorrect answer or an acknowledgment of uncertainty was coded as a lack of knowledge
Table 3. Media literacy and demographic associations with political engagement for white and nonwhite respondents. Stepwise entry of demographics followed by stepwise entry of other independent measures. ~ns after other measures enter the equation; NW=nonwhite; W=white. Statistical significance denoted by *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001; Gender coded as binary with higher score representing female. Degrees of freedom reported are for the final block of measures entering the equation.
Finding 3: As shown in Table 2 below, associations between media literacy and demographics were weak. Demographics represent institutional opportunities and barriers, and long-standing discriminatory policies require sustained advocacy to remedy (Wilkerson, 2020; Rothstein, 2017). According to the National Science Foundation (2018), people with more education and income tend to know more about principles of scientific inquiry. Nevertheless, public understanding of science has increased over time regardless of education levels. This suggests that people also learn about science from informal sources, such as the media and one another. Thus, although growing equity gaps may affect the abilities for people of color to resist disinformation and mobilize for political action (Fain, 2020; Modan, 2020; Strada, 2020), they also may be affected by a sustained lack of minority representation in the media (Brooks & Hebert, 2006; Dixon & Linz, 2000; Sui & Paul, 2017). In other words, because few states require and assess media literacy instruction in formal education, an unequal presence of community-based voices promoting critical thinking about media and circulating information could help explain equity gaps in media literacy (Media Literacy Now, 2020). Table 2. Associations of demographics with media and science media literacy for white and nonwhite respondents. NW=nonwhite; W=white. Statistical significance denoted by *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001; Gender coded as binary with higher score representing female. Stepwise entry of demographics. Degrees of freedom reported are for the final block of measures entering the equation.
Findings Finding 1: As shown in Table 1 below, people of color tended to report less general and science-specific media literacy, lower levels of voting intent, and more willingness to take risks to protest for racial justice. This may reflect that when institutional barriers exist for making a difference through voting, people of color embrace other ways to advocate for change. They were not more likely to accept risks to protest for reopening the economy. Finding 2: Also shown in Table 1, people of color tended to report more acceptance of COVID-19 disinformation and less accurate knowledge about COVID-19. This is consistent with the evidence that disinformation campaigns targeting minorities in 2020 included many themes reflecting false information about COVID-19. This also aligns with concerns that accurate information has been lacking and inconsistent (Kim & Kreps, 2020). Table 1. t-tests comparing mean scores of white and nonwhite participants for key topics. NW=nonwhite; W=white. Statistical significance denoted by *p<.01; **p<.001; The only measures nonsignificant for Levene’s test for equality of variances were Media Literacy for Content and COVID-19 disinformation Beliefs; this affects the choice of t-test used and degrees of freedom reported.
Research Questions Will there be a difference in the media literacy and political belief scores between nonwhite and white respondents? Will there be a difference in the COVID-19 knowledge and COVID-19 disinformation belief scores between nonwhite and white respondents? To what extent will the ways media literacy associates with political behavior beliefs, COVID-19 knowledge, and COVID-19 disinformation beliefs differ for nonwhite respondents as compared to associations for white respondents?
Figure 2 of 3 Figure 2. Trust in the fact checked and non-fact checked news story according to partisanship, outlet and other factors. Notes: Source, Authors; n= 1138; Note: For example to interpret the figure on general trust in the media, 98 per cent of those that trust the media “a lot” have trust in the new story.
