Tripartition in English

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French politics in English. youtube.com/@Tripartition https://www.instagram.com/tripartition.en/

🟨 #2026MunicipalElections | How did France vote? 2nd Round results broken down by political blocs in the 20 biggest cities in Metropolitan France (2/2) #municipales2026 #france #elections
🟨 #2026MunicipalElections | How did France vote? 2nd Round results broken down by political blocs in the 20 biggest cities in Metropolitan France (1/2) #municipales2026 #france #elections
🟨 #2026MunicipalElections | In 2020, held hours before the first Covid-19 lockdown, that figure was 34.67%. Turnout at 5pm was 52.36% in 2014 and 54.45% in 2008. #municipales2026 #france #elections
🟨 #2026MunicipalElections | 48.10% of eligible voters had cast their ballots by 5pm according to the Interior Ministry. #municipales2026 #france #elections
How Tripartition uses « nuances politiques » Tripartition does not rely solely on the Interior Ministry’s official classification of lists when presenting results. In our view, these are often opaque, inconsistent, and do not always clearly present the political dynamics at play. In using our own classification, our goal is to make clear the political affiliation of the « tête de liste » (head of the list) as well as the overall political flavour of the list as a whole.
Why are they controversial? Critics argue that as these are determined by the Interior Ministry, they can be manipulated to the advantage of the governing party. The Interior Ministry initially refused to give the NUPES left-wing coalition its own distinctive « nuance politique » in the 2022 legislative elections. Although overruled by the Conseil d’Etat, there remained much controversy over candidates who were not given the nuance, despite being part of the NUPES coalition. This led to Le Monde, a major newspaper, deciding to determine candidates’ political leanings without relying on the official political nuances. This led to a discrepancy in results, where official results saw the NUPES perform worse than in Le Monde’s count.
What are they? 25 « nuances politiques » are used in the 2026 Municipal Elections. These include: Individual party nuances: when lists are officially endorsed by a single political party (e.g. FI, SOC, HOR, REN, LR, RN) Alliance nuances: when lists are jointly backed by at least two parties from the same political bloc (UXG, UG, UC, UD, UXD) Sensitivity nuances: used when a list is supported by a party without its own nuance, crosses bloc boundaries, has no official backing but a clear political leaning, or is running in dissidence from an established party (e.g. EXG, DVG, DVC, DVD, EXD)
What are « nuances politiques » ? Prefects assign each candidate list an official political label in communes of over of 3,500 residents as well as in communes which are capitals of regional administrative divisions (« sous-préfectures »). Why? The idea is to give a clearer national picture of how each political bloc performs at the polls.
What are « nuances politiques » and why are they controversial?
🟨 #2026MunicipalElections | In 2020, held hours before the first Covid-19 lockdown, that figure was 15.29%. Turnout at noon was 19.83% in 2014 and 23.68% in 2008. #municipales2026 #france #elections
🟨 #2026MunicipalElections | 20.33% of eligible voters had cast their ballots by noon according to the Interior Ministry.
« Quincangulaires » = 5-way races 16
« Quadrangulaires » = 4-way races 157
« Triangulaires » = 3-way races 821
« Duels » = 2-way races 548
Communes have already elected a municipal council in the 1st round 96%
Voters eligible to cast their ballots in the 2nd round ~33%
*Lyon: another exception to the norm? Why? French communes are usually organised into larger groupings known as « intercommunalités ». These have different names based on size: you may have heard of « agglomérations » or « métropoles ». These groupings centralise the provision of certain municipal services at a higher level across all the communes in that « intercommunalité » (e.g. public transport). Typically, the « conseillers communautaires » at these levels are drawn (more or less proportionally according to the size of their populations) directly from the municipal councils of participating communes. However, in Lyon, they are elected directly by voters.
*Lyon: another exception to the norm? Voters in Lyon actually cast 3 ballots: 1 for their arrondissement’s councillors 1 for councillors elected to the city-wide municipal council 1 for their metropolitan councillors
Arguments against the reform Risk of instability: reducing the « prime majoritaire » from 50% to 25% increases the risk of there being no majority at the city-wide municipal council, potentially leading to political instability or deadlock. A rushed reform?: contrary to usual practice, the reform was passed and implemented within a year of this year’s municipal election. Added complexity: adding an additional ballot risks confusing voters and adding to logistical difficulties. Several polling stations in Paris had to be moved due to their previous locations being too small to accommodate the new electoral system. Gerrymandering?: some critics argue that the reform is meant to block the left from holding the city. Under the previous electoral system and voting trends, Paris looked set to remain under left-wing control.
