Dad. Lawyering in Utah. Occasional pretend scholar. Movies. Books. Lawyer Work: https://www.mc2b.com/taylor-kordsiemon Pretend Scholar Work: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=3465182
![Turning to this appeal, we recognize that Berriel and Farmer addressed the term “imminent” in other statutory contexts, but
we still find these decisions persuasive as to how that same word should be interpreted for purposes of the Act. And against that backdrop, we turn to the evidence presented below.
¶22 As noted, the Commissioner based his decision on the July 20 text. In the Commissioner’s view, this text was an “expression of anger” showing that Green had “some desire to engage in a physical altercation.” Even accepting that premise, however, several things stand out to us.
¶23 First, in the text, Green never said that she was actually going to hit Canteros-Alvarez. Instead, what she said was she
would like to hit her. These are different things.
¶24 Second, on the face of the text, Green expressed that desire
in conditional terms. Again, Green said that she hoped Canteros-Alvarez would “swing first so that [she could] beat the shit out of
[her].” In this sense, what she said was that she was not going to hit Canteros-Alvarez unless Canteros-Alvarez hit her first,
meaning that the threat of violence was dependent on an event that had not yet happened and might not happen. In our view, the conditional nature of this statement weakens any suggestion that
the threatened violence was “impending” and “about to occur at any moment.” Clara, 2024 UT 10, ¶ 36 (quotation simplified).
¶25 Third, because the text was sent while the two were some distance away from each other, it seems analogous to the situation involved in Berriel. And again, the supreme court there held that although the friend told the defendant, over the phone, that she was under a threat of violence “at the time of the call,” this was distinguishable from a suggestion that she was still facing an “imminent” threat of danger at the time of the subsequent
stabbing. Berriel, 2013 UT 19, ¶ 16 (emphasis omitted).](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:aeh25pysb2rcvipzfijs72gh/bafkreif4ljutvcxarwvwkpnqicxeglvdf4tzmrbuobnrahglf47ibxjiv4)
![¶17 A court may issue a protective order under the Act “[i]f it appears . . . that domestic violence or abuse has occurred” or “that there is a substantial likelihood domestic violence or abuse will occur.” Utah Code § 78B-7-603(1). In the ruling at issue, the Commissioner never referred to domestic violence, instead focusing on abuse, and the parties have followed suit on appeal. In challenging the issuance of the protective order, Green’s principal argument is that there was insufficient evidence to show that abuse had either occurred or was substantially likely to occur. We agree.
¶18 Abuse is defined under the Act as “intentionally or knowingly causing or attempting to cause another individual
physical harm or intentionally or knowingly placing another individual in reasonable fear of imminent physical harm.” Id. § 78B-7-102(1). As noted, Canteros-Alvarez never alleged that Green had actually physically harmed her. Instead, Canteros-Alvarez alleged that Green had abused her by placing her in fear…](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:aeh25pysb2rcvipzfijs72gh/bafkreih5xej3gvmik63kmoluyavobngyijzy37owm65fi4xxhgjvkv5loy)
![Callais does make it very difficult—perhaps almost impossible—to use the VRA to deliberately create majority-minority districts in response to “vote dilution,” which reduces the power of minority voters. Under previous Supreme Court precedent, such districts could be and were created in a wide range of circumstances in which minority influence might otherwise be diluted in the district line-drawing process, even in circumstances where there was no evidence of deliberate racial discrimination.
The VRA enforces the 15th Amendment, which mandates that “[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” The ban on racial discrimination with respect to voting is categorical, and does not make any exception for racial gerrymandering intended to increase minority representation, rather than reduce it.](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:aeh25pysb2rcvipzfijs72gh/bafkreidhseumxiq3mf3dksvqicmorfgchmmg67duzyz6eldcyxyfn6qv44)
![The Court was led to observe that “in view of the current state of international law and of the elements of fact at its disposal, [it] cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake”. The Court added, lastly, that there was an obligation to pursue in good faith and to conclude negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:aeh25pysb2rcvipzfijs72gh/bafkreihx4xc4whfx2ouq7nnwcdj5uqsv3ysksdf5pahaagni7p3fadxgru)
![Introducing her view that “commonsense principles of communication” can sometimes help resolve disputes over the meaning of statutory terms, JUSTICE BARRETT points to
an old chestnut. Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 512, 514 (concurring opinion). Suppose a legislature used the phrase “who-
ever drew blood in the streets” in a criminal statute imposing punishment. As a matter of “common sense,” JUSTICE BARRETT says, it would “‘g[o] without saying’” that the law
doesn’t apply to a surgeon accessing a patient’s vein to save his life. Ibid. That is because the phrase “drew blood” is
susceptible to two conventional idiomatic meanings: one “applicable to violent encounters with man or beast” and
the other “to medical procedures,” A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law 357 (2012) (Scalia & Garner). And any](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:aeh25pysb2rcvipzfijs72gh/bafkreiaadv7eemxtz5twls6kpkqqseqcrazubwzfaubaqmroejcb4ljlym)
![“If the House was at all apprehensive of any wrongful intervention of the Supreme Court … [then] sweep away at once their appellate jurisdiction in all cases, and leave the tribuna, without even the color or appearance of authority for their wrongful intervention.”
And if the Court would not uphold such a jurisdiction-stripping law, the Congress should “defy judicial usurpation by annihilating the usurpers in the abolition of the tribunal.”](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:aeh25pysb2rcvipzfijs72gh/bafkreihi6snwkkpobunseuikaq7d24ni4epcpsq5tl2cjvhnuottseuebi)
Dad. Lawyering in Utah. Occasional pretend scholar. Movies. Books. Lawyer Work: https://www.mc2b.com/taylor-kordsiemon Pretend Scholar Work: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=3465182