Table 1 Set of 60 news site quality scores generated by trustworthiness ratings from 8 professional fact-checkers and from averaging the trustworthiness ratings of Democrats and Republicans to create politically balanced trustworthiness ratings from 970 laypeople From: Differences in misinformation sharing can lead to politically asymmetric sanctions Mainstream Hyper-partisan Fake news Domain Fact-checker rating Politically balanced layperson rating Domain Fact-checker rating Politically balanced layperson rating Domain Fact-checker rating Politically balanced layperson rating abcnews.go.com 0.56 0.45 activepost.com 0 0.2 americannews.com 0 0.22 aol.com/news 0.41 0.35 antiwar.com 0 0.18 angrypatriotmovement.com 0 0.18 bbc.co.uk 0.81 0.38 blacklistednews.com 0 0.18 bb4sp.com 0 0.18 bostonglobe.com 0.75 0.33 breitbart.com 0.16 0.22 beforeitsnews.com 0 0.19 cbsnews.com 0.66 0.48 commondreams.org 0.03 0.18 channel24news.com 0.06 0.25 chicagotribune.com 0.53 0.38 conservativetribune.com 0.03 0.24 clashdaily.com 0 0.18 cnn.com 0.84 0.47 crooksandliars.com 0.13 0.18 conservativedailypost.com 0 0.23 dailymail.co.uk 0.44 0.3 dailycaller.com 0.13 0.21 dailybuzzlive.com 0 0.24 foxnews.com 0.44 0.45 dailykos.com 0.16 0.2 downtrend.com 0 0.19 huffingtonpost.com 0.47 0.41 dailysignal.com 0 0.2 freedomdaily.com 0.03 0.2 latimes.com 0.75 0.33 dailywire.com 0.16 0.25 newsbreakshere.com 0 0.19 msnbc.com 0.66 0.44 ijr.com 0.09 0.19 notallowedto.com 0 0.17 news.yahoo.com 0.59 0.4 infowars.com 0.03 0.21 now8news.com 0 0.2 nydailynews.com 0.34 0.33 newsmax.com 0.13 0.23 onepoliticalplaza.com 0 0.19 nypost.com 0.38 0.38 patriotpost.us 0 0.21 react365.com 0 0.17 nytimes.com 0.91 0.45 rawstory.com 0.09 0.19 realnewsrightnow.com 0 0.21 sfchronicle.com 0.59 0.26 redstate.com 0.06 0.2 socialeverythings.com 0 0.18 usatoday.com 0.6…
What is lost in pointing the finger at online misinformation Despite the evidence against social media or AI-driven misinformation being persuasive enough to swing an election, this doesn’t mean misinformation in general is not problematic in other ways. Frequent false claims about the reliability of the 2020 election result by Donald Trump circulated among angry crowds outside vote-counting centres and culminated in the storming of the Capitol on 6 January 2021. In this election, with a potential photo finish, genuine uncertainty around the results and possible delays in vote counting could leave space for false claims to flourish at a time when they could be most harmful. But focusing on online misinformation as the cause of unease or even unrest can distract from larger questions as to why people accept something that isn’t true or that is so at odds with prevailing beliefs. It can also let more powerful people off the hook, Altay says: “This focus on social media diverts our attention from politicians, from older institutions, or even from some media organisations that are much more powerful and influential and sometimes spread misinformation that I think is more consequential than what’s spread online by regular users.”
How journalists unwittingly assist disinformation campaigns When the Department of Justice announced their indictment against Tenet Media in September, it became a major news story. It involved Russian money, a shady plot and one of the country’s most popular YouTubers two months before election day. However, given the limits of the influence operation, journalists should have offered “much more careful reporting and contextualisation,” argues Allen. This often requires showing that the amounts of money involved and the overall reach were relatively small.
Does AI pose a new misinformation risk? The 2024 presidential election will be the first where generative AI applications are available at scale prompting fears that it is “supercharging the threat of election disinformation,” where “anyone can create high-quality ‘deepfakes’ with just a simple text prompt,” to deceive voters. A contributor to a recent podcast by the Brookings Institution said of the threat of AI: “We could end up in a situation of an election being decided [emphasis added] based on false narratives.” Fears often centre around the quantity of misinformation that can be generated using AI, the increasing quality as the technology improves and the ability to create personalised misinformation targeted at recipients. In a recent piece published by Harvard’s Misinformation Review, a group of researchers including Altay and the Reuters Institute’s Felix Simon argued that, overall, “current concerns about the effects of generative AI are overblown” and in keeping with other “moral panics surrounding new technologies” that emerged in the past. Could individuals be hyper-targeted with AI-generated content? Possibly, but AI-generated content doesn’t distribute itself and there is little evidence from political campaigns that direct, personalised messages are very persuasive. As with the rise of existing technologies, argues Altay, AI will have “a huge influence in what we do. But it doesn't mean it's going to determine who we vote for.”
According to this year’s Digital News Report, 72% of online news users in the US said they were concerned about what is real and what is fake on the internet, up by 8 points from the year before. This percentage is much higher than the 59% average across the 47 markets covered by the report. Respondents across all countries said the platforms where they found it most difficult to discern trustworthy information were X and TikTok. But concern is not the same as exposure. A review of evidence published in Nature earlier this year documents “a pattern of low exposure to false and inflammatory content that is concentrated among a narrow fringe with strong motivations to seek out such information.” Most people only see very little misinformation online, and the ones seeing the most are those who are most amenable and go looking for it.