Why was this reformed? The city-wide mayor can no longer be elected with only a minority of votes: Similar to ‘swing states’ in the US, several key arrondissements in Paris – which increasingly were becoming more left-wing – held the balance of power, meaning a candidate could become mayor of Paris while receiving fewer total votes city-wide than their opponents. Greater political pluralism: the reduction of the « prime majoritaire » from 50% to 25% at the city-wide municipal council / conseil de Paris level, in theory, allows better representation of smaller parties and could even require cross-party cooperation.
Has this always been the case? No. Prior to reforms to the « loi PLM » implemented in 2025, voters in Paris, Lyon & Marseille used to cast 1 ballot in municipal elections like all other French voters. Their 1 ballot elected their arrondissement councillors. 1/3rd of arrondissement councillors from each arrondissement would then also sit in the city-wide municipal council / Conseil de Paris. Voters in Paris, Lyon and Marseille thus did not directly elect the city-wide municipal council which then went on to elect the cities’ mayors.
Seat allocation & mayoralty Arrondissement Councils in Paris, Lyon & Marseille and Municipal Councils elsewhere in France The list which comes first in the 2nd round (or received 50%+ in the 1st round) is attributed a « prime majoritaire » of 50% of seats. The rest are distributed proportionally. Municipal Councils in Lyon & Marseille and the Conseil de Paris The list which comes first in the 2nd round (or received 50%+ in the 1st round) is attributed a « prime majoritaire » of 25% of seats. The rest are distributed proportionally. The mayor is elected at the first post-election council meeting by councillors
Paris, Lyon & Marseille Each of these 3 cities are divided up into a number of arrondissements. Each with their own mayor and councillors. Voters cast 2 ballots*: 1 for their arrondissement’s councillors 1 for councillors elected to the city-wide municipal council (named « Conseil de Paris » in Paris) Elsewhere in France Cities are not divided up into arrondissements elsewhere in France. Voters cast 1 ballot: for councillors elected to the city-wide municipal council
Why do Paris, Lyon & Marseille vote differently? The « loi PLM » and recent reforms
What’s « technique » about these list mergers? In practice, this means that whilst the elected members from the merged list will help support the election of the (left-wing) mayor at the first municipal council meeting, they will otherwise be sitting with the opposition and not participating in the governing municipal majority. This is made possible by the 50% « prime majoritaire »*, which guarantees the frontrunner list a majority of seats. This means means that, even if some members elected from a merged list opt to sit in the opposition post-election, the mayor will still have a majority at the municipal council to govern. *except in Paris, Lyon and Marseille where it is 25%
What’s « technique » about these list mergers? Owing to the ideological differences between France Unbowed (LFI) and other left-wing parties, these parties have been reluctant to sit together post-election in the same political grouping. However, due to their electoral need to avoid splitting the vote, in many cities they have opted to merge their lists in what is called a « fusion technique ».
Context As detailed in the explainer about « fusions », the electoral system means that whichever list comes first will automatically gain a majority of seats*. Traditionally, a « fusion » at the electoral stage has also meant that members from the merged list would sit and govern together in a single political group at municipal councils if it won the 2nd round. *except in Paris, Lyon and Marseille
fusion technique = = ‘technical’ list mergers (ahead of the 2nd round)
Consequences of the « prime majoritaire » As a result of this, the electoral logic turns into one akin to first-past-the-post (FPTP). The electoral logic for each list is therefore to be first in the 2nd round as this will automatically give them a majority of seats* in the conseil municipal. Merging lists often helps. *except in Paris, Lyon and Marseille
The disproportionate nature of the « prime majoritaire » Example: 2020 Municipal Elections in Annecy
Why merge lists? To combine ideologically similar political forces to strengthen position ahead of the 2nd round of voting. The electoral system gives a « prime majoritaire » to the list that comes first. This means they get 50% of seats + a number proportionally calculated according to their vote share. The « prime majoritaire » in Paris, Lyon and Marseille is now 25%, more on that in another explainer.
Who can merge? Lists that receive more than 10% of votes cast can opt to participate in the 2nd round. Lists that receive at least 5% of votes cast can merge with one of the aforementioned lists.