How to Spot Disinformation [infographic] 1. Consider the Source - Click away from the story to investigate the source.Its missions in contact info 2. Check the Author - Do a quick search on the author are they real incredible 3. Check the Date - Reposting old news stories doesn't mean they are relevant to current events 4. Supporting Sources - Click on supporting sources to verify if they are accurate and relevant. 5. Read Beyond - Headlines can be outrageous to get clicks. What's the whole story? 6. Is it a joke? It's if it's too outlandish. It may be a satire research the site and author to be sure. 7. Ask the experts - Ask a subject matter expert or consult a fact-checking website.
How to differentiate authoritarian threats? Does this fit into the authoritarian playbook? And does the actor have a pattern of following the other parts of the playbook? *Scapegoating vulnerable communities *Corrupting elections *Stoking violence *Politicizing independent institutions *Spreading disinformation *Aggrandizing executive power *Quashing descent *Is this something new? *How significant is the deviation? *How significant does this event deviate from modern precedent? *With what frequency and degree is this happening? *Does this present a systemic risk? *Does this concentrate and consolidate power? *Is the actor acting alone? *How are their allies reacting? *Is the system responding to constrain the actor?
Executive Summary *Right-wing extremist terror incidents in the U.S. have been increasing since the mid-2000s, but the past six years have seen their sharpest rise yet. There were just seven right-wing terror incidents in the period 2005-2007, but by 2017-2019 there were 27, which increased to 40 in 2020-2022. *The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) Center on Extremism (COE) has documented 67 domestic terror incidents by right-wing extremists in the United States from 2017 to 2022. These include successful terrorist attacks, failed terrorist attacks and foiled terrorist plots. *White supremacists were responsible for more attacks than any other type of right-wing extremist in the past six years (30 of 67, or 45%), but anti-government extremists, anti-abortion extremists and other types of right-wing extremists have also plotted and carried out attacks. *Right-wing terror attacks during this period also resulted in more deaths (58) from such attacks than any of the previous six-year periods since the time of the Oklahoma City bombing. All but five of those deaths occurred in white supremacist attacks—primarily mass shootings directed against minority targets. *Most incidents (72%) involved only a single perpetrator, whether an arsonist targeting an abortion clinic or a white supremacist shooter targeting a synagogue. *Single perpetrators were also far more likely to successfully carry out attacks; plots with multiple perpetrators were usually stopped by law enforcement. *Most incidents were not committed by organized extremist groups *Firearms were the most popular weapon chosen for attacks (27 of 67 incidents, or 40%, not counting two additional incidents where firearms were one of two weapon types). Incendiary devices (featured in 25% of incidents) were also popular, followed by explosive devices (18%). *Right-wing terrorists considered a wide array of targets. Government targets were most frequently chosen by perpetrators (in 18 of 67, or 27% of incidents), cl…
Since the revelations of Russia spreading false information via social media to interfere in the 2016 US election, the digital battlefield has expanded to include new players and more sophisticated techniques. 2020 has been a breakout year for information warfare, as indicated by the dramatic increase in news mentions of “disinformation” and “misinformation.” First, the Covid-19 outbreak spawned an infodemic, with false information about virus treatments and conspiracy theories proliferating online. Then, ahead of the 2020 US presidential election, National Counterintelligence and Security Center director William Evanina warned of nations — including Iran, China, and others — seeking to “use influence measures in social and traditional media in an effort to sway U.S. voters’ preferences and perspectives, to shift U.S. policies, to increase discord and to undermine confidence in our democratic process.”
Although significant questions remain, psychological science yields important conclusions about the origins and spread of misinformation and how to counter it effectively. Based on these findings, here are eight specific recommendations for scientists, policymakers, media, and the public to meet the ongoing risk of misinformation to health, well-being, and civic life. *Avoid repeating misinformation without including a correction The repetition of false claims increases belief in those claims, a phenomenon known as the illusory truth effect. People of all ages are susceptible to illusory truth, even when they already have relevant prior knowledge about the topic. When media sources, political elites, or celebrities repeat misinformation, their influence and repetition can perpetuate false beliefs. Repeating misinformation is necessary only when actively correcting a falsehood. In these cases, the falsehood should be repeated briefly, with the correction featured more prominently than the falsehood itself. *Collaborate with social media companies to understand and reduce the spread of harmful misinformation Most misinformation on social media is shared by very few users, even during public health emergencies. These “superspreaders” can play an outsized role in distributing misinformation. Social media “echo chambers” bind and isolate communities with similar beliefs, which aids the spread of falsehoods and impedes the spread of factual corrections. On social media, sensational, moral, emotional, and derogatory content about the “other side” can spread faster than neutral or positive content. Scientists, policymakers, and public health professionals should work with online platforms to understand and harness the incentive structures of social media to reduce the spread of dangerous misinformation.
Case Study Summaries Table 1: Overview of Case Studies [10 x 5 Table is presented. Information organized here by intervention type] 1. Intervention: Supporting local journalism *Type: Public information *How much is known: Modest *How effective does it seem: Significant *How easily does it scale: Difficult 2. Intervention: Media literacy education *Type: Public information *How much is known: Significant *How effective does it seem: Significant *How easily does it scale: Difficult 3. Intervention: Fact-checking *Type: Social media content *How much is known: Significant *How effective does it seem: Modest *How easily does it scale: Modest 4. Intervention: Labeling social media content *Type: Public information *How much is known: Modest *How effective does it seem: Modest *How easily does it scale: Easy 5. Intervention: Counter-messaging strategies *Type: Public information *How much is known: Modest *How effective does it seem: Modest *How easily does it scale: Difficult 6. Intervention: Cybersecurity for elections and campaigns *Type: Governent action *How much is known: Modest *How effective does it seem: Modest *How easily does it scale: Modest 7. Intervention: Statecraft, deterrence, and disruption *Type: Government action *How much is known: Modest *How effective does it seem: Limited *How easily does it scale: Modest 8. Intervention: Platform Action *Type: Removing inauthentic asset networks *How much is known: Limited *How effective does it seem: Modest *How easily does it scale: Modest 9. Intervention: Reducing data collection and targeted ads *Type: Platform Action *How much is known: Modest *How effective does it seem: Limited *How easily does it scale: Difficult 10. Intervention: Changing recommendation algorithms *Type: Platform action *How much is known: Limited *How effective does it seem: Significant *How easily does it scale: Modest
Key Findings Negative life events are part of, but not the sole cause of, radicalization. The enduring appeal of extremist groups seems to lie in attending to fundamental human needs. Recruitment to radical groups deliberately leverages personal vulnerabilities. Both radicalization and deradicalization can be triggered. Heavy-handed attempts by formal institutions to deradicalize individuals often fail. Stigmatization of groups seems mostly to push at-risk individuals further down the extremist path. Media literacy and open access to diverse sources of information appear critical for deradicalization.
The SMART Social Cause Viral altruism SMART [Figur arranged by a 2 X 4 table] [Column 1] SMART [Row 1] *Social influence - The momentum driving many viral causes comes from the rapid emergence of a public consensus on what the socially desired course of action is. [Row 2] *Moral imperative - Establishing a strongly felt moral conviction that compels people to act on a (social) cause. [Row 3] *Effective reactions - content that evokes strong emotional reactions is more likely to go viral. [Row 4] *Translational impact - translating social momentum into sustained real world contributions. [Column 2] Psychological factors [Row 1] *Descriptive norms - Social Information about how many influential others people care about, such as friends, family and role models are contributing to the cause *Prescriptive norms - leveraging pyramid appear network influenced by encouraging others in one social network to follow suit facilitating social conformity [Row 2] *Identifiable victim effect - People relate better to a (single) victim who has suffered harm than to abstract statistics. *Moral elevation - Being uplifted and inspired by witnessing others perform acts of kindness. [Row 3] *Empathy is an emotional contagion. *Positive emotional content, containing affective imagery, is especially likely to go viral. *Warm-glow giving - People derive positive emotional benefits from helping others. [Row 4] *Slacktivism - Token support with little behavioral follow-through. **The half-life of viral altruism is generally very short. **More meaningful engagement with a cause is required over time to make altruism stick.
According to the Anti-Defamation League: *A stereotype is an oversimplified generalization about a person or group of people without regard for individual differences. Even seemingly positive stereotypes that link a person or group to a specific positive trait can have negative consequences. *Prejudice is prejudging or making a decision about a person or group of people without sufficient knowledge. Prejudicial thinking is frequently based on stereotypes. *Discrimination is the denial of justice and fair treatment by individuals and/or institutions in many arenas, including employment, education, housing, banking and political rights. Discrimination is an action that can follow prejudicial thinking. When diversity – differences in race, gender, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, gender identity, language and class – is not valued and respected, the resulting lack of understanding can fuel intergroup tension and create an inequitable community. Not only can this tension cause inequities, it also creates the potential for scapegoating, discrimination, intergroup conflict and violence. Bullying, harassment, violence and hate crimes have a powerful negative impact on the entire community and underscore the importance of addressing issues of prejudice and discrimination.
In some ways, the current Russian approach to propaganda builds on Soviet Cold War–era techniques, with an emphasis on obfuscation and on getting targets to act in the interests of the propagandist without realizing that they have done so. In other ways, it is completely new and driven by the characteristics of the contemporary information environment. Russia has taken advantage of technology and available media in ways that would have been inconceivable during the Cold War. Its tools and channels now include the Internet, social media, and the evolving landscape of professional and amateur journalism and media outlets. Distinctive Features of the Contemporary Model for Russian Propaganda *High-volume and multichannel *Rapid, continuous, and repetitive *Lacks commitment to objective reality *Lacks commitment to consistency. We characterize the contemporary Russian model for propaganda as “the firehose of falsehood” because of two of its distinctive features: high numbers of channels and messages and a shameless willingness to disseminate partial truths or outright fictions. In the words of one observer, “[N]ew Russian propaganda entertains, confuses and overwhelms the audience.”
What You Can Do to Fight Fake News: Expert Tips Reality is a matter of perception and information shapes reality. To shift reality with false information is destabilizing—and can have serious ramifications on mental health—leading to significant anxiety and more. We live in a highly-connected world, it doesn’t take much to tip over into instability or even chaos. The good news—and this isn’t fake—is there are some steps you can take to protect yourself from the negative impact of fake news. 1. Don't Believe Everything You Read “The beginning of wisdom is found in doubting; by doubting we come to the question, and by questioning we may come upon the truth.” Sage words that were written in 1120 but ring true today from Pierre Abelard, a medieval French philosopher, teacher, and theologian. Serve as your own fact checker. Simple things can help: check the date of the article (just because it comes up at the top of the search results page doesn’t mean it’s the most current information) and the source of the information. Look at the information in the URL. Academic institutions (denoted by a .edu) and the government (.gov) can be among the most reliable places for research, statistics, and factual information. For example, https://www.nimh.nih.gov/index.shtml is the link to the National Institute of Mental Health. See the .gov in the URL? 2. Confirm the Information Yes, we know that you’re busy, and debunking fake news takes time. So, go to organizations that dedicate themselves to this kind of investigatory work. Their mission: when misinformation obscures the truth, they lift the veil via fact-checking, original investigative reporting, and providing evidence-based analysis with documented sources. FactCheck.org, Snopes.com, and PolitiFact.com are some of the most respected. If you read something that you suspect may not be true, it’s likely that one of these organizations has verified the piece—just type the title of the article or a keyword from the article into…
According to The Investigative Committee the plot fell apart when several members refused to take part in the violent toppling of government and informed law enforcement. The Investigative Committee announced that three of the plotters had been arrested, while another four where still at large. One of the arrested plotters is Serob Gasparian, the leader of Sev Hovaz, a militia from Nagorno-Karabakh. Gasparian has been a noted critic of the Pashinyan government, however, his lawyer has denied all charges.
Background In summer 2022 the GEC launched an extensive literature review. The objective was to map the spectrum of research on measures against information manipulation by foreign malign actors, including research on interventions the Department could take or has taken. The review helped establish an evidence-based strategic and operational framework to optimize the Department’s efforts to confront disinformation and its negative effects globally, as well as understand knowledge gaps and potential areas of further study. Findings *Research on addressing preventative and defensive measures is more prevalent than on punitive or offensive ones. *Many of the defensive interventions recommended by the literature are already being undertaken by the GEC. *More research is needed on malign actor exposure activities and the efficacy of this intervention. *65% of the reviewed literature did not focus on a specific threat actor, but Russia was by far the most scrutinized country.
What’s acceptable – and unacceptable – on day one? What do Trump’s supporters think of some of the more unprecedented steps he has suggested he may take in his early days in office? In the September survey: 58% of Trump supporters said it would be definitely or probably acceptable for him to use executive orders to make policies if he can’t get his priorities through Congress. 54% said it would be acceptable for him to order federal law enforcement officials to investigate his Democratic political opponents. At the same time, 58% said it would be *unacceptable* for him to fire government workers for not being loyal to him. 57% said it would be unacceptable for him to pardon friends or supporters who have been convicted of a crime.
For Trump supporters, immigration was a more important issue in 2024 than in 2020 [Complex graphic] The economy and immigration were top issues for Trump supporters. Just as it was in 2020, the economy was the most important issue for Trump voters this year. In a September survey, 93% said it was very important to their vote. Immigration ranked second, as 82% said it was very important to their vote. This was a substantial increase from 2020, when 61% of Trump supporters rated it as very important to them. Issues that were much less important to Trump voters included climate change (11% said it was very important), racial and ethnic inequality (18%), and abortion (35%).
Network analysis One of our primary goals was to uncover communities, which represent groupings of thematically related keywords. We formed co-occurrence networks based on Trump’s tweets, where nodes are keywords, and form links between two keywords if they appear in the same tweet. For example, if the keywords “bad” and “media” appear in the same tweet, they receive a link. Using an online archive of the president’s tweets on GitHub, we extracted the top 100 keywords from Trump’s Twitter account from each of the last four years. We removed retweets and common words like “it” and “the.”
Tech Against Terrorism’s Statement for Record to the Select Committee "Examining Tech Platforms’ Moderation Actions and Policies Related to the Attack on January 6 and Their Impact on Online Extremist Behaviour" March 30, 2022 Tech Against Terrorism is an initiative supported by the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (UN CTED) and was launched in April 2017. We work with the global tech industry to tackle terrorist use of the internet whilst respecting human rights. Tech Against Terrorism’s support mechanisms for the tech industry span across bespoke training, mentorship, capacity-building, threat reports, software and product development, and operational support. Our team consists of open-source intelligence analysts, and counterterrorism and tech policy experts, and we closely monitor online terrorist and violent extremist spaces. Since our inception in 2017, we have engaged with and provided practical support to more than 400 global tech platforms. Within this engagement, Tech Against Terrorism has closely mentored 33 tech platforms to help them tackle terrorist use of their platforms whilst respecting human rights and freedom of speech. Tech Against Terrorism has been asked to submit a written statement for the record to reflect our platform-specific expertise, especially within the realms of content moderation policies and their enforcement as they related to January 6. This submission of evidence highlights the online extremist behaviour around January 6 with open-source intelligence insights, as well as an in-depth analysis of tech platforms’ content moderation policies before, during, and after the attack on January 6.
Figure labeled "The “4-stages model of the the terrorist mindset"" "The Process of Ideological Development" Column 1: It's Not Right *Social and Economic Deprivation **Context Column 2: It's Not Fair *Inequality and Resentment **Comparison Column 3: It's Your Fault *Blame/Attribution **Attribution Column 4: You're Evil *Generalizing / Stereotyping *Dehumanizing / Demonizing the Enemy (Cause) **Reaction Center Row: Social and Economic Deprivation 》Inequality and Resentment 》Blame / Attribution *Blame / Attribution 》 Generalizing / Stereotyping *Blame / Attribution 》 Dehumanizing/ Demonizing the Enemy (Cause)
[Figure shown with boxes connected by arrows] Figure 4. Civilians, women, and children: terrorists' tools and weapon of war (Source: Author, 2016) *[Row 1] Counter terrorism attacks by established powers *[Row 2] Economic resource *[Row 3] Emotional support *[Row 4] Socio-econoic marginalization of communities 》 Vulnerability 》Demographic continuity 》 Establishment of terrorist groups 》 Terror, brutality, extortion, murder
Abstract Background: Terrorism-related deaths are at an all-time high as there were 32,685 and 29,376 terrorism-related deaths in 2014 and 2015, respectively. Terrorism is defined as the use of violence and intimidation in the pursuit of political aims. Terrorism is detrimental for mental health, premature mortality, and economic losses and un dermines the central tenets of public health to improve the health and well-being of populations. Despite the impact terrorism has on avoidable morbidity and mortality, population health research largely overlooks social determinants of terrorism and risk factors that contribute to terrorist activities. Methods: Drawing from what is known about commonly studied social determinants of health topics, including the relationships between structural and interpersonal discrimination, social cohesion, and gang violence and health, we present a public health framework, rooted in the social determinants of health, for identifying poten tial factors influencing terrorism and violent radicalization. Results: Social determinants of health provide unique insight into how interpersonal and structural factors can influence risk for violent radicalization and terrorist activity. Each of the topics we review provides an entry pIoint for existing public health and behavioral science knowledge to be used in preventing and understanding violent radicalization and terrorism. For example, anti-Muslim sentiment has promoted discrimination against Muslims, while also serving to marginalize and stigmatize Muslim communities. These conditions limit the social resources, like social cohesion, that Muslims have access to and make political violence more appealing to some. Conclusions: Public health can contribute much to the ongoing debate around terrorism. The field must take a more prevention-focused approach to the problem of terrorism. Failure to do so only perpetuates approachesthat have not been successful.