« fusion » = list mergers (ahead of the 2nd round)
1st round turnout: 57.10%
🟥 #2026MunicipalElections | 1st Round Results in #Nîmes J. Sanchez (National Rally): 30.39%* V. Bouget (Union of the Left): 30.05%* F. Proust (Union of the Right): 19.55%* J. Plantier (Misc. Right): 15.55%* P. Dupretz (France Unbowed): 4.46%
🟥 #2026MunicipalElections | 1st Round Results in #Grenoble A. Carignon (Republican): 27.04%* L. Ruffin (Union of the Left): 26.33%* A. Brunon (France Unbowed): 14.59%* R. Gentil (Public Square): 10.00% H. Gerbi (Horizons): 9.63% V. Gabriac (National Rally): 5.20%
🟥 #2026MunicipalElections | 1st Round Results in #Angers C. Béchu (Union of the Centre): 49.48%* R. Laveau (Union of the Left): 28.71%* A. Saeidi (France Unbowed): 8.20% A. Lahondès (National Rally): 7.92% V. Rambault (Misc.): 3.94%
🟥 #2026MunicipalElections | 1st Round Results in #Dijon N. Koenders (Socialist): 39.13%* E. Bichot (Union of the Right): 25.83%* T. Coudert (Union of the Right for the Republic-National Rally): 12.70%* M. Haberstrau (Union of the Left): 8.56% O. Minard (France Unbowed): 7.73% R. Goguel (Misc.): 4.47%
🟥 #2026MunicipalElections | 1st Round Results in #Villeurbanne C. Van Styvendaal (Union of the Left): 37.94%* J-P. Bret (Dissident Socialist): 17.99%* M. Garabedian (France Unbowed): 17.53%* S. Cruz (Republican-Renaissance): 13.47%* G. Canon (National Rally): 11.65%*
🟥 #2026MunicipalElections | 1st Round Results in #LeHavre E. Philippe (Union of the Centre): 43.76%* J-P. Lecoq (Union of the Left): 33.25%* F. Keller (National Rally): 15.30%* C. Boulogne (France Unbowed): 4.00%
🟥 #2026MunicipalElections | 1st Round Results in #SaintEtienne R. Juanico (Union of the Left): 29.16%* C. Jousserand (National Rally): 18.97%* D. Cinieri (Union of the Right): 16.30%* V. Mercier (France Unbowed): 13.29%* S. Labich (Misc.): 9.36% M. Chassaubene (Misc. Right): 6.72%
🟥 #2026MunicipalElections | 1st Round Results in #Reims A. Robinet (Union of the Right): 43.79%* A-S. Frigout (National Rally): 21.03%* E. Quénard (Union of the Left): 17.97%* S. Lang (Dissident Republican): 7.68% P. Coradel (France Unbowed): 6.88%
🟥 #2026MunicipalElections | 1st Round Results in #Toulon L. Lavalette (National Rally): 42.05%* J. Massi (Misc. Right): 29.54%* M. Bonnus (Republican): 15.71%* M. Brunel (Union of the Left): 8.38% I. Cornil (France Unbowed): 3.82%
🟥 #2026MunicipalElections | 1st Round Results in #Rennes N. Appéré (Union of the Left): 34.53%* C. Compagnon (Union of the Centre): 22.47%* M. Mesmeur (France Unbowed): 18.61%* J. Masson (National Rally): 6.67% T. Rousseau (Republican): 6.30% U. Rabaté (Dissident France Unbowed): 5.07%
🟥 #2026MunicipalElections | 1st Round Results in #Lille A. Deslandes (Socialist): 26.26%* L. Addouche (France Unbowed): 23.36%* S. Baly (Ecologist): 17.75%* V. Spillebout (Union of the Centre): 11.14%* M. Valet (National Rally): 10.92%* L. Delemer (Republican): 8.46%
🟥 #2026MunicipalElections | 1st Round Results in #Bordeaux P. Humic (Union of the Left): 27.68%* T. Cazenave (Union of the Centre): 25.58%* P. Dessertine (Misc. Centre): 20.16%* N. Raymond (France Unbowed): 9.36% J. Rechagneux (National Rally): 7.02% P. Poutou (New Anti-Capitalist Party): 5.14%
🟥 #2026MunicipalElections | 1st Round Results in #Strasbourg C. Trautmann (Socialist): 25.93%* J-P. Vetter (Union of the Right): 24.23%* J. Barseghian (Union of the Left): 19.72%* F. Kobryn (France Unbowed): 12.03%* V. Joron (National Rally): 7.00% P. Jakubowicz (Union of the Centre): 5.10%
🟥 #2026MunicipalElections | 1st Round Results in #Montpellier M. Delafosse (Union of the Left): 33.41%* N. Oziol (France Unbowed): 15.36%* M. Altrad (Misc. Centre): 11.31%* P. Saurel (Misc. Left): 8.86% R. Gaillard (Misc.): 8.21% I. Perrein (Misc. Right): 7.50%
🟥 #2026MunicipalElections | 1st Round Results in Nantes J. Rolland (Union of the Left): 35.24%* F. Chombart de Lauwe (Misc. Right): 33.77%* W. Aucant (France Unbowed): 11.20%* M. Belhamiti (Misc. Centre): 8.12% M. Medkour (Misc. Left): 5.53% J-C. Hulot (National Rally): 4.